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Abstract
This study examines the road to statehood for the Zionist and Palestinian
movements. There are three components which frame this investigation: 1. social
movements and the practices in which they engage that are aimed at establishing
statehood for a people; 2. distinctive configurations of the international system and the
manner in which both the material and ideational foundations of that system pulls units
towards conformity and predictable behavior; and finally, 3. the role of agency, that is,
the way in which instrumentally rational individuals attempt to push the structure in
which they are embedded towards a configuration that is better suited to their interests
and objectives
The most influential factor guiding these struggles for national liberation are those
forces which emanate from the prevailing structure of the international system. Not only
was it demonstrated that the established material and ideational preferences of existing
states have strong bearing on a movement’s ideological orientation and by consequence
its chosen course of struggle, but hegemonic order configurations also define political
cleavages and in so doing present movement leaders with both tactical and strategic
opportunities by harnessing or exploiting those cleavages. From the agency perspective,
the cases showed that the leadership of each movement was highly influential in the
determination of a movement’s success or failure.
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Chapter I:
Introduction

Research Puzzle
Since the destruction of ancient Jerusalem by Roman legions in 70 CE, Jews the
world over had maintained the dream of one day returning to their ancestral homeland.
Yet, despite being relegated to the status of second-class citizen in the countries where
they sought refuge, and in spite of repeated episodes of often violent persecution, over the
centuries no serious effort towards the fulfillment of this dream was ever undertaken. It is
therefore interesting that when in the nineteenth century several geographically,
linguistically, and temporally disconnected ideologues proposed the active pursuit of
such an endeavor, that these appeals obtained the level of critical mass within the Jewish
communities of Europe. All the more intriguing is that what began in 1882 with an
impetuous journey by fourteen impassioned university students intent on establishing an
agricultural community in Palestine, soon transpired into a full-fledged movement for
national liberation. This movement would go on to fulfill that millennia-old dream with
the establishment of the State of Israel sixty-six years later; declaring independence on
May 15, 1948.
What was the realization of a dream for world Jewry, however, quickly transpired
into a nightmare for the Arab inhabitants of Palestinian. Shocked by the rapid influx of
1

Jewish immigrants and the corresponding transformation of that land into a burgeoning
Jewish community, the call for establishing an independent Arab state in Palestine was all
but assured. Towards this end, Palestinians have enjoyed a great deal of material and
ideational support from regional allies as well as global powers. In addition, they have
benefited significantly from an outpouring of public sympathy, both at home and abroad.
It is therefore perplexing that in the course of some 100 years of struggle the Palestinian
people have not been able to seize their rightful position as an equal member among the
community of nations.
The success of the Zionist movement in achieving statehood is an exceptional
case: the vast majority of Jews did not live Palestine; the movement did not enjoy
widespread backing, not from world Jewry nor from the international community; and
although the movement was able to make some land purchases, it was only able to muster
scant material resources. These are all conditions that would ostensibly point to the
movement’s inevitable failure. Conversely, the Palestinian movement for national
liberation presents an exceptional case as well in that the Palestinians have not yet
attained independent statehood despite possession of territory, an abundance of both
material and moral support, and repeated confirmation of their legal right to do so by the
international community.
Taken together, the contradictions presented by these two cases raise a puzzling
question: Why is it that one national liberation movement attained their goal of statehood
while the other movement has not yet reached that status? More specifically, how was it
that the Zionist movement was able to forge international conditions conducive to the
establishment of a Jewish state and that, when presented with the pivotal opportunity to
2

do so, the Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion was able to sufficiently mobilize world Jewry
towards this end while the Palestinian Organization leader Yasser Arafat, when facing a
similarly favorable structural alignment and a comparable level of internal mobilization
was not able to bring about the establishment of an independent State of Palestinian?

National Liberation
Struggles for national liberation have been waged on every corner of the globe, by
every categorization of people, and in every era (Beary, 2008; Armatige, 2007). Only a
small percentage of these struggles have acquired the sustained attention of the
international community and even fewer are likely to ever achieve their goal of
independent statehood. What is it that accounts for such disparity? Is it a particular
configuration of the attitudes, interests, institutional regimes, and established alliance
structures of the international order that allow a given movement to rise, persist, and
ultimately achieve its stated goal? Or is it the abilities, actions, and accessible resources
of the movements themselves that determine the outcome of struggles for national
liberation? Put another way, is it international structure that dictates the outcome of
struggles for national liberation? Is it the agency of the movement itself that determines
its fate? Or is it some combination of the two?
The majority of explanations for national liberation movement success focus on
those accounts that place emphasis on internal factors such as the role of leadership,
organizational efficiency and/or the movement’s capacity to mobilize resources and to
marshal those resources towards the movement’s immediate and long-term objectives
(Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000). In fact, among social movement theorists conventional
3

wisdom holds that the attainment of statehood rests firmly within the movement itself and
the pressure it can bring to bear on the target state. Group size, ethnic unity, resource
availability, recruitment capabilities, violence and attrition strategies, and political
prowess are most often postulated to be essential ingredients in the ‘quest for statehood’
recipe (Lim, 2010: 262-3). This suggests that agency and the movement’s composition
are the determinate factors. Can this really be? Certainly twenty-five million Kurds
would argue that size cannot be the crucial determining factor, nor would have Yugoslav
Partisans agreed that ethnic unity was the essential determinant in their favor. Exactly
what resources were mobilized against the Raj? Did violence in any way contribute to
Czech independence? Could one honestly consider Kosovo’s independence to be the
result of KLA political prowess or does great power preference provide a better
explanation?
Given a wealth of empirical evidence suggesting that internal forces may not be
the only factors responsible for determining national liberation movement success
(Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000), others have sought causation in those forces that are
external to the group (e.g. Miller and Kagan, 1997). Often such explanations focus on the
interests and inclinations of seminal external actors. The role of NATO in bringing about
statehood for the newly independent states of the former Yugoslavian Republic is a good
example of how external actors can be the crucial factor. The same could be said for the
case of East Timor where attainment of statehood could not have been possible without
the backing of western governments and the support of the United Nations. That East
Timorese independence was delayed by over 25 years, moreover, points to yet another
level of external constraints; that of the international system. Undeniably, configurations
4

of the international political order have a tremendous (but not necessarily decisive)
impact on the outcome of national liberation movements. In the case of East Timor, it
was a Cold War alignment wherein Indonesia’s reluctance to see the establishment of an
independent communist government within the archipelago was defended by means of
harsh repressive policies—policies that were supported by the anti-communist West.
Consistent with these accounts, both internal and external explanations figure
prominently in the descriptions of Zionism’s success and the Palestinian’s frustrated
aspirations. In fact, the Zionist and Palestinian movements provide an exceptional
opportunity for analysis of both system effects and the role of agency on national
liberation movement success or failure by presenting a study of two movements with
historical attachments to, and vying for the same parcel of land in a dispute shaped by
nearly identical hegemonic actors.1 These ‘mirror-image’ conflict characteristics are
buttressed by the fact that both peoples were inspired by socialist-rooted, secularnationalist ideologies and found solidarity in charismatic leaders who stood at the head of
umbrella organizations with worldwide operations. Both movements, moreover,
experienced factional splits on the basis of cultural-religious philosophies, as well as the
tactical means of obtaining their strategic objective. Given these identical characteristics,
it is puzzling that one group was able to achieve the objective of statehood while the
other was not. Nevertheless, when one begins unpacking the idiosyncrasies of each
movement and the structure in which it was embedded, clarification of the causes of these
different outcomes begins to come into view.
1

Aside from China, all of the great powers have played pivotal roles in both the Zionist and Palestinian
bids for statehood. Moreover, each movement successfully captured the attention of an attentive
international public, while the role of regional powers has been instrumental in directing the course and
outcome of each peoples’ struggle.
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With reference to Zionism, among the most pervasive explanations for the
movement’s success stems from the claim that the Holocaust was the singular most
important factor allowing for the formation of the State of Israel (Segev, 2000). However,
the claim that the Zionists would not have prevailed in obtaining their state in the absence
of such a horrific genocide, while logically compelling, is highly dubious. In fact, the
empirical record demonstrates that a variety of additional forces were at play. For
example, from a structural perspective it was the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
subsequent rise of Great Britain as the regional hegemon in the wake of WWI that
afforded Zionist leaders with the vital opening needed to establish a critical foothold in
Palestine. Similarly, British decline after WWII, the rise of the US hegemony, fears of
Soviet expansionalism in the Middle East, and Arab underestimation of Zionist
capabilities were all important forces that provided the requisite structural space for the
movement’s attainment of statehood.
Complementing these externally derived sources of Zionism’s success are those
narratives that emphasize the role of agency. Most notable among these are those
accounts that highlight the detailed planning of Theodor Herzl, the tireless labors and
diplomatic skill of Chaim Weizmann, and the calculating yet charismatic leadership of
David Ben-Gurion. Other explanations assign credit to Jewish militant groups and the
wave of violence they perpetrated on British assets. From this perspective it is claimed
that it was Jewish terrorism that effectively raised the cost of British occupation resulting
in battle fatigue and ultimately the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine. Finally,
there are those accounts that attribute Zionism’s success to the efforts of influential
members of the American Jewish community who through political action were able to
6

secure the Truman Administration’s support for the establishment of the Jewish state
(Snetsinger, 1974).
Palestinian inability to achieve statehood on the other hand, is most commonly
attributed to the bi-polar geopolitical configuration that defined political relations
throughout the Cold War and the resulting Israeli-Arab wars that prevented the
emergence of an independent Palestinian leadership. Such explanations assert that it was
the superpowers’ reluctance to aggravate their oil-rich Arab client states, their keen desire
to avoid direct confrontation in the region, and in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War,
America’s unwavering support for the State of Israel that prevented the formation of a
Palestinian state. Buttressing these system-level explanations are those that look to the
effects of local external influences, and as a result, place the blame for Palestinian failure
squarely in the hands of Arab states and inter-Arab politics. For example, as Sayigh and
Shlaim observed, “the absence of even a semblance of Arab unity [throughout the Cold
War] deprived the PLO its main means to build international consensus on the Palestine
issue” (1997: 142).
Like Zionist success, Palestinian disappointment finds explanation in the internal
dimension as well. Geographically dispersed as a result of al Nakba—the ‘great
catastrophe’ of 1948—the Palestinian leadership was initially unable to mobilize the
Palestinian people towards the aims of a mass movement. As a consequence, the fate of
Palestinian statehood came to rest in the hands of Cairo throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
In the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, however, Yasser Arafat was able to seize the helm
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization through the promotion of revolutionary
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struggle, and in turn, establish an indigenous movement for national liberation
independent of external control.
A skilled tactician, Arafat not only demonstrated the capacity to successfully
confront Israeli forces, but in doing so, mobilized the Palestinian masses towards the aim
of statehood while concomitantly fostering international sympathy for the Palestinian
cause. Yet despite these notable achievements, the nature of the regime established by
Arafat cultivated ideological divisions and political fractionalization. As As’ad Ghanem
points out in Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Liberation Movement,
aside from Israeli opposition to an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem, it was
“the rise of Hamas as an alternative to the PLO, and the consequent emergence of a
struggle within the Palestinian leadership…[that] caused the failure of the Palestinian
national liberation movement” (2010: 18-19). Nevertheless, the single most cofounding
factor frustrating the Palestinian’s advance and final achievement of de jure recognition
has been the condition of occupation and the Israeli government’s official policy vis-à-vis
Palestinian statehood.

Research Orientation and Study Structure
When seeking insight into struggles for national liberation, it is common practice
to focus on the conflict’s dynamics—those seemingly intractable positions that separate
the warring parties, the barriers that frustrate efforts to reach a compromise, and the dayto-day events that direct and ultimately structure the course of hostilities. The inclination
to pay particular attention to these characteristics is natural, after all it is these daily and
ongoing disputes that dominate news headlines and present themselves as the most
8

obvious path to the conflict’s resolution. If for example, Israel would just stop building
settlements we could finally address the key issue of territorial boundaries. If Palestinians
would just stop inflicting violence on Israeli citizens, Israelis would feel secure and thus
more amenable to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Or if the United States would
merely step up and take a strong leadership role, the parties could be coaxed into signing
a comprehensive and lasting peace accord. Surely if we could just resolve these and other
core issues that lie at the heart of the conflict, this line of thinking goes, then peaceful
resolution would certainly follow.
With regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would be easy to write yet
another treatise that perpetuates the viewpoints held by one side over the other. I could
illustrate how it is Israeli occupation policy that stands in the way of a reasonable
settlement. Alternatively I could demonstrate how it is Palestinian terrorism and allied
rocket attacks that are the primary barriers to peace. I could argue that on the basis of
historical, religious, or legal grounds that one side has a more legitimate claim to the land
than the other. Or I could look inward to declare that it is domestic politics that stands in
the way of the conflict’s resolution. Alternatively, I could look outward to find evidence
for the claim that it is external sympathies, interests, and strategic calculations that are the
principal reasons the conflict persists today.
Seeking to gain greater insight into the Gordian Knot that is the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict while avoiding the propensity to over emphasize the symptomatic and strategic
positions adopted by the opposing parties throughout the conflict’s long and ongoing
existence, I turn attention away from the particularities that have come to define the
conflict to instead focus on the unique characteristics of the parties themselves and the
9

ways they interact within the structures in which they are rooted. This is not, therefore, a
study into contentious issues or even the dynamics processes that unfold between parties
engaged in hostilities. In fact, this study is not about relations between warring parties at
all. Instead, it is an investigation into individual movements for national liberation
viewed in relation to system-level influences rather than local conflict dynamics
(although admittedly some attention will be given to these dynamics when the results of
their effects are systemic). The definitive objective is the identification of both structural
and internal forces that in their interaction drive, guide and ultimately determine the
outcome of struggles for national liberation with the aim of marshaling these insights
towards the objective of peace. In this sense, the Zionist and Palestinian experiences will
serve as the basis for comparative analysis.
There are three components that frame this investigation: 1. social movements and
the practices in which they engage that are aimed at establishing statehood for a people;
2. distinctive configurations of the international system and the manner in which both the
material and ideational foundations of that system pulls units towards conformity and
predictable behavior; and finally, 3. the role of agency, that is, the way in which
instrumentally rational individuals attempt to push the structure in which they are
embedded towards a configuration that is better suited to their interests and objectives. In
the following chapter, I unpack the literature addressing each of these components to
reveal the significant roles they play in the determination of a national liberation
movement’s success or failure. I will hence extract from that review key variables
thought to be indicative of a national liberation movement’s rise, course, and outcome
within the context of a systems-level analysis.
10

In chapter three, I establish a theoretical framework and methodology to guide
this investigation. The central aim will be to construct a matrix for evaluating the process
of national liberation with an eye towards testing the supposition that it is the particular
alignment of attitudes, elite strategies, states’ interests, established institutions and
regimes, and the prevailing alliance structure of any given international system that
allows a given movement to rise, persist, and ultimately achieve its stated goal. At the
same time, the framework will allow us to appraise the assertion that it is the abilities,
actions, and accessible resources of the movements themselves that are more determinate
of their fate. In the end, the theoretical framework established in chapter three will
provide an avenue for answering the questions: what instruments are made available to
national liberation movement members when engaging with the international system?
With these instruments in mind, to what degree is it that agency of the movement itself is
responsible for movement advancement and struggle outcomes. Or alternatively, are the
forces emanating from the international structure so strong that the fate of any given
national liberation movement is sealed from the outset?
Towards this end, the third chapter will also lay out an inventory of factors that
indicate the impact of agency and a separate inventory indicating the influences of
structural forces. Once these lists are clearly defined, the second step of this process
entails the development of a method for evaluation and assigning measure to the force of
each indicator. For example, by defining parameters such, “central to the movement
achieving its objective” as having a ‘very strong impact.’ or “gave the movement an
advantage toward the attainment of its objective” as being strongly influential or “had no
impact on the movement abilities to achieve its objective,” as having a low impact and so
11

on; it will be possible to establish a list of the forces that are expected to be essential to
the quest for statehood recipe and those factors that are expected to be marginally
important, have no impact, or to have negative effects.
Putting these indicators into play, the third step of this approach involves
unraveling the historical record to, a) establish the movement’s immediate and long-term
objectives, b) ascertain the degree to which these objective had been achieved, and c)
discover the force or forces that were determinate of that outcome. This will be the
central undertaking of chapters four and five. Mining the historiographies of first the
Zionist movement and then the Palestinian movement, the study is inductive in its
orientation and employs a heuristic methodology. The purpose of employing a heuristic
approach is to discover, by developing an empathetic feel for each case, the texture of
each movement and the forces of causation that allowed them advance their respective
bids for statehood. In doing so, the chapters provide the raw material for evaluating the
role of the influential variables extracted from the literature review and incorporated in
the theoretical framework.
Guided by the theoretical framework and indicators established therein, chapter
six takes on the final step in this process of heuristic investigation by evaluating the
causal force of each indicator in the emergence, drive, and ultimate outcome of a national
liberation struggles. The task will be to view each indicator in isolation to evaluate its
influence on the movements’ ability to attain its various objectives (e.g. movement
validation, international recognition, and sovereign affirmation). Although ascertaining
an exact measure of influence for each variable is idealistic and untenable, a comparison
of the two cases will allow us to discover which forces were essential to movement
12

advancement, which were helpful, and which did not matter at all. In the end, this process
will allow us to either confirm or reject the hypotheses thoroughly enough to contribute
practical insights into national liberation movement processes and outcomes with the aim
of stimulating similar work grounded in an understanding of the constraining and
facilitating forces of international structure. Finally, this chapter will conclude by
evaluating both the benefits and limits of this study.

13

Chapter II:
Perspectives on Struggles for National Liberation

Questions
What is it that accounts for the emergence and ultimate success or failure of
national liberation struggles? Is it structural pressures brought about by international
norm development (Bercovitch et al, 1997) and economic modernization (Skocpol,
1979)? Or is success/failure the result of elite disaffection (Crenshaw, 1981) and elite
competition (Horowitz, 1985)? Does the presence of natural resources have a
contributing effect; resulting in the emergence and persistence of ‘conflict entrepreneurs’
who are motivated primarily by greed (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin,
2003) or ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ who are able to successfully integrate greed with
grievance to foster support from aggrieved populations (Lipschutz and Crawford, 1998)?
Alternatively, could it be that great power interests rather than group characteristics and
capabilities are the decisive factors—determining both the conflict’s course and its
ultimate outcome (O’Leary and Triman, 2007:9)?
A large number of accounts explaining the fate of nationalist movements have
been put forth, yet to date no unified understanding has been devised. Despite this
impasse, I intend to demonstrate that progress towards a general theory of national
liberation movement success can be made by recognizing and deciphering the impact of
14

defining indicators of success or failure common to all national liberation struggles. At
this initial stage, I suggest that these include a leadership’s ability to forge unity of
purpose among a specifically defined populace, the capacity of that populace to amass a
requisite amount of both ideational and material resources, and the movement’s political
aptitude for effectively marshalling those resources as an instrument for overcoming
externally imposed barriers to statehood. These barriers in turn constitute a second set of
indicators that may be determinate of movement’s success or failure; that is, the existing
composition of structural conditions. These involve consideration of existing state wishes
and especially great power interests, the constitution of international society and its
prevailing attitude towards self-determination, and unalterable environmental conditions
such as geography and the availability of natural resources.

Literature Review
At its core, the questions defining the parameters of this study are: how is it that
peoples become nations, and in particular, how is it that nations become states?
Accordingly, and following the guidance established above, the following literature
review examines what is known or thought to be known about the success and failure of
struggles for national liberation. On the one hand this will entail an assessment of social
movements; how they are formed and under what conditions they succeed. What is it that
accounts for their persistence, the tactics they choose to employ, and to what extent is
leadership responsible for the achievement of their aims? On the other hand, this
undertaking demands an evaluation of the literature appraising the role of external forces:
the specific configurations of the ideational, political, and strategic orders in which
15

particular movements take place and the associated interests which sustain and drive
those orders. All told, the questions which frame this study properly lend themselves to
analysis within an agent/structure framework; examination of which will be pursued in
the following chapter.
In what is arguably the most comprehensive and authoritative study on
independence movements, at the turn of the century Ted Robert Gurr declared that the
tsunami of ethnic and nationalist conflicts that swept across much of the world in the
wake of World War II and throughout the 1990s had largely abated (2000: xiii). As the
large number of case studies focused on individual independence movements reveal,
there is good reason to have confidence in Gurr’s assessment. From Panama to Palau, the
twentieth century witnessed resolution to the bulk of the world’s national liberation
struggles. Independence movements motivated by colonial resentment in much of Africa
and Asia or by anti-imperialist fervor such as those in Cuba and the rest of Latin America
have, for the most part, been entirely resolved. Whether based in nationalist zeal such as
the many anti-Portuguese movements of the 1960s and 1970s, ethnically centered as
those in the former Yugoslav Republic, religiously driven as for example in Bangladesh,
or externally imposed as was the case in East Timor, the twentieth century witnessed the
attainment of sovereign independence for nearly 120 peoples and the realization of
political autonomy for dozens of others.
Some of these successes were achieved through bloody civil wars (as in Algeria),
some through non-violent transitions (as was the case with the Velvet Revolutions of the
1990s). Many were elitist-led (Indonesia), others the result of spontaneous popular
uprisings (Korea). Sometimes statehood required outside intervention (East Timor and
16

Kosovo), at other times independence resulted because of outside intervention
(Moldova). All told, the international community grew from approximately 82
recognized sovereign states in 1899 to 196 in the year 20142—this achievement in spite
of a moderate rate of state extinction.
Despite this optimistic outlook, Gurr and others forewarned that where conflict
had become deeply entrenched, veterans of ethnic and nationalist movements would
continue to challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of targeted states with
intensified vigor, endurance, and popularity (Gurr, 2000: xv and, Ganguly & MacDuff,
2003: 10). Indeed, although several groups accepted political compromises (the
Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Free Aceh Movement for example), or in at
least one case have been crushed by government forces (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam), the vast majority of the 21st century’s unresolved independence movements have
become evermore unwavering in their demands. As Dov Lynch observes, the result has
been the emergence of “frozen conflicts [that] have produced an impasse of volatile
stability” (in Beary, 2008: 105). Pointing to further reason for concern, David Armitage’s
statistical study on the rise of movements for national liberation found strong correlation
between the emergence of said movements and moments of hegemonic decline (2007:
110).

2

The exact number of recognized sovereign states is difficult to pinpoint. As Worldatalas.com notes,
“Many sources offer different answers.” This may be due to political bias and/or issues related to
definition. See: http://geography.about.com/cs/countries/a/numbercountries.htm. Retrieved December 28,
2014.
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The Role of Social Movements
Sidney Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges by people with
common purpose and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and
authorities” (1994 3-4). In the earliest literature, these groups were seen as irrational,
hysterical, and invariably as threatening entities (Blumer, 1939). Within this collectivebehaviorist perspective, social movement participants were viewed as “intensely
disconnected [and] wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking”
(Hoffer, 1951: 7) and thus amounted to nothing more than anomalous political
phenomena. With the emergence of social movements peopled by highly educated and
economically well-off participants pressing for the expansion of civil rights, social
justice, and withdraw from Vietnam, the view of social movements as being comprised of
socially unstable and alienated malcontents gave way to structural accounts on the one
hand, and rationalist and cultural explanations on the other (Garner, 1997: 5).
This rational actor/structural strain approach, the approach adopted here, seeks to
understand the passage from structural configurations that give rise to conditions for
change to movement mobilization and action by accounting for the effects of culture,
politics, and rationality (Canel, 1997). In line with this view, Lipsky (1970), Jenkins and
Perrow (1977), McAdam (1982) and others have observed that “the timing and fate of
movements are largely dependent upon the opportunities afforded to activists by changes
on the broader political system or structure.” Elaborating on this concept, Tarrow coined
the term political opportunity structure: “consistent—but not necessarily formal,
permanent or national—dimensions of the political environment that either encourage or
discourage people from using collective action” (1994: 18).
18

Whereas the political opportunity structure within which individual struggles for
independence take place form one dimension of the national liberation puzzle, the role of
agency forms the other. As Eduardo Canel (1997) points out, it is rational leaders who
“identify and define grievances, develop a group sense, devise strategies, and facilitate
mobilization” and in so doing, play an instrumental role in the success or failure of
individual social movements. In fact, the view taken here and around which this literature
review is focused is that agency plays as much a role in the formulation of structure (and
is thereby also determinate of movement success/failure) as do forces external to the
movement and its capabilities. This is what McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly have identified
as a soft structuralism approach—the idea that structures are contingent rather than
strictly determined in the sense that they are seen as being sensitive to the nuances of
political [and other] processes (1997: 145).

According to Tarrow, it is the specific configuration of a given political
opportunity structure that provides the impetus for social movements. As he puts it,
”Social movements form when ordinary citizens, sometimes encouraged by leaders,
respond to changes in opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal
potential allies, and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable” (1994: 18).
Building upon this theme, in their empirical study of new social movements in Western
Europe Kriesi et al (1995) identified four determinates of movement emergence: 1)
National Cleavage Structures—established political conflicts between the center and the
periphery, religious groups, urban dwellers and rural populaces, and/or economic classes;
2) Institutional Structures—specifically the strength of formal political institutions (i.e.
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the state), established informal procedures, and the potential for mobilization in said
environment; 3) Prevailing Elite Strategies—categorized as exclusive (repressive,
confrontational, and polarizing) or inclusive (facilitative, cooperative, and assimilative);
and 4) Available Alliance Structures—the configuration of power within a given political
system, the availability of influential allies, and existing cleavages among elites.
In sum, their research demonstrated that countries with weak institutional
structures that are relatively open, democratic, and possess political cultures that are
facilitative, cooperative, and assimilative provide the greatest potential for social
movement success. Moreover, the authors found that “salient traditional cleavages can be
quite constraining…” (25) and that preoccupation with traditional struggles prevent new
movements from entering the political arena.
Upon first glance, these observations are seemingly counterintuitive; at least as
they pertain to struggles for national liberation. If for example, the opportunity structure
in which a nationalist group finds itself is defined as democratic, open, and facilitative,
than why should it be necessary that a national liberation movement emerge in the first
place? Would it not be more productive to merely assert one’s rights and demands
through available democratic and facilitative political processes? On the other hand, to
say that salient traditional cleavages are so constraining as to override any endeavor to
insert a new narrative into the political arena is to fundamentally misunderstand the
impetus for national independence. As David Carment observes, it is the “systematic
denial of minority aspirations, goals, values, and needs” and their overall mistreatment
that gives rise to violent conflicts and calls for self-determination (2003: 29).
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Yet, despite what on the face of it seems to be a disconnect between Kriesi’s
findings and empirical observations of national liberation movement emergence, one
should not be so quick to dismiss the Kriesi et al indicators. This is because Kriesi and his
colleagues confined their study to the emergence of social movements within individual
countries and therefore did not take into account the high-minded ambitions of national
liberation movements and the unique do-or-die circumstances under which they take
place. More fundamentally, they did not take recognition of the fact that struggles for
national liberation are pursed not within any individual state, but are rather the product of
movement interaction with the international community as a whole. It is therefore not
national structures that are determinative, but rather, international ones.
Accordingly, this study will draw extensively on the Kriesi et al indicators of
movement emergence and success, yet with a view to struggle between movement and
international structure rather than national structures. Thus instead of speaking of
national cleavages, I will examine the effects of international cleavages: ideological
divisions between pluralists and solidarists for example; or separation between
hegemonic interests and the interest of less powerful states. Likewise, rather than
focusing solely on national institutional constraints, primary consideration will be given
to international institutional structures and the procedural processes they demand.
Similarly, when we speak of elite strategies it will states’ foreign policies and their
cumulative approach to self-determination that will be of interest. Finally, it is not
national power structures that will be the primary focus, but rather international and
regional power structures and the effects of those structure on a movement’s ability to
either rally allies and/or exploit preexisting cleavage among Member States.
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Leadership

Traditional works on group leadership have focused on typologies and styles of
individual leaders (e.g. Weber, 1945; Downton, 1966; Blondel, 1987) primarily in
relation to problems of collective action (Olson, 1965) and resource mobilization (Tilly,
1977). Dovetailing these approaches are more contemporary studies that tend to focus on
the process of leadership and the choice of violent or non-violent strategies (Van Acker,
2004; Misra, 2001: 21-22). Highlighting the possibility that the task-orientated choices
taken by a leadership are crucial to determining a movement’s success or failure
(Aminzade et al, 2001: 152), these studies underscore a simple yet key aspect of all social
movements: that said movements are peopled by individuals. As McCarthy and Zald
(1973), point out, within social movement organizations it is a relatively small group of
people—leadership in particular—that is entirely responsible for movement success. It is
leadership, for example, that mobilizes people, money, and other resources (Burklin,
1990: 9), and it is leaders who identify grievances, develop group identity, devise
strategies, and facilitate mobilization by reducing opportunity costs though strategies of
collective action (Canel, 1997).
Forming the rational core of national liberation movements, successful attainment
of statehood is largely dependent upon the leadership’s actions and its ability to capitalize
on preexisting conditions in order to unify the group, fan the flames of discontent, and
create within the minds of its followers the image of an independent state wherein group
interests will be safeguarded (Wood 1981: 123). In support of these objectives,
recruitment and mobilization have been deemed crucial (Reagan and Norton, 2005: 326).
Accordingly, in the drive to sustain group solidarity while concomitantly maintaining the
22

leadership’s position as the dominate faction, scholars have pointed to the importance of
recruitment and the effects of elitist leadership preferences (Jackson and Rosberg 1984),
the ability to exploit geography (Gates, 2003: 113), the exile of rival factions (Sayigh,
1997), the recruiting effectiveness of particular ideologies around which groups are
organized (Cash, 1989), the composition of peer groups (Sageman, 2004), and/or the
group’s long-term and short-term objectives (Weinstein, 2003). Upon closer inspection,
however, it becomes evident that these capabilities may be more the product of the
decisionmaking structure in which leaders operate (Aminzade et al: 154) and as
comprised within the movement’s organizational constitution (US Army: 2007).
Focus on organizational structure has centered on the influences of preexisting
social networks (Munson, 2001) and whether the group was founded upon religious unity
or nationalist solidarity. Whereas religiously-based movements typically take the form of
dispersed cell- networks, nearly all nationalist movements are hierarchically structured
(ibid: 2-3,7). In contrast to contemporary popular thought, O’Leary and Silke (2007)
found that hierarchically structured nationalist movements (be they secular, ethnic and/or
Marxist) are better equipped to carrying out coordinated actions and are thus more prone
to use violence than are religious-based groups (2007: 398). This has been attributed to
the fact that hierarchically structured organizations allow for better use of skillspecialization and coordinated action (US Army, 2007: 7) and evidence indicating that
hierarchy gives rise to asocial fractionalization among elites (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:
24). In turn it has been found that fractionalization and the violence it gives rise to
weakens in-group support (Misra, 2001: 22) and perpetuates state an advantage within
competitive atmospheres (Gates, 2002: 122). Accordingly, leadership objectives may be
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more dependent upon its capabilities vis-à-vis the state than on its professed grievance
(Buhaug, 2006: 705), while the prospects for peaceful outcomes are often a function of a
leadership’s longevity and its propensity to use violence (Chiozza and Choi, 2003).
Taking cues from these accounts, it can be surmised that fractionalization just
may be the single greatest barrier to effective leadership. While hierarchically ordered
movements facilitate efficient task-oriented action by making good use of diverse skill
sets, where hierarchical decisionmaking structures deny equality of voice among elites
the potential breakdown of unified leadership and in-group solidarity is high. Movement
success then, may be a function of group cohesion, institutional strength, and ability of
strong and charismatic leaders to maintain elite solidarity towards these ends. In addition,
success appears to be contingent upon the leadership’s ability to exploit specialized-skills
and to direct and deploy these and other group resources in a most effective manner. That
is to say, in a manner that most efficiently brings the political opportunity structure into a
configuration that is conducive to statehood.

Violent and Non-violent Strategies

Aside from group formation and mobilization, the leaders of national liberation
movements have two definitive objectives: creating the de facto conditions of statehood
in pursuit of de jure recognition. Towards these ends and as Martha Crenshaw
demonstrates, violence alone is rarely enough to produce conditions for success (1996,:
260) and groups attempting such a strategy often bring about their own demise (O’Leary
and Silke, 2007). Notable examples include the Shining Path’s recalcitrant anti-populist
behavior (Misra, 2001: 22), the PLO’s inability to produce tangible gains through
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violence (Sayigh: 18), and the Tamil Tigers’ stubborn pursuit of a totalitarian strategy
(Ross, 2009). In like fashion, states relying exclusively on military force seldom bring
about a group’s defeat (Jones and Libicki, 2008: 42).3 In fact, violent retaliatory strategies
are more likely to bolster in-group solidarity (Ibid: xvii) as was witnessed in the case of
British forces in Northern Ireland or the reaction to Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon
and in the Palestinian territories.
Scholarly accounts of strategic choice point to variety of overriding
considerations that may or may not result in rational calculations to engage in violence.
Primary among these point to regime type (Jebb et al, 2006: 130); the level, degree, and
accountability of democratic state institutions (Van England and Rudolph, 2008;
Giulliano, 2006); the available mechanisms for peaceful protest (Misra, 2001: 19);
political will (Rudolph, 2008: 182); balance of capabilities (Younis, 2000: 13-19;
Crenshaw, 1978: 103-108); and the number of contending parties (Walter, 2006a).
Strategies of violence are thus probable where the state is engaged in democratic
transition (Kivimak and Thornig, 2002; O’Leary and Silke: 419), the group believes the
state will make concessions (Walter, 2006b) and/or when the state believes it can achieve
‘peace with war’ (Wickramasinghe, 2009).
Conversely, empirical studies have demonstrated that negotiated peace is likely to
be pursued by strong democracies (Dayton and Kriesberg, 2009: 117), where territory is
separable (Wood, 1981: 112) and participants have become locked into a ‘mutually
hurting stalemate’ (Zartman, 1993) leading to ‘war weariness’ (Mason and Fett, 1996) as
a result of a protracted conflict (Mason et al, 1999). These observations draw attention to
3

Of the 648 groups in existence between 1968 and 2000 the authors found that only 7% were resolved by
force (19).
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the importance of a movement’s pursuit of diplomatic strategies; both in the formal realm
and as a means of influencing public opinion. As Horowitz found, “whether a
secessionist movement will achieve its aims…is determined largely by international
politics, by the balance of interests, and forces beyond the state” (1985: 230): In other
words, by external forces.
Because ultimately a national liberation movement’s aim is to achieve recognition
of its cause as legitimate within the eyes of external audiences, it is incumbent upon a
movement’s leadership to rally those forces that have not as yet recognized the
movement’s legitimate legal status by whatever means available. One of the most
effective tools for accomplishing this objective is through the implementation of an
armalite and ballot box strategy (Maillot, 2005: 25). Although seemingly contradictory,
when employed in tandem the deployment of these two tactics—violence on the one hand
and formal diplomacy and the pursuit of political processes on the other—have strong
potential to produce ripe conditions for a negotiated agreement. This observations has
been confirmed by a number of empirical case studies; most notably the cases of the
African National Congress (Van England, 2008), the Irish Republican Army (Frampton,
2009), and the Kosovo Liberation Army (Weller, 1999).
The implementation of persistent and far-reaching campaigns of public diplomacy
have also been shown to be an effective tool for exerting pressure on target states and
their allies. As International Affairs Specialist Raphael F. Perl points out, “terrorists [and
national liberation movements] must have publicity in some form if they are to gain
attention, inspire fear and respect, and secure favorable understanding of their cause, if
not their act[s]” (1997). Defined as “a process of creating an overall international image
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that enhances your ability to achieve diplomatic success” (Rourke and Boyer, 2010: G10), in its most pragmatic form it is what Joseph Nye refers to as the deployment of soft
power: “The ability to get other countries to want what you want” (1990: 166).
For a people whose access to international institutions, mainstream media outlets,
and who have been deprived a fair hearing in both national and international forums,
direct appeal to the international public may be the best hope for advancing their cause.
Often opining elaborate and emotive treatises appealing to seemingly populace yet
ideologically-infused sentiments, the leaders of national liberation movements create a
universal sense of justice for their cause by embedding it within a historical narrative that
validates the movement’s quest for statehood. These appeals, even when backed by
violence, have been demonstrated to be a powerful tool in the battle for public opinion.
As pointed out by Craig and George (1995), when effectively articulated by charismatic
leaders, these ideas have the potential to not only stiffen their constituent’s resolve, but to
mesmerize the entire world and thereby foster the creation of a supportive international
populace who will in turn place pressure on their respective governments to address the
national liberation movement’s grievances.

Perspectives on System-Level Determinates of Success
Thus far focus has centered on the role of agency and localized configurations of
the political opportunity structure in which struggles for national liberation take place. It
was established that group composition and its mobilization potential are dependent upon
localized structural factors, leadership coherence, the effects of a movement’s
institutional and decisionmaking apparatus, a leadership’s tactical choices, and its
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strategic orientation. I now turn to a review of the literature addressing the systemic
determinates of national liberation movement success or failure. This will entail
assessment of the role external actors; including great powers, regional states, and other
non-great power stakeholders. It will also involve examination of international public
opinion and the effects it can have the course and outcome of struggles for national
liberation. The remainder of the section will focus on the far-reaching and overarching
impact international society—defined by the attitudes held by existing states and the
power configurations that define their relations—has on the emergence, persistence, and
eventual outcome of struggles for national liberation.

External Actors

At its broadest level, the literature addressing the impact of external actors on
struggles for national liberation focuses on their system-level effects. As Carment and
James (2000) point out, the conduct of external actors—in particular great powers—visà-vis a national liberation movement is more often guided by geopolitical interests than it
is by sentiments of solidarity. Nevertheless, this is not to say that ideology plays no role
in struggles for independence. As evidenced by the conduct of the great powers
throughout the Cold War, ideology not only facilitated the interests of great powers in
that it served as the foundation for strategically crucial alliances, it also provided the
international public with comfort in the belief that “their sacrifices were worthwhile
contributions to a historical process, the outcome of which was certain in the end”
(Moran, 2001). Following this line of reasoning, it has been established that pre-existing
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social and religious networks (Munson, 2001), ethnic loyalties, cultural attachments, and
shared experiences, are contributing determinates of alliance configuration (Birch, 1978).
Where struggles for national liberation confound great power interests, great
power alignment has been demonstrated to be a good indicator of a movement’s
propensity to implement strategies of violence. Following Walter’s observation that
national liberation movements almost always choose to fight to the finish rather than
give-in to government forces—particularly in the absence of great power intervention and
guarantees to enforce the terms of a negotiated settlement (1997: 335)—Benjamin Miller
and Korina Kagan found that when great power interests were in accord, aggressive
actions were highly constrained. When great powers adopt competitive postures on the
other hand, belligerents were afforded broad freedom action (1997: 59-60). This
condition, more often than not, favors the independence movement in that allows for easy
access to weapons and freedom from external interference. As Crenshaw observed in the
case of 1954 Algeria, in the absence of external pressure “the creation of a new
nationalist movement determined to use violence was opportune”(1978: 6).
In extreme cases, regional and great powers may be compelled to take military
action against the movement and/or its target state. While pressure to intervene is almost
always based on geopolitical interests, pressure from below can have a seminal impact as
well. As Polletta and Jasper point out, “It is a perception of shared status or relation,
which may be imagined rather than experienced directly,” that allows individual citizens
to identify and support such struggles (2001, 284). Jenson (1995) explains: “collective
identity—generates resources, solidarity, alliance possibilities (and opposition), and
‘routes to representation’ (that is, institutional access). In other words, [it] helps to ‘make
29

opportunities’ within the prevailing political opportunity structure” (in Lim: 278-9). A
good example of this phenomena is established by Audie Klotz (1995) who demonstrates
that in the case of South Africa the power of ideas, embodied as international norms,
have strong potential to transform local struggles into transnational movements, and in so
doing, compel external actors to act in ways that may not necessarily serve their best
interests.
Intervention can bring about an ultimate end to struggles for national liberation—
either in favor of statehood or against depending on the orientation and political
objectives sought by intervening parties. Whether justified on the basis of great and
regional power interests or in the pursuit of the ‘sanctity of human life’ and the need to
protect citizens from abuse (Murphy, 1996: 11-12) as enshrined in the Responsibly to
Protect, the literature on intervention highlights several factors accounting for its
employment and eventual outcome. With regard to the former, aside from the intervening
states’ interests, fear of contagion resulting in regional anarchy (Keohane, 2002) has been
demonstrated to be a central concern. So too has its potential effects on global economic
conditions (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002), as well as the potential for engulfing peripheral
ethnic communities (Saideman, 2002) and/or peoples bound by ideological solidarity
(Wilhelmen, 2005) . In the end however, the ultimate success of international
intervention has been shown to be dependent upon the institutional reach and capabilities
of the intervening parties (Fearon and Laitin, 2004), and their level of commitment
(Fearon and Laitin, 1998).
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International Society and the Determinates of Success

Because ultimately it is the assemblage of established sovereign states which
grants statehood,4 it is the interests, attitudes, and predispositions of the international
community that comprises much of the opportunity structure in which struggles for
national liberation take place. Nonetheless, unlike many structural accounts of political
phenomena that tend to view structure as reified and absolutely deterministic—“beyond
the control of even the most capable leaders” (Lim 2010: 266) – the constructs that
comprise international society are socially constructed and are therefore inherently
pliable (Wendt, 1999). Indeed, although often measured in terms of decades rather than
days, months, or even years; the structures that make up a society of states at any given
moment are in constant flux as both the moral and security objectives of that society are
the object of ongoing and eternal debate. Reflecting this continuous transitional state,
perspectives on independence from an international society standpoint can divided among
two debates. These entail the role of nationalism and prevailing attitudes on the
justifications for self-determination on the one hand (Coppieters and Sakwa, 2003;
Buchanan, 2006), and whether it is de facto conditions that establish statehood (Wellman,
2005) or de jure recognition that is the ultimate determinate movement success (Wight,
1977; Fabry, 2010).

4

There are rare exceptions to this rule. Most notably Northern Cyprus; a nation which has all of the
attributes and functions of a state, but is nonetheless recognized as such by only one member of the
international community (BBC, 2011: “Cyprus Country Profile,”).
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Justifications for Self-Determination

Attitudes towards the principal of self-determination in international affairs have
played a central role in the emergence and course of nationalist struggles as movements,
target states, and other interested parties have pointed to various definitions to justify
their respective claims. In the literature these can be divided into two broadly defined
ideal types. Reflecting a traditionalist view are those who claim that self-determination
exists a priori without regard to a group’s composition or its capabilities (Wellman,
2005: 97). Says Philoptt, “any group of individuals within a defined territory which
desires to govern itself…prima facie has right to self-determination” (1995: 353). Beary
notes, however, that the international community’s contending preference for the
maintenance of territorial borders renders such international rulings ambiguous (2008:
102), and in the end, provide little support for non-colonial based independence
movements (91). With this in mind, followers of the a posteriori view counter that in
reality, “the legal situation adapts itself to the factual” (Beary: 91). Accordingly, if an
independence movement is to garner international support, it is incumbent upon its
leaders to establish ‘just cause’ (see e.g. Buchanan, 2006; Coppieters and Sakwa, 2003).
Following this line of reasoning, contemporary justifications for selfdetermination rest upon pragmatic considerations as well as an agent’s ability to
demonstrate moral righteousness. Scholarly focus has centered on structural themes such
as the availability of ‘divisible territory’ (Toft, 2003) or hegemonic decline (Armitage,
2007: 110), and on the effects of discriminatory policies. Noteworthy accounts of latter
stress just cause on the basis of economic deprivation (Gurr et al, 1970), ethnic
discrimination (Carment, 2003), and/or extreme state repression (Smith, 1986).
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Importantly, these works provide insight into the strategic calculus of nationalist
movements. According to Campos, groups airing their plight as a result of such injustices
can sometimes pursue strategies of ‘extraversion,’ by internationalizing the conflict. This
“allows the movement to overcome internal weaknesses while forcing the target state to
reassess its policies in light of international opinion” (2003: 114). In extreme cases this
can result in international recognition and legitimization of the ‘terrorists’ (Jebb et al,
2006: 233), or conversely, rationalize repressive violence against separatists by pointing
to the changing nature of warfare, the inherent right to self-defense, and customary law’s
adaptive role (Kenney, 2004).

Nationalism

The literature addressing the rise of nationalism reveals that in the modern era
(since the Peace of Westphalia and especially subsequent to the French Revolution) the
international community has demonstrated an ever growing penchant for nation-states:
that is to say, human groupings who share a conviction of being congenitally related (a
nation) and who form a political unit (a state) whose borders coincide or roughly coincide
with the territorial distribution of that nation (Ritzer, 2007). The right to selfdetermination then, not only requires the forging of favorable material conditions and an
appeal to overturn unjust conditions, but also a peoples’ ability to establish just cause by
demonstrating national cohesion. Taking an even more extreme position, others have
argued that nationalism, “a principle which holds that the political and national unit
should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983: 1), is sufficient evidence for establishing just cause
in the pursuit of self-determination.
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It has been well established that the ‘stories’ peoples profess about their common
identity in an effort to assert their legitimate right to self-determination are of two
types—primordial and modernist. Primordial nationalists envision nationalism as
‘romantic:’ a reflection of an ancient tendency among humans to organize into distinct
groups based upon affinity of birth (Motyl, 2001). From this view “group attachments are
unique, emotional, intense, and durable because they are based upon kinship and
promoted along lines of common ancestry” (ibid: 272-3). In such cases, it has been
demonstrated that nationalism can be a powerful instrument for movement leaders in that
it affords them a persuasive tool: the ability to draw upon “ethno-symbolism”—the power
of myth and memory—to trigger in-group sentiment, and in turn, mobilize the national
group in response to external threats be they real or imagined (Smith, 1999).
Accordingly, primordialists-based movements for self-determination are likely to emerge
when ethnic/cultural unity (Brown et al, 2001) and/or ancestral homelands are at risk
(Karsh, 2001).
Modernists (sometimes referred to as civic nationalists) on the other hand hold,
that nationalism is the product of rapid change brought about by political shifts (Breuilly,
1985) and/or the functional demands of modern economies (Hobsbawm, 1990). It is for
this reason, scholars attached to the modernists school assert that nationalism only
appeared and became a sociological necessity in the modern world (Gellner, 1983). From
this perspective, Hobsbawn explains, “nations [are the product of] artifact, invention, and
social engineering…” (1990: 10). The outcome of these efforts, according to Benedict
Anderson, is the social construction of ‘civic’ nationalism premised on imagined
communities: “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never
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know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of
each lives the image of their communion” (1991: 6).
The central proposition is that nationalism—more correctly, a grouping’s ability
to demonstrate national cohesion—is the essential quantifier of self-determination. It is
therefore vital that the stories a people tell themselves about the origin and nature of their
being—either as the result of ancestral linkages or historical consequence—resonates
within the minds of external actors as well. Often this is simply taken as a given, such as
is the case with Irish nationalists, Kurdish separatists, or the Basques of Spain. In other
cases, where a peoples’ assertion to national unity is not as clear or widely accepted, the
pursuit of self-determination requires affirmative actions; deliberate efforts to forge
within the consciousness of outside parties the validity of the group’s nationalist claim.

De facto vs. De Jure Qualification

One of the most central debates among scholars of statehood centers around the
question of qualification; that is, under what conditions can a movement successfully
attain the status of statehood. Is it through the forging of material conditions? Or is it
legal recognition as a state by existing members of the international community that
matters most? Those holding to the former view, point to the Montevideo Convention as
establishing the baseline requisites of statehood. These include: that the group 1) be in
possession of a permanent population, 2) that they hold possession of a divisible and
defined territory, 3) that its people and its territory have an established government and,
4) that that government and its people are capable of conducting relations with other
states (in Brownlie, 1998: 70). In their assessment “any group has a moral right to
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succeed as long as its political divorce will leave it and the remainder state in a position
to perform the requisite political functions” (Wellman, 2005: 1). This sentiment echoes
the thoughts of British Foreign Secretary George Canning voiced nearly two centuries
ago. As he observed:
We ought not to acknowledge the separate and independent existence of any
[state], which is so doubtfully established, that the mere effect of that
acknowledgement shall be to mix parties again in internal squabbles if not
open hostilities (in Therry ed., 1836: 302-3).

It is for this reason that the promoters of the de facto argument declare that new
states only “come into being because they have been capable of establishing structures of
authority backed by a coercive apparatus of power” (Fabry, 2010: 2).
Those who promote the de jure school of state formation on the other hand, argue
that this ‘declarative view’ is in empirical falsehood. Ultimately, they argue, mutual
recognition of one’s independence forms the foundation of international society. It is for
this reason that aspiring movements must convince existing member states that they are
worthy of statehood: that they acknowledge the prevailing international society’s
common interest and values, and as Bull (1995) notes, that they pledge to be…
bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another, such as that they
should respect one anther’s claims to independence, that they should honor
agreements into which they enter, and that they should be subject to certain
limitations in exercising force against one another (Bull, 1995: 13).
Martin Wight refers to this precondition as ‘legitimacy’—the “collective
judgment of international society about rightful membership [among] the family of
nations”—it is “the branch of international law that…seeks to lay policies to guide
existing states in the manner of recognizing a new community as fulfilling the conditions
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of statehood and qualif[ing] for membership [within] the society of nations” (Wight,
1977: 153; 158). According to this constitutive view, the declarativist’s claim that an
entity is entitled to sovereign statehood regardless of whether or not it is recognized as
such by others (Grant, 1999: 19) simply cannot be true since ultimately statehood is a
matter of mutual recognition. As Brownlie observes, “the political act of recognition is a
precondition of the existence of legal rights…this is to say that the very personality of a
state depends on the political decision of other states” (1998, 88). Accordingly,
legitimacy is not a mere matter of establishing a set of requisite material conditions and
declaring one’s allegiance to the prevailing set of principles that guide members of
international society; rather it entails the convincing of existing states of one’s
legitimacy. That the aspiring state is peace-loving and accepts the obligations of
statehood as established under international law and is able and willing to carry out those
obligations (UN Charter, Article 4.1).

Summary
Recapping the forgoing literature review with an eye towards forging a theoretical
framework for the analysis of national liberation movement success/failure, the following
conclusions can be asserted about struggles for national liberation; the influences, both
internal and external, that guide their course; and the essential barriers that must be
overcome if a national liberation movement is to achieve sovereign independence. For
the sake of clarity, these indicators are divided among the three central elements that
make up struggles for national liberation. These include the political opportunity structure
in which they take place; the role of agency, that is to say the activities of the movement
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itself; and exogenous variables such as attitudes towards self-determination and the
influence, if any, of differing forms of nationalisms.

Political Opportunity Structure
Following the insights of McAdam (1982) and others, the emergence, timing, and
fate of any national liberation movement is largely determined by changes in the political
opportunity structure in which it is embedded. This is because, as Tarrow (1994) notes,
any given political opportunity structure is comprised of continually evolving dimensions
of the political environment that either encourage or discourage people from using
collective action. Kriesi et al found that primary among these dimensions (as related to
social movement emergence and success) are political cleavage structures within the
prevailing political opportunity structure (hegemonic order), institutional structures, elite
strategies, and alliance structures; or perhaps more correctly, ‘power structures.’
Comprised as the summation of attitudes, interests, and values held by existing
states, it is the hegemonic order that is the primary target of a national liberation
movement’s activities. Setting aside for the moment debates over de facto vs. de jure
qualification, this is reasoned on the basis that a national liberation movement’s ultimate
objective is to acquire legitimacy as an independent state in the eyes of its peers—that is
to say, in the eyes of existing Member States. Achieving this objective thus requires some
sort of shift in those existing attitudes, interests, and values so as to provide the political
space for the emergence and acceptance of a new and sovereign equal.
As chapter three will explore in further detail, being the sum of all that is, it is the
hegemonic order that guides a movement in its struggle for statehood. The norms that
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channel states’ actions, the laws that constrain some behaviors while lending legitimacy
to others, and the institutional rules of process and procedure all combine to define a clear
path toward the objective of state. Nonetheless, while the map to statehood may be
clearly marked, navigating around and/or overcoming the many hurdles that pepper that
path along the way requires perceptive forethought, lucid understanding of exiting elite
strategies and the motives that propel their actions, as well as an unclouded assessment of
existing power structures and the manner in which movement members can either exploit
power cleavage or show themselves to be a useful instrument in the attainment of existing
state—particularly great power—interests. Navigating one’s way to statehood also
requires unity of purpose among movement members, sustained focus on both short and
long-term objectives, as well as the ability to demonstrate one’s worthiness (i.e. that the
new state will have the capacity of statehood, will be peace-loving, and will uphold
values, laws, and norms which sustain the prevailing hegemonic order).

Agency
When speaking of agency with regard to social movements, what we are really
referring to is that movement’s leadership and the organizational structure it creates. As
pertains to struggles for national liberation, Wood (1981) observed above that it is
leadership that forms the movement’s rational core and it is leadership that capitalizes on
preexisting conditions in the hegemonic order to unify the group, fan the flames of
discontent, and to create within the minds of its followers the image of an independent
state wherein group interests will be safeguarded. Aside from these essential instruments
of mobilization and recruitment, it is leadership that forges a movement’s long-term
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strategic plan and it is leadership that ‘reads’ the prevailing hegemonic order and devises
tactical strategies for advancing the movement’s immediate aims.
In their pursuit of movement objectives, be they short or long-term, movement
leaders have a variety of tools at their disposal. As gleaned from the proceeding literature
review, these can be summarized as strategies of violence, formal diplomacy, public
diplomacy, exploitation of power cleavages, and extraversion. At this point, no judgment
will passed on the value or morality of any of these tactical choices except to say that a
movement’s leadership must be very careful not to overplay his/her hand. Violent attacks
perpetrated against a target state’s military forces or civilian leadership, for example, may
be deemed acceptable by the international community, while attacks on unarmed civilians
may not. Likewise, the pursuit of an extraversion strategy could easily backfire.
Internationalizing the conflict may force the target state and its allies to reassess their
policies in light of international opinion, but the mere act of questioning target state
behavior could inspire others to question the actions of the movement itself.
In the execution of tactical and strategic activities, O’Leary and Silke (2007)
found that hierarchically structured movements are better equipped to carrying out
coordinated actions. This was attributed to the fact that hierarchically structured
organizations allow for better use of skill-specialization and coordinated action (US
Army, 2007: 7). Nevertheless, while hierarchal organization structures help to optimize
and facilitate synchronized action, Jackson and Rosberg have demonstrate these same
organization structure more readily give way to in-group fractionalization—particularly
where leaders holding differing ideological, political, and/or strategic views than the
mainstream are not afford equal voice in the decisionmaking process. In turn, Misra
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(2001) was able to demonstrate that fractionalization just may pose the greatest barrier to
movement success in that it weakens in-group support for political leaders while
perpetuating state advantage within competitive atmospheres (Gates, 2002).

Nationalism and Self-determination
The idea that social systems are not merely mechanical outcomes, but rather the
product of “an active constituting process, accomplished by, and consisting in, the doings
of active subjects” (Giddens, 1993:121)—both nationalism and justifications for selfdetermination have strong bearing on the emergence and eventual outcome of struggles
for national liberation. Be they primordial-based or civic, viewed as existing a priori or a
posteriori, based on declarativist claims or that of constitutive recognition; the particular
basis and justifications for a people’s nationalist claim to self-determination and
independent sovereign statehood really does not matter. All that matters is that a majority
of existing states—or at the very least, several ‘significant’ states—accept a movement’s
asserted narrative as either valid or as serving their foreign policy objectives. Evidence
for this assertion abounds: South Sudan, Kosovo, Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, Cyprus, and
on and on.
Towards this end, members of a national liberation movement have at their
disposal two types of audiences member they can appeal to: solidarist and pluralist.
According to Jackson and Sørenson (2010: 136), the former stress the importance of the
individual and place human rights over the rights of state. This affords militarily inferior
movements and/or movements experiencing discrimination and/or state repression an
avenue for rallying international support for their right to self-determination based on a
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nationalist consciousness even where none had existed previously. Pluralist on the other
hand, stress the importance of state sovereignty believing an international structure
centered around sovereign states to be the surest means of preserving order and thereby
justice for all. Hence, appealing to the later, national liberation movements can
sometimes elicit support for their professed right to self-determination from existing
states—particularly hegemonic powers—by demonstrating that their elevated status
would bring about greater regional and/or global security.
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Chapter III:
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Framework
Are the conditions that bring about a national liberation movement’s success or
failure generated from within the movement itself, or are forces external to group
dynamics ultimately responsible for a movement’s successful bid for independence? In
what ways do system-level forces condition a movement’s actions and its pathway to
statehood? Are system effects strongly frustrating; constraining a movement’s activities
and determinative of their ultimate fate? Or does the international system offer movement
leaders a variety of opportunities to be harnessed in the pursuit of their cause?
Specifically, what have been the processes of interaction between Palestinian and Zionist
movement members and the respective international systems in which they were
imbedded and how have those processes been indicative of each movement’s outcome?
Struggles for national liberation are deeply imbed within a process of
structuration—the idea that social systems are not merely mechanical outcomes; rather
they are the product of “an active constituting process, accomplished by, and consisting
in, the doings of active subjects” (Giddens, 1993:121). They are in other words, mutually
constituted in the interactions of agents and structure. As Alexander Wendt points out:
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human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions
help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and [in return]
society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions
between these purposeful actors (Wendt, 1987: 337-338).
Accordingly, the route through which national liberation movements seek
statehood involves a process of give and take between agents on the one hand and
structure on the other. Viewed in this light, struggles for national liberation can be
envisioned as dialogues between movement members and the existing states which
constitute the international system in which they are all embedded. For its part it, it is the
specific configuration of the prevailing international system that sets the parameters for
new state inclusion by defining institutional pathways to statehood and establishing the
rules through which struggles can be pursued. This suggests that movement behavior is a
function system preference, the balance of power, and how units are positioned within the
complex system of international society (Jervis, 1999: 5).
On the other hand, “[national liberation movements] do not merely react to [the
international system] but seek a particular outcome or relationship” with it (ibid: 275).
This requires not mere passive acceptance of prevailing structural configurations, but
active efforts to change that configuration both materially and ideationally. Success is
therefore also a function of a movement’s activities and its leadership’s ability to
effectively assess the temperament of international society and to mobilize the full force
of its resources towards its immediate and long-term aims in a manner that will have the
greatest chance of advancing the objective of statehood.
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The Process of National Liberation
This study employs a system-level analytic approach. The orientation is justified
on the insight that ultimately it is the existing members of international society that both
movements and target states seek to influence: the movement seeking recognition of its
nationalist claim and right to self-determination by appealing to material and/or solidarist
elements of that system; the target state seeking to suppress that claim by upholding its
sovereign rights and the pluralist principle of territorial integrity. Illustrating the effects
of structuration in the pursuit of these two competing objectives, the following
descriptive examines system-level constraints and opportunities that lie in the path of
struggles for national liberation. This is to say, the way in which the prevailing
international system seeks to pull the movement towards conformity, while
concomitantly, the movement seeks to push that same system towards a new
configuration—a configuration that includes itself as a full and equal member of
international society.
The International System

International society is the culmination of state’s preferences and a common
attitude towards the proper ordering of international society (Bull, 1977). Consequently,
the composition of any given international system is the product of both moral and
security interests. Comprising the solidarist hemisphere of the international structure are
those moral interests which define conceptions of justice and the civil ordering of
international society, and in so doing, provide a national liberation movement with an
avenue for justifying and receiving acceptance of its claim to self-determination on the
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basis of universal right (Philoptt, 1995). Representing the pluralist view of international
society are security interests variously defined as being the product of need, ambition,
and above all, the desire for stability (Kaplan, 1957). Establishing oneself as a vital asset
in the pursuit of those interests is therefore yet another avenue available to the leaders of
liberation movements in that winning favor from among existing states—particularly
great powers—is likely to facilitate their efforts to gain both recognition of and support
for the cause of sovereign independence.

Figure 3.1 –Composition of International Systems (Hegemonic Orders)
Moral Interests

Great Power Interests
Philosophical

Foundations

International
Temperament

International
System

Other States’ Interests

Security Interests

Availability of Allies

Institutional Openings

As depicted in figure 3.1, it is great powers—by the utter preponderance of their
capabilities—who have the strongest influence on the philosophical foundation of that
system and thus make the most significant contributions to that society’s temperament as
well as its morally and strategically informed constitution (the bold arrows). At the same
time the diagram also highlights the role of non-great powers and the potential for
counter-narratives that may or may not run parallel to great power preferences (the
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dashed arrows). Significantly therefore, it illustrates that national liberation movements
are not wholly subject to the whims of great powers, but rather, can sometimes garner the
support of ‘non-aligned’ states affording movement members the ability to act in a
manner which may be contrary to hegemonic interests but nonetheless enjoy the security
of being supported by a significant sector of international society.

National Liberation Movements

Defined herein, a movement is the summation of group characteristics and
capabilities which are themselves in part a direct byproduct of the prevailing international
system. The narratives of identity which movement’s leaders marshal in an effort to
justify their claim to self-determination are a central component of a movement’s
personality; as are narratives of tragedy framed within the context of a people’s distinct
historical experience. Oftentimes competing narratives arise resulting in fractionalization,
and as a result, divergent paths to statehood. Nevertheless, while the narratives of
uniqueness leaders tell are effective towards the recruitment of members and the
mobilization of resources, these stories only tangentially account for the movement’s
overall approach to statehood.
This assertion is based on the observation that it is the philosophical foundation of
any given international system which sets the limits of available political ideologies that
may come to underpin a movement’s personality. It is not the case, therefore, that
movement leaders single-handedly craft a movement’s ideological identity—that they
choose to be Marxist revolutionaries or pacifist democrats. Rather, as depicted in table
3.1, a movement’s ideological identity—although informed by historical experience and
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common recognition of cultural myths (Geertz, 1973)—is primarily the product of
prevailing political attitudes, common understandings of society’s moral and security
interests, as well as the existing institutional structures that have been erected to preserve
those attitudes and interests.
Table 3.1
International Systems and their Proximate Effects
International
System

Sentiments of
SelfDetermination

Type of
Nationalisma

Colonialism

Low

Primordial

Imperialism

Low

Primordial

Decolonization

High

Bi-Polarity

By-product of
Great Power
Interests

Civic

Proxy Wars

Uni-Polarity

Medium

Mixed

Separatist Conflicts

Territorialb

Civicc

Nature of
Conflict
Revolt
(Seizure of Political
Institutions)
Revolution
(Overthrow of Political and
Economic Institutions)
Trusteeshipb

Marxist
Revolutionsc

a – Most prevalent type of nationalism for the era in question
b – Mandate Territories as well as Trust Territories as defined under Article 77 of the UN Charter
c – Non-Trust Territories / Movements seeking independence

Beyond influencing a movement’s ideological foundation, figure 3.2 illustrates
that international structures exert strong pressures on a movement’s active pursuit of
statehood as well. For instance, the philosophical foundation of an international system,
informed by the established international temperament, defines the institutional pathways
to statehood and thus strongly influences a movement’s strategic pursuit of struggle. It is
thus proposed that Zionism’s pursuit of legal permission to engage in a socialist-utopian
state-building program can be seen as a product of late nineteenth century idealism.
48

Likewise, the Palestinian’s adoption of a Marist-revolutionary approach through armed
struggle was reflective of a mid twentieth century anti-imperialist temperament.
Moreover, that the Palestinians adopted a more pragmatic approach based in a negotiated
agreement is a response to hegemonic preferences which came to dominate the
international temperament as America rose to prominence in the post-Cold War era.
Figure 3.2 – System Origins of Movement Personality and Activities
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When viewed in combination with figure 3.1, it can be seen that the international
temperament of any given international society is not merely indicative of a movement’s
long-term strategic approach, but also presents to movement leaders a variety of
opportunities to advance their shorter-term objectives. This is premised on the
observation that the divided nature of a system’s international temperament presents
movements with political cleavages that can be exploited to actively rally the resources of
allies to their cause. These same cleavages afford the movement the ability to act in
defiance of great power interests by summoning sentiments of solidarity as a means of
counterbalancing the hegemonic will. Accordingly, the methodology for investigating the
advance and ultimate outcome of national liberation movements established forthwith
pays due attention to the process of structuration within the context of struggles for
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national liberation. It sets forth a mechanism for evaluating the effects of systemic
pressures on movement activities on the one hand, and the manner in which movement
activities serve to re-frame international temperaments on the other.

Methodology
Drawing upon the historical experiences of both Zionism and the Palestinian
movement for national liberation, this study follows an inductive analytical methodology.
The initial aim is to present an overall depiction of the individuals, resources, political
factions, and bureaucratic procedures of decisionmaking that comprise each peoples’
movements. At the same time it will be necessary to expose system generated factors
including the institutional foundation of a given international society, its mechanisms for
facilitating interactions between the system’s units, the existence of political cleavages,
and the role of elite strategies in conditioning prevailing alliance structures. Then, by
employing a configurative-ideographic approach it will be possible to claim validity by
allowing the facts on the ground to speak for themselves (Eckstein, 1975: 96).
As opposed to disciplined-configurative studies which “simply assume that
‘general laws’ are available” – that concrete configurations exist a priori and are thus
validated by cases that confirm their existence (ibid: 104)—configurative-ideographic
studies are “largely intuitive interpretation[s], claiming validity on the ground that
intensive study and empathetic feel for cases provide authoritative insights into them”
(ibid: 97). As such, Sidney Verba (1967) notes, “they do not easily add up” to reliable
and valid statements of regularity about sets of cases. Nevertheless, this observation is
mitigated on two grounds: 1) the interpretations they provide may be subtle but are
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persuasive in that they suggest a genuine feel and understanding for the cases they treat,
and 2) exponents of configurative-ideographic studies never claim that their studies ‘add
up’ to theory, only that they provide interesting insights that may serve to discover new
ways of thinking about existing problems (Eckstein, 1975).
Accordingly, the methodological approach employed here adds up to a heuristic
case study. Paraphrasing Eckstein (104), the task of this work is to deliberately stimulate
the imagination about how national liberation movements unfold and advance with the
aim of discerning important general problems that arise in their associated struggles and
possible theoretical explanations of ways in which those problems are overcome
(Eckstein: 104). To do this, I first purpose a set of hypotheses which logically flow from
the preceding literature review and established theoretical framework. Then, in accord
with those hypotheses I delineate the historiography of both the Zionist and Palestinian
struggles for national liberation with the aim of discovering variances or similarities in
the manner in which each movement approached various hurdles in their respective paths
to statehood. Not only will this strategy allow for a deep and empathetic feel for each
case, but in doing so, afford both academics and practitioners a model for thinking about
these struggles and their potential resolution in new and interesting ways.
In the pursuit of theses tasks I rely extensively on primary documents: principally
legal instruments from the League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS), United Nations
documentation including rules of procedure, meeting minutes, treaties, and resolution. I
also draw upon first hand accounts, memos, and the internal reports of individual
countries. Adding context to these structure-setting documents I incorporate the memoirs
and speeches of seminal political leaders as well as a wealth of secondary sources. By
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affording the ability to appraise contemporary analysis of on going events, these latter
resources will be central to developing an empathetic feel and gaining insight into the
‘texture’ of each case; thus accenting the benefits of a heuristic approach.

Definition of Variables
The following definitions seek to capture the complex and multidimensional
nature of both the dependant and independent variables that comprise struggles for
national liberation. It is believed that by compartmentalizing the various elements that
make up each of the defining variables we will be able to more closely pinpoint the exact
force of causation at each level of a movement’s advancement. In the conclusion of the
this study it will therefore be possible to better identify the forces that have propelled
both the Zionist and Palestinian movements, and through comparative analysis, identify
possible explanations for Zionism’s success and whether or not these insights can be
marshaled to bring about a final and positive conclusion to the Palestinian cause.

Dependent Variable: Statehood

While statehood itself is a matter of quantifiable tangibles such as territorial
possession, legal recognition, and political acceptance, this study’s focus on the process
of struggle—i.e. the manner in which those attributes are acquired—demands a more
robust conception of state. Accordingly, for the purpose of this study the dependant
variable ‘statehood’ will be defined in three parts; each representative of the three stages
of struggle a movement must pass through in its quest for independence. These included
movement emergence and recognition, de facto recognition, and de jure affirmation.
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Moreover, it should be noted that the following definitions place strong emphasis on
(near) universal recognition over recognition granted by individual states or groups of
states. This is reflective of this study’s viewpoint that it is only system-level inclusion
that can effectively count as attaining a national liberation movement’s objectives.
Movement Emergence and Recognition – identified by internationally binding
documentation stating that the goals and aspirations of a people and its governing bodies
are not only legitimate, but constitute a fundamental objective of the international
community as well. As postulated in the following hypotheses, I suggest that recognition
of said status is the product of nationalist narratives, conditions of tragedy, and the
interests of existing states; particularly great powers.
De facto Recognition – achieved when the aspiring state has a) met the requirements of
statehood as defined by the Montevideo Convention (CSA, 1936; LNTS, Vol. 156: 25),
b) it has, in accord with Foreign Secretary George Canning’s observation (see pg. 36),
created a viable economic base and has establish the means to defend its defined territory,
and c) that recognition of said status has been enshrined in internationally binding
legislation defining the new entity as a de facto state endowed with certain rights and
duties including the ability to participate in international forums in accordance with
provisional rule 136 of the United Nations Rules of Procedure and provisional rule 59 of
the Security Council.
De Jure Affirmation – establish as attained with the acceptance of the candidate state as a
full and unrestricted member of the United Nations under Article 4 of the Charter. In
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accordance with that guidance, the movement and it leaders must demonstrate that they
are peace-loving and accept the obligations of statehood as established in the Charter. In
addition because de jure affirmation ultimately rest with the Security Council whose
members are ultimately concerned with sustained stability, it is reasoned that a) the state
in question has secured its borders, and b) that its leadership is reasonably unified and
resolved to settle differences through political processes rather then violence.

Independent Variable: International System

As described in the theoretical framework above, the international system in
which a movement is embedded has strong causal force on the course and outcome of
struggles for national liberation. The sources and potential effects of these forces will be
briefly summarized below under the heading ‘institutional structure.’ In addition, because
a primary aim of this study is to gain greater insight into the process of movement
advancement, due attention is given to structurally generated mechanisms thorough
which movement members can press their cause. These include, divergent elite strategies,
political cleavages, and the availability of allies on the basis of solidarity and/or material
interests.
Institutional Structure – Comprised of both moral and material interests of existing states,
the institutional structure of a prevailing international society defines specific pathways
to statehood. On the one hand, by defining what is legitimate and morally desirable—the
international temperament—system-level norms drive movement members to behave in
certain, acceptable ways. On the other hand, material interests, especially those of great
powers, afford movement members leeway in negotiating their path to statehood. Upon
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these criteria it is postulated that advancement from one stage of statehood to the next
(e.g. from emergence, to de facto recognition) can only come about with shifts in the
prevailing hegemonic order. That is to say, when either the moral or material foundations
of international society experiences such fundamental change as to establish new
governing institutions, thus creating new pathways thorough which movement leaders
can advance their cause.
Elite Strategies – a reflection of institutional structures, elite strategies define various
orientations adopted by existing states towards the validity of self-determination claims
or the movement itself. These can be confrontational in nature such as Israel’s posture
vis-à-vis Palestinian statehood or facilitative nature such as Great Britain’s early efforts
to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. As a whole, elite strategies define a system’s
alliance structure.
Political Cleavages – those system-wide divisions of interests and/or preferences—
whether moral or materially grounded—that afford movement leaders the ability to
harness or exploit specified cohorts of the international system towards their objective.
Concretely, they are the battlefield upon which struggles for national liberation take place
as movement members seek support by making themselves materially useful to great
power interests, or when that avenue is not available, seek to counter those interests by
rallying sentiments of solidarity from states opposed to prevailing hegemonic
preferences.
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Alliance Structure – a product of elite strategies and/or political cleavages; the
availability of allies whose resources—both material and solidarist—can be marshaled
towards the advancement of statehood. Alternatively, the presence of existing states
aligned against the movement’s cause.
Independent Variable: National Liberation Movement

Whereas international systems present movement’s with both hurdles to be
overcome and opportunities to be seized, the independent variable ‘national liberation
movement’ is the sum of resources available to a people in their quest for statehood.
These included competency of leadership, narratives of both nationalism and conditions
of tragedy, and the skillful deployment of violent and non-violent tactics. This study
takes further note of rival factions and both the facilitating and frustrating roles they play
in the drive for statehood.
Leadership – the capacity to effectively read the system-defined strategic environment
and to deploy the proper mix of resources (including violence and diplomacy) that will
best achieve the movements short and long-term aims. In support of this objective, the
movement’s strategic planning and organizational decisionmaking structures will also be
evaluated.
Narratives – the stories people project about the origins of their being as a unique culture
and the accounts of suffering that those people have or continue to endure. Evaluated on
the basis of resonance. That is, the degree to which those stories are accepted as valid by
both in-group and external actors.
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Tactics – the timing, location, and choice of mental and/or material resources expended
to achieve the movements long and/or short-term objectives. These include the use of
violence, the mobilization of diplomatic assets, and the implementation of public
diplomacy campaigns. Measured by simply asking if the tactic achieved its intended
purpose.
Fractionalization – the breakup of movement leaders and members on the basis of
ideological or political differences, and/or differing strategic visions. Fractionalization is
thought to facilitate the movement’s efforts in that differing factions bring additional
outside resources to the cause. Alternatively, it can severely frustrate a movements
efforts, particularly in the pursuit of de jure affirmation, in that the leadership is unable to
present to seminal states a united front.

Hypotheses
The following set of hypotheses are drawn from the proceeding literature review
placed within the context of the theoretical framework that guides this study. As noted,
each of the case studies will be divided into three sections corresponding to the three
stages of statehood defined above. Beginning with the case of Zionism, at the end of each
of these sections the relevant hypotheses will be assessed—answering either yes or no to
the hypothesized question or rating the hypothesized effect on a gradient of slightly,
moderately, or strongly Then at the end of each chapter, an overall appraisal will be
presented. In this regard the Palestinian case study will be more comprehensive as
comparison with the Zionist experience will be evaluated throughout.
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1) Movement emergence and mobilization is the product of repressive, confrontational,
and polarizing political structures with inadequate institutional apparatuses for
meeting the demands of a disenfranchised populace (Kriesi et al, 1995).

2) International system openings brought about by shifts in the hegemonic order are the
only means though which a movements can emerge and advance.

3) Movement members are afforded greater policy options including the pursuit of
violent strategies when great powers adopt competitive postures. Likewise, their
actions are highly constrained when great power interests are in accord (Miller and
Kagan,1997).

4) A movement’s strategic and tactical approach is the product of hegemonic
preferences and cleavages in the international temperament—i.e. pluralist vs.
solidarist values (Jackson and Sorenson, 2013).

5) A movement’s founding ideology is the product of prevailing international
temperament and that ideology in turn is determinate of a movement’s approach to
statehood.

6) To obtain legal recognition as an equal, the narratives movement members project
about the origin and nature of their being (their nationalist claim to selfdetermination) must find resonance within the minds of the majority of existing
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members of the international community (Coppieters and Sakwa, 2003; Philoptt,
1995).

7) The formation of a workable strategic plan for attaining statehood and the capacity to
refrain from deviating from it is essential to the positive advancement and ultimate
success of the movement’s objectives Wood (1981).

8) Allies are essential to a movement’s recognition, advancement and ultimate
attainment of statehood (Kriesi et al, 1995).

9) Movement recognition and successful attainment of statehood can only be obtained
when that objective is in the interests of at least one great power (O’Leary and
Triman, 2007).

10) In-group fractionalization is the greatest barrier to movement advancement and
success (Misra, 2001; Gates, 2002).
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Chapter IV:
The Zionist Movement for National Liberation
Introduction
Zionism, the Jewish people’s movement for national liberation, emerged and took
place within a worldwide opportunity structure which constituted an integral part of the
wider historical process of emancipation of nations that commenced in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Although over the course of some 1,800 years the dream of returning
to Zion (Jerusalem) had been kept alive by Jew and gentile alike, it was not until the reign
of Napoleon Bonaparte that the contours of the modern nation state began to coalesce
within the consciousness of European society, and as a consequence, initiated a great
Jewish awaking. This chapter untangles the final 100 years of struggle for Jewish selfdetermination to assess the role of both structural forces and movement characteristics
which in the end led to the creation of the State of Israel in 1949.

Movement Emergence and Recognition
On August 31, 1897 nearly 200 delegates hailing from 17 countries and
representing 69 Zionist societies met in Basel Switzerland to proclaim:
The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine
secured by public law.
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The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:
1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish
agricultural and industrial workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of
appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the
laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and
consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary,
to the attainment of the aim of Zionism (First Zionist Congress, 1897).
The First Zionist Congress, its formation of the Zionist Organization, and its
subsequent adoption of the Basel Program was soon thereafter endorsed by 260 Russian
and eastern European Zionist associations (JVL, “Zionism”; Israeli Knesset, 2008) and
thus marks the emergence of the Jewish movement for national liberation.
Twenty years later, on November 2, 1917 Zionist leaders in London achieved yet
another milestone in their quest for statehood: formal recognition of the movement’s
objectives as a legitimate and obtainable goal by the reigning global hegemon of that
time, Great Britain. This landmark amendment to British policy can be witnessed with
the publication of the Balfour Declaration which reads:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country (Balfour, 1917).
This fundamental structural opening was strengthen further on July 24, 1922
when members of the Council of the League of Nations voted unanimously, not only to
incorporate the Balfour Declaration into the newly formulated Mandate for Palestine, but
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to charge the Zionist movement itself with the responsibility of bringing its ambitions
into fruition. These terms are made evident in Article 4 of the Mandate:
An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the
purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in
such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of
the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in
Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist
and take part in the development of the country.
The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in
the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency.
It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to
secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the
establishment of the Jewish national home (League of Nations, 1922).

Recalling the hypotheses pertaining to movement emergence and recognition as
established in chapter three, it is presumed that tragedy befell the Jewish people in the
period immediately prior to the convening of the First Zionist Congress and that this
initial act of the Jewish movement for national liberation was only made possible by the
rise of a far-sighted leader who was able to unite his people by invoking a primordial
narrative of Self within the context of a repressive international system which offered no
institutional avenues for redress other than open revolt. Moreover, that Zionist leaders
were able to obtain recognition as a legitimate entity and effect concrete institutional
transformation towards that end suggests that their historical narrative had been
universally accepted, and thus too, their nationalist claim to self determination. It also
suggests a shift in temperaments among members of the international community vis-àvis Jews in general and nationalism specifically, as well as modification to material
conditions within the international hegemonic order.
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International System
Narration of the Jewish Diaspora is in may respects a history of Europe. From the
height of Roman supremacy through the depths of the Dark Ages to the rise of Napoleon
and the Age of Enlightenment, the lives of Jews were everywhere influenced by the
economic, political, and social makeup of the European powers. This segment evaluates
the impact of these forces on Jewish aspirations to one day return to their homeland—
Eretz Israel. It then turns attention to the Zionist leadership and their ability to gain
international recognition for that cause.

Age of Exile

As Roman administrator and noted historian Cassius Dio recorded in Roman
History (c.235), tragedy befell the Jews of ancient Judea for the final time under the reign
of Emperor Hadrian. The Bar Kokhaba Revolt that had been trigged as result of antiJewish policies and Hadrian's building of a Roman temple on the site of the Jewish
Tempe in Jerusalem was decidedly crushed between the years 131 and 135 CE. Under the
command of Hadrian's military commander Julius Severus, Dio observed:
Fifty of [the Jew's] most important outposts and nine hundred and eighty-five
of their most famous villages were razed to the ground. Five hundred and
eighty thousand men were slain in the various raids and battles, and the
number of those that perished by famine, disease and fire was past finding
out. Thus nearly the whole of Judaea was made desolate (Book LXIX: 446450).
Then, in an attempt to erase any memory of Judea, Hadrian renamed the province
Syria Palaestina (after the Philistines) and Jews were forever forbidden from entering its
rededicated capital.
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For Jewish communities enduing the ensuing 1,800 years of exile, the quest for
acceptance and harmonious living with their gentile neighbors was punctuated by regular
episodes of torment, discrimination, and expulsion. Much of this suffering was brought
on by the decrees of reigning popes and other religious leaders who persistently
demonized the Jews and called for their destruction. One such example was Martin
Luther’s 1543 Von den Juden und ihren Lügen (On the Jews and Their Lies) which called
upon the Christian masses to set Jewish Synagogues and schools afire and to raze their
homes; to deprive the Jews of their religious texts and their Rabbis of teaching, to enslave
them; and in the end, should they fail to convert, drive them from the country like mad
dogs (Luther, 1543: 7-16). The product of such vehement attacks was recurrent outbursts
of anti-Semitic pogroms and the repeated destruction of Jewish communities throughout
Europe. In fact, by Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama’s (2003) count, 1,399 such
persecutions had broken out in 936 European cities between the years 1100 CE and 1800
CE.

Age of Enlightenment

What began as a revolution in thought with the philosophies of Bacon, Descartes,
and Spinoza, soon transcended the ideational realm to bring about earth-shattering
transformations in the material world. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) brought to
Europe an entirely new system of political order; an order based on sovereign states free
from external control and endowed with the right of cuius regio, eius religio (Croxton,
1999: 574–575). Inspiring both the American and French Revolutions and promoting
freedom of religion as well as the right to civic participation and equality under the law,
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for a people long deprived of territorial possession these early temperamental
advancements had little immediate effect.
Initially denied full rights of citizenship, it was only through the impassioned
pleas of humanists such as Abbè Henri Grègoire and the persuasive logic voiced by
nobleman such as Adrien Jean François Duport that Jews finally won their emancipation
on September 27, 1791. Duport in particular, skillfully argued that to deny Jews the rights
and privileges afforded other French citizens was a hypocrisy of the greatest order and in
contravention of the Republic’s Constitution (Hunt, 1996: 99). The French National
Assembly agreed issuing the following decree:
The National Assembly, considering that the conditions necessary to be a
French citizen and to become an active citizen are fixed by the Constitution,
and that every man meeting the said conditions, who swears the civic oath,
and engages himself to fulfill all the duties that the Constitution imposes, has
the right to all of the advantages that the Constitution assures;
Revokes all adjournments, reservations, and exceptions inserted into the
preceding decrees relative to Jewish individuals who will swear the civic oath
which will be regarded as a renunciation of all the privileges and exceptions
introduced previously in their favor (French Republic National Assembly,
1791).
Nonetheless, as the historian Benzion Netanyahu (1944) points out, because
enlightenment thinking of the time placed great value on the universal over the particular
“emancipation offered the Jews freedom and equality with the Gentile citizens provided
they assimilated into the national culture, while retaining only their cult and faith”
[emphasis added] (Safran, 1965: 8). While the vast majority of Jews eagerly embraced
the opportunity to assimilate, it soon became evident that total absorption would prove
elusive. For although they would attain political and economic freedom, the Jews of
western Europe were incapable of achieving social acceptance from a community which
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remained conscious of Judaism’s ingrained particularism—a particularism which would
forever place Eretz-Israel at the center of its worldview. As David Vital explains:
…the place of Erez-Israel in Jewish belief and in what might be termed
Jewish outlook in its most representative and characteristic forms was
precisely that element of Judaism which all those who strove to secularize
Judaism were most anxious to be rid of. For the more powerfully and
consistently one wished to emphasize the universal qualities of Judaism as a
‘world’ religion or ethical system, the more conscious one became of the fact
that the attachment to Erez-Israel epitomized all that was particularistic and
non-assimilable in it, non-reducible to universal categories (1975: 9).

Age of Emergence

Marching across the Levant in April 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte declared the Jews
to be the “rightful heirs of Palestine.” ”Hasten,” he called out, “now is the moment,
which may not return for thousands of years, to claim the restoration of [your] civic rights
among the population of the universe which had been shamefully withheld from you for
thousands of years, your political existence as a nation among the nations, and the
unlimited natural right to worship Jehovah in accordance with your faith... (Bonaparte,
1799). While the sincerity of Napoleon’s calls for a Jewish Palestine may never be
known, what is clear is that Napoleon viewed Jewish emancipation as a French strategic
interest.
In part, the 1804 publication of the French Civil Code (1804; 1823) sought, in
Napoleon’s own words, “to liberate the Jews and make them full citizens….to confer
upon them all the legal rights of equality, liberty and fraternity as was enjoyed by the
Catholics and Protestants.” “I thought,” he recalled, “that this would bring to France
many riches because the Jews are numerous and they would come in large numbers to
our country where they would enjoy more privileges than in any other nation” (as relayed
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to his personal physician Dr. O’Meara on the Island of St, Helena on the 10th of
November 1816; cited in: Weider, 1998). Similar rights of citizenship were afforded the
Jews (and other non-traditional Europeans) in 1814 with the signing of the Congress of
Vienna and the 1818 Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle where Jewish representatives were for
the first time afforded a voice within the highest echelons of European politics (Kohler,
1918).
After 1700 years of exile, a glimmer of light could be detected within the
institutional apparatus of Europe; nevertheless both social and geographic barriers were
strongly aligned against the movement’s success. Unlike the Greeks, Serbs, Poles, and
other peoples seeking political autonomy at that time, the Jews of Europe were
geographically dispersed, spoke many different languages, and in the end, were not in
possession of their ancestral homeland. At the same time, although their legal status was
quick to change, social attitudes were not. As Odessa resident and pioneer Zionist activist
Leo Pinsker observed:
[Although] the Jewish people had ceased to exist as an actual state, as a
political entity, they could nevertheless not submit to total annihilation—they
lived on spiritually as a nation. The world saw in this people the uncanny
form of one of the dead walking among the living. The ghostlike apparition
of a living corpse, a people without unity or organization, without land or
bonds of unity, no longer alive, and yet walking among the living…A fear of
[this] Jewish ghost has passed down the generations and the centuries. First
as a breeder of prejudice, later in conjunction with other forces …it
culminated in Judeophobia (Pinsker 1939, 9).
The source of this Judeophobia—this inability of the universal to absorb its
particular—lay in human psychology and the natural antagonisms it breeds. As
Netanyahu observed, “the loss of country could not render [the Jews] a deadly blow, for
the simple reason that they never lost it…They kept alive the idea of their country, even
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though they lost its material foundation, and the idea served as a unifying bond almost as
potent as the real territory [emphasis in original] (Netanyahu 1944, 10). It was this
unshakable bond reasoned Pinsker, and later Theodore Herzl, that was the source of antiSemitism and it was that bond which posed the greatest threat to the Jewish people. For if
the Jews were to submit to Europe’s prescription to the Jewish Problem—if they were to
relinquish their history, intermarry, and assimilate—then surely the Jewish nation would
cease to exist.
Nowhere was this sense of Judeophobia more evident than in the northern and
eastern providences of Europe. In Norway, for example, the 1814 Constitution forbade
Jews access to the kingdom (Constitution of Norway, 1814: § 2). This prohibition was
soon thereafter adopted by the Kingdom of Sweden with the signing of the Convention of
Moss (1814). In Czarist Russia Jewish residency was confined to the Pale of Settlement
while so called May (temporary) Laws limited their access to higher education and
certain ‘high’ offices, canceled their deeds and other holdings outside the Pale, and
deprived Jews the right to conduct business on Christian holidays (1882; in Singer and
Adler, 1906). In addition to these legal restrictions, the Jews of Russia were subjected to
regular government-organized pogroms—the most severe of which took place in 1903.
The New York Times reported:
The anti-Jewish riots in Kishinev, Bessarabia, are worse than the censor will
permit to publish. There was a well laid-out plan for the general massacre of
Jews on the day following the Russian Easter. The mob was led by priests,
and the general cry, "Kill the Jews," was taken-up all over the city. The Jews
were taken wholly unaware and were slaughtered like sheep…Babies were
literally torn to pieces by the frenzied and bloodthirsty mob. The local police
made no attempt to check the reign of terror (Editor, New York Times,
1903).
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Unabashed anti-Semitism was not restricted to the periphery of Europe moreover.
western Europeans also held a deep distrust of the Jews as was witnessed with the
Dreyfus Affair. Reflecting on these seemingly unalterable social attitudes, Pinsker
concluded:
The people among who we live will always and everywhere take a hostile
attitude towards us, even one of superstitious fear, so long as we have no
fatherland, or at least the semblance of one. There is something unnatural
about a people without a territory, just as there is about a man without a
shadow. Since this is so, our people must have its own territory, its own
center (1944, 114).
Fortunately for the then nascent Zionist movement, a dramatic shift in the
prevailing hegemonic order was about to merge with that outwardly negative European
temperament vis-à-vis the Jews to find a mutually satisfactory solution to the ‘Jewish
problem.’
Commenting on the Turkish Revolution of 1908, noted Zionist leader Chaim
Weizmann stated, “I can see in that historical event nothing but the removal of threefourths of the difficulties with which we have previously confronted” (Weizmann, 1909).
Although the revolt heralded in a host of new hurdles for the Zionist movement to
overcome—most enduringly the complexity of Jewish-Arab relations—the rise of France
and especially Great Britain as regional hegemons and their subsequent signing of the
Sykes-Picot Agreement made possible the Balfour Declaration and its inclusion into the
Mandate for Palestine.
Many have attributed the granting of the Balfour Declaration as a debt of
gratitude owed to Chaim Weizmann for his invention of a fermentation process allowing
for the mass production of high explosives during the Great War (John, 1985). A closer
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reading of the historical record demonstrates that the decision was far more strategic in
nature. In his memoirs Prime Minister David Lloyd George reveals his thinking at that
time:
There is no better proof of the value of the Balfour Declaration as a military
move than the fact that Germany entered into negotiations with Turkey in an
endeavor to provide an alternative scheme which would appeal to Zionists.
Another most cogent reason for the adoption by the Allies of the policy of the
Declaration lay in the state of Russia herself…It was believed that if Great
Britain declared for the fulfillment of Zionist aspirations in Palestine under
her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of
the Entente.
It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence
upon world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of
Jewish financial interests. In America, their aid in this respect would have a
special value when the Allies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable
securities available for American purchases. Such were the chief
considerations which, in 1917, impelled the British Government towards
making a contract with Jewry (1939: 726).
Movement Approach
Given their continued treatment as second-class citizens and a worldview
transfixed on returning to Eretz-Israel, it is somewhat surprising that upon emancipation
there was little enthusiasm within the Jewish community for reestablishing an
independent Jewish state in Palestine; or anywhere else for that matter. The problem as
identified by early proto-Zionist thinkers was that although the Jews were bound by book,
blood, and history, they had not yet to develop a national consciousness. Moses Hess’
Rome in Jerusalem, for example, pointed out that the Jews would always remain
strangers among the nations and peoples of Europe who for reasons of humanity and
justice may emancipate them but would never respect them (1862: 74). “If the
emancipation of the Jews is irreconcilable with Jewish nationality,” he continued, “then
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the Jews must sacrifice emancipation to nationality.” Accordingly, he reasoned, “the
solution lie in Labor Zionism—a returning of the Jews to the Land of Israel where they
would build a socialist utopia and find redemption in the tilling of the soil” (ibid: 174).
A mix of religious philosophy, enlightenment thinking, and secularism, Hess’s
Labor Zionist movement would go on to become a central driving force in the rebuilding
of Eretz- Israel. Nevertheless, for the Jews of Europe at that time—a mostly artesian and
merchant middle class—the notion of resettling such a desolate and unforgiving land as
Palestine held little appeal (Tsur, 1979). More than that, Hess’ prescription drew attention
to the particularistic primordial bonds which had sustained the Jewish people throughout
the centuries and argued for a re-birth of the Jewish nation founded upon that union. In
other words, Hess glorified Jewish distinctiveness (their particularism) and warned
against submission to the universal. In a world where the Jews were so recently
emancipated seeking nothing more than assimilation, Hess’ ideas were largely ignored.
Having witnessed first-hand the swift and fervent rise of anti-Semitic attacks,
former assimilationist turn proto-Zionist Leo Pinsker’s took a more scientific view.
Describing the pervasive permanence of anti-Semitism in mechanical-psychological
terms, Pinsker concluded that so long as Jews maintained their exclusive worldview they
would never be accepted; not in Europe nor anywhere else. “This was not because of any
overt prejudice,” Pinsker concluded:
Rather it was because rejection of other is a natural human condition, and the
Jews for reasons of heredity, history, and self-loathing, had come to
constitute a particular form of demonopathy which proceeded from an
inherited aberration of the human mind (Pinsker, 1882: 11).
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Seeking to put his ideas into effect, Pinsker published Auto-Emancipation in 1882
and set out to demonstrate that Jews could never be equals until they developed a national
consciousness—a condition which could only be accomplished with the establishment of
their own state. Towards this objective, he called for a convening of Jewish leaders and
traveled throughout Germany and Poland to elicit their support. While Pinsker’s
pamphlet managed to inspire a small group of university students to emigrate to
Palestine—and in so doing, sparked the First Aliyah (wave of Jewish immigration to
Palestine)—his efforts to mobilize influential Jewish leaders towards his objectives were
met with disappointment. In a letter to his collogue Dr. Ruelf dated September 27, 1882
Pinsker summarized the fruits of his efforts:
All were caught up in the whirlpool of emigration [mostly to the United
States]. They listened to my words with great sympathy, shook their heads in
agreement, even entered into a light debate; but either they did not understand
me properly, or they refused to (in Netanyahu, 1944: 125).
That Hess’ appeals to primordial bonds and a religious dialectic emphasizing the
rebuilding of Eretz Israel as a path to eternal redemption did not take root cannot be
attributed to historical circumstance—these ideas had long been central components of
the Jewish worldview. Likewise, that Pinsker’s psychologically deduced argument that
Jews would continue to endure great oppression sparked little more than an ideologically
infused social experiment by a few intellectuals should not be surprising—after all, the
bitterness of tragedy had been well known among world Jewry for thousands of years.
Instead, what was needed to launch such a immense enterprise was a man who
understood the fact that “no human being was powerful or wealthy enough to transport a
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people from one domicile to another—only an idea could create the necessary
momentum” [emphasis added] (in Adler, 1970: 7).
Laying the foundations of that idea, Theodor Herzl’s Political Zionism as
developed in his 1896 book Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) went beyond mere
intellectual and emotional pleas to establish a blueprint for the founding of a Jewish state.
Departing from high-minded schemes of the past intended to influence elitist
intellectuals, Herzl drew upon his journalistic talents to transmit a message to the
common man. Simply put, his plan sought to obtain a legal charter through international
discussion, diplomacy, positive political action, and was careful to emphasize no use of
force (Herzl, 1896). Towards this objective, the plan envisaged the establishment of two
bodies—a Society of Jews endowed with the power to negotiate on the behalf of the
Jewish people and a Jewish Company which was to put into effect what the Society of
Jews had scientifically and politically prepared (ibid: 50). To proceed otherwise, Herzl
reasoned, would be to merely transfer the fate of the Jews from one form of arbitrary rule
to another.
Publication of Der Judenstaat was met with immediate controversy. The title
itself aroused an emotional response. In the East, Herzl was seen as a modern day
Moses—“the western Jew who had returned to his people to lead them to the Promised
Land” (Adler, 1970: 24). Elsewhere, rabbis—both Orthodox and Reform—condemned
his ideas as being contrary to the fundamental principals of Judaism. On the other hand,
assimilationists feared his thesis would jeopardize their newfound political and economic
freedoms. Meanwhile, members of the First Aliyah worried that so clear an exposition of
Jewish nationalism would cause the Turkish government to frustrate Zionist ambitions in
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Palestine (ibid: 23). Nevertheless, no one could deny Herzl’s magnetism: his appeal to
the Jewish masses. As the Revisionist Zionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky later observed, “his
personality, his demeanor, his majestic appearance embodied everything that Jews were
not but sought to be” (in Rubinstein, 2000: 10).
The imagery of Herzl’s message, his exhaustive lobbying efforts, and his
charismatic appeal were essential to the convening of the First Zionist Congress just one
year after the publication of Der Judenstaat. Likewise, it was these same characteristics
which Chaim Weizmann rallied in his efforts to win international favor. As one British
official observed:
When the [First World] war began, his cause was hardly known…He once
told me that 2,000 interviews had gone into the making of the Balfour
Declaration. With unerring skill he adapted his arguments to the special
circumstances of each statesman. To the British and Americans he could use
biblical language and awake a deep emotional undertone; to other
nationalities he more often talked in terms of interest. Mr. Lloyd George was
told that Palestine was a little mountainous country not unlike Wales; with
Lord Balfour the philosophical background of Zionism could be surveyed;
for Lord Cecil the problem was placed in the setting of a new world
organization; while to Lord Milner the extension of imperial power could be
vividly portrayed (in John, 1985).
Assessment of Applicable Hypotheses
1. Was movement emergence the product of repressive institutional structures incapable
of meeting the demands of this disenfranchised people?

No. Conditions of repression and tragedy persisted for over 1800 years, yet no
movement emerged. Moreover, while post-emancipation repression may have
motivated some Jews to join the cause, it cannot be said that conditions of tragedy
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were instrumental to movement emergence since only a few enthusiasts heeded early
calls to settle Eretz-Israel.

2. Were narratives of Jewish nationalism understood and accepted by a majority of
Europeans?

Yes. Ironically, as observed by both Hess and Pinsker, it was the Jews themselves
who either did not understand or accept narratives of Jewish nationalism.
Accordingly, Jews were more likely to embrace assimilation rather than
emancipation. Nevertheless, in the eyes of many Europeans it was the particularistic
nature of that nation which constituted a ‘Jewish Problem’ (the assumption that Jews
would never fully assimilate) and thus compelled a solution to the ‘Jewish Question.’

3. Is it true that it was only through shifts in the prevailing international structure that
institutional openings were made available so that a movement for Jewish national
liberation was able to emerge?

Yes. Enlightenment thinking culminating in the Napoleonic Civil Code laid the
foundational environment for movement emergence while the fall of the Ottoman
Empire and subsequent rise of Great Britain as the region’s dominate hegemon
allowed that movement to take on concrete dimensions.

75

4. Was movement recognition a product of great power interest.

Yes. As noted by Prime Minister David Lloyd George, adoption of the Balfour
Declaration is best viewed as a military objective—encouraging Jews to promote the
interests of the Entente and as a means of holding back German and French ambitions
in the region.

5. Was Zionism’s adopted ideology and associated strategic approach as detailed in
Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat a reflection of the established international
temperament.

Yes. Herzl’s promotion of political Zionism conformed with the rapidly developing
international legal system guiding relations between sovereigns state that gained
ground throughout the nineteenth century. Moreover, his adoption of Hess’ Labor
Zionism approach to state building financed by the creation of a joint-stock company
to fund the creation of a socialist-utopia was a refection of 19th century economic
dogma and social idealism.

De Facto Recognition
On November 29, 1947 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution
181(II)—commonly known as the Partition Plan for Palestine. In doing so, the
international body had in effect recognized the de facto existence of the Jewish State of
Israel and an Arab State of Palestine (see figure 4.1). In part, it reads:
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1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any
case not longer than 1 August 1948.
2. …The Mandatory Power shall use its best endevours to ensure that an area
situated in the territory of the Jewish State…shall be evacuated at the earliest
possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
3. Independent Arab and Jewish States…will come into existence in Palestine
two months after the evacuation of the Mandatory power has been completed
but in any case not later than 1 October, 1948 (GAOR: A/RES/181(II)).

After vigorous parliamentary debate, Great

Figure 4.1- UN Partition Plan

Britain’s House of Commons recognized the partition
of Palestine to be the most prudent path forward and
on December 11th announced its intentions to
terminate the Mandate at midnight on May 14, 1948
(HANSARD, 1947: Vol. 445). At 4pm on that date—
eight hours prior to the official termination of British
rule (due to Sabbath restrictions)—David Ben-Gurion
declared, “We, the members of the National Council,
representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the
Zionist movement the world over…By virtue of our
natural and historic right and the strength of the
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a
Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel (PGI, 1947: No. 1). Eleven
minutes later President Harry Truman declared, “The United States recognizes the
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provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state of Israel” (Truman,
1947).
Guided by the variable definitions and process hypotheses which inform this
study, this section seek to find causation for Zionism’s de facto recognition on the basis
of several assumptions. 1) That movement members maintained unity in their steadfast
execution of Theodor Herzl’s plan and were able to rally allies toward the attainment of
that plan’s objectives. 2) That by adhering to hegemonic preferences while exploiting
existing political cleavages in the prevailing international temperament, movement
members were able to create the conditions of statehood as established in the Montevideo
Convention as well as a viable economic and defense base; and in turn, were able to have
those conditions recognized as a de facto state by the international community. 3) That in
the final surge for de facto recognition a shift in hegemonic preferences had taken place
resulting in divided great power interests thus affording movement leaders greater leeway
in their tactical choices. 4) Finally, that de facto recognition was an interest of the
system’s most significant great power.
For the sake of clarity, this section will be divided into two parts. The first
subsection covers the early, mostly pro-Zionist environment. It then turns attention to the
gradual erosion of external support, culminating with the British White Paper of 1939.
The second subsection examines the consequences of this change in loyalties, the way in
which WWII and the post-war hegemonic order re-orientated the movement’s objective
and approach, as well as the consequent impact of an increasingly defiant and self-reliant
Jewish offensive on great-power policy options.
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Figure 4.2 - Hussien—McMahon Letters

International System (1917-1939)
Speaking to the audacity of the Balfour
Declaration, noted journalist Arthur Koestle
observed, “In that document one nation
solemnly promised a second nation the country
of a third” (1949: 4). Taking that observation
several steps further, the territory promised was
at that time still part of the Empire of a fourth.
Meanwhile, even before the British had come
into possession of that territory, and even before
they had promised parts of it to the second, they
were engage in negotiations with the leader of a
fifth over the future of the entire region. A
contract which they were unable to fulfill with
the sighing of a treaty with yet a sixth (France).

Seeking to enlist Arab support for a revolt against Ottoman rulers, as early as
1914 British officials in Cairo entered into talks with the Sharif of Mecca Hussein Bin
Ali. In exchange for Arab cooperation the High Commissioner to Cairo, Sir Henry
McMahon, was authorized ensure Bin Ali Arab independence after the war within an illdefined territory. In a series of correspondences taking place between 1915 and 1916, Bin
Ali sought clarification on the precise territory promised. In a letter dated October 24,
1915 McMahon attempted to put the matter to rest by making a series of pledges which in
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sum promised all of the Arabian Peninsula—“subject to modification”—excluding the
districts of Mersin and Alexandria and portions of Syria lying west of Damascus, Homs,
Hama, and Aleppo—see figure 4.2 (McMahon, 1915). On the basis of Sir Henry’s
pledge, Sharif Hussein declared war against the Ottoman on June 5, 1916.
Even before Hussein’s

Figure 4.3 –The Sykes-Picot Agreement

commitment, however, British officials
were engaged in negotiations with French
authorities over post-war spheres of
influence in the region. These talks
culminated with the Sykes-Picot
Agreement of 1916; effectively ceasing to
France much of what had been promised to
Sharif Hussein (Figure 4.3). Complicating
Figure 4.4- Zionist Vision

matters even further, the 1917 Balfour
Declaration’s commitment to the Jews spurred
Zionist ambitions which sought to reclaim their
vision of the ancient Kingdom of Israel. All this
done with little attention paid to the practical
matter of addressing the citizenship right of
those residents already living west of the Jordan
River.
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As the regional and global hegemon, Great Britain had its final say on the matter
with publication of the 1922 White Paper. Recalling McMahon’s letter of October 1915,
it declared:
This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty’s Government as
covering the Vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The
whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H.
McMahon’s pledge (Churchill, 1922).
Despite this affirmation of Jewish ambitions in the region, over the course of the
next twenty-five years British policy towards the Zionist enterprise gradually eroded; in
time, taking the form of outright hostility. Initially, modernization of the newly acquired
territory was among the highest British priorities. Nevertheless, Great Britain’s dual
commitments to “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”
(Balfour, 1917) while doing nothing “which might prejudice the civil and religious rights
of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Council of the League of Nations,
1922) were immediately exposed as incompatible and untenable.
Witnessing the rapid and expanding growth of the Yishuv (the Jewish community
in Palestine), Arab residents of Palestine quickly came to fear their subjection to a Jewish
minority. These fears were confirmed with the arrival of a third wave of Jewish
immigrants beginning in 1919. Freshly schooled in socialist Zionism, these idealist
working-class pioneers joined forces with members of the Second Aliyah (1904-1914) to
greatly expand the Jewish presence in Palestine through land purchases, infrastructure
creation, and institution building. The potential for overt aggression between Arabs and
Jews was further exasperated when members of Britain’s Occupied Enemy Territory
Administration (OETA)—the very organization designated to facilitate the establishment
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of a Jewish homeland in Palestine—began to demonstrate overt signs of anti-Semitism.
Openly advocating a revocation of the Belfour Declaration, OETA leaders went so far as
to instigate an Arab uprising (the Nebi Musa riots of 1920) against the Jews in the hopes
of convincing the Entente powers of the dangers involved should they support the
establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Palin Commission, 1920).
The riots of 1920 were followed by similar organized uprisings in 1924, 1929,
and from 1936 to 1939. In each case, the British government lunched a commission of
inquiry; ostensibly seeking to strike a balance between the fears of the two parties. From
the Zionist’s perspective, however, each ensuing White Paper was more menacing then
the former. In fact, to Yishuv members it appeared that the Arab populace of Palestine
was being rewarded for their attacks on Jews and Jewish assets—that British elite
structures were becoming more confrontational towards the Jewish cause while teaching
the perpetuators of violence the benefits of their behavior.
The Churchill White Paper, for example, brought into the open developing
political cleavages within the halls Parliament by demonstrating fissures with the
government’s earlier support for “all necessary measures [to be] taken to encourage and
stimulate immigration into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle
Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of
the soil.” (Faisal- Weizmann, 1919). Instead, the new policy sought to limit Jewish
immigration by stating that it should not be “so great in volume as to exceed whatever
may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals”
(Churchill, 1922). The White Paper further recommended establishing a joint Jewish-
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Arab council to regulate Jewish immigration and called into question the scope of Great
Britain’s earlier territorial commitment to Jewish settlement (ibid).
Then in reaction to the Western Wall riots of 1929, the Passfield White Paper of
1930 drew upon the findings of both the 1929 Shaw Commission and the 1930 HopeSimpson Report to draw similar conclusions. Passfield and his colleagues found that the
fundamental cause for Arab unrest in Palestine stemmed from:
the economic depression, under which they undoubtedly suffer at present,
[that was] largely due to excessive Jewish immigration, and so long as some
grounds exist upon which this suspicion may be plausibly represented to be
well founded, there can be little hope of any improvement in the mutual
relations of the two races (Passfield, 1930).
Upon that basis and in consideration of the economic and geographic capacity of
Palestine, the Government of Great Britain took steps to limit Jewish land purchases
while a the same time attempted to severely restrict Jewish immigration—“a move that in
its implementation,” said Chaim Weizmann, “was in complete contravention to its earlier
commitments” (1983(1): 606).
Fears of a British reversal on it its earlier pledge to the Jewish people were
confirmed in 1939 with publication of the MacDonald White Paper. Amplified by the
Peel Commission’s recommendation for the partition of Palestine (1937: XXII), the Arab
Riots of 1936-9 gave rise to yet another stiffening of British policy vis-à-vis the Yishuv.
While David Ben-Gurion (1937) and other Zionist leaders (JTA, 1938) enthusiastically
endorsed partition as a step towards statehood, the Woodhead Commission of 1938 found
“the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create
independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the
problem [was] impracticable.” As a consequence, the 1939 MacDonald White Paper
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departed radically from British policy of the past by calling for the creation of an
independent Palestinian State within 10 years and noted “unequivocally” that it is not part
of [His Majesty’s Government’s] policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.”
Towards this end, the Paper set strict limitation on Jewish land purchases and limited
Jewish immigration to not more than 10,000 persons per year for five years. It then
asserted that “after the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration [was to] be
permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it” (MacDonald,
1939).

Movement Approach (1917-1939)
The international system of the 1920s and 1930s was one of both constriction and
opportunity. On the one hand, Jews in many parts of the global were experiencing greater
freedoms, better economic conditions, and could look to Palestine as a refuge of last
resort. On the other hand, US restriction on Jewish immigration, growing anti-Semitic
hostility in parts of Europe, and the rise of the Nazi party in Germany were all indicators
pointing to the need for an autonomous Jewish state. As we have just seen, however, the
Mandate power increasing came to see such an endeavor as a danger to its interests in the
region, and to that end, sought to frustrate Zionist aims from the outset. Setting this
policy into motion, the British White paper of 1922 states:

The Secretary of State is of the opinion that before a further measure of selfgovernment is extended to Palestine…the institutions of the country will have
become well established; its financial credit will be based on firm
foundations, and the Palestinian officials [in this context, both Arabs and
Jews] will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of
government (Churchill, 1922).
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One consequence of this challenge was that the Jewish community in Palestine
took measures to create an autonomous political infrastructure and security apparatus
parallel to that of the British administration. In truth, the process had begun decades
earlier.
In accord with Herzl’s original vision, the First Zionist Congress of 1897 set out
to overcome four fundamental hurdles. First, establish the necessary political institutions
and infrastructure that would serve as the foundations of a future state. Second, convince
an as yet unenthusiastic world Jewry of the need for an independent Jewish state, and in
that process, overcome deep and often rigid ideological, social, economic, political, and
religious divisions. Third, establish a reliable source of financial resources needed to
sustain and carry the movement forward. And finally, forge political alliances with
influential powers in the drive to obtain legal recognition of the movement itself and its
ultimate object.
As their first order of business, delegates to the First Zionist Congress established
the World Zionist Congress—Herzl’s “Society of Jews.” A mostly democratic institution
(woman could attend, but not vote), the WZC was “a synthesis of all forces to be found in
Zionism,” (Weizmann, 1901; in 1983(1): 9) and quickly established itself as a centralized
policymaking body; the final arbiter of what was and what was not to be considered
official Zionist policy. This founding institution was accompanied by the formation of the
World Zionist Organization—Herzl’s “Jewish Company.” As the administrative arm of
the Zionist movement, the WZO was tasked with putting Congress’ policies into action.
Primary among these duties was the making of preparations for the establishment of a
Jewish homeland in Ottoman-ruled Palestine.
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The first undertaking pursued by the WZO was the raising of capital necessary for
the implementation of the Zionist venture. It had always been Herzl’s hope that funding
for the Zionist project would come from that small class of ‘Jewish money magnets’ who
would invest in the movement if not for reasons of ideological solidarity, then for the
prospects of profit (Herzl, 1896: 74–75). To the leadership’s dismay wealthy Jews, with
few exceptions, proved to be neither Zionists nor willing to invest in the Jewish
enterprise. Overcoming this setback, the leadership established Karen Keyemth Le Israel
(the Jewish National Fund—JNF or KKL) in 1901. The agency was charged primarily
with purchasing land in Palestine thorough its subordinate Karen Heyesod, but whose
very creation yielded two unforeseen benefits.
In its efforts to raise finances for land purchases, KKL capitalized on the network
of Jewish societies spread throughout Europe and North America to establish pro-Zionist
organizations in every community. As part of its efforts to recruit supporters, KKL drew
upon the local resources of these organizations to distribute ‘blue boxes’ (charity boxes)
to individual families who could not afford to donate large sums but could support the
movement with small amounts of pocket change. Not only did the blue box campaign
alleviate the movement’s reliance on wealthy Jewish magnets; more importantly, it
turned the movement into a truly mass movement in that it made even the most
improvised contributor feel as if he/she was apart of something momentous. As KKL’s
first president put it:
The idea of JNF caught the imagination of tens of thousands of people
throughout the Diaspora, from the smallest Eastern European Shtetl to the
largest American metropolis…The blue boxes forged a link of love between
Diaspora Jewry and the land of Israel; between those living there and the idea
of redeeming the land (Krementzky).
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The blue box campaign and other like-minded initiatives also served as a bridge
to those Jews who were willing to reject their Jewish identity, and in some cases were
even hostile to the Zionist cause, but in the end, could not turn their backs on their fellow
kinsmen. As Chaim Weizmann observed:
Those wealthy Jews who could not wholly divorce themselves from a feeling
of responsibility toward their people, but at the same time could not identify
themselves with the hopes of the masses, were prepared with a sort of lefthanded generosity, on condition that their right hand did not know what the
left hand was doing…They would give—with disclaimers; and we would
accept—with reservations (Weizmann, 1949: 75).
Over time, however, critics of Herzlian Zionism became evermore vocal and
nearly derailed the movement from its outset. On one side of the spectrum there were the
staunch anti-Zionist. Hasidic Jews who rejected the movement’s aim of returning world
Jewry to Eretz-Israel on the grounds that such a venture was contradictory to Talmudic
teachings. Assimilationists on the other had rebuffed Zionism believing that if a Jewish
state were to be establish their adopted home countries may demand their departure.
Situated at the other end of the spectrum were revisionist Zionists headed by Ze’ev
Jabotinsky. Revisionists believed that Herzl’s political-Zionism did not go far enough.
They demanded that all of greater Israel should be reclaimed—in including that which
extended into Transjordan (see Fig. 4.4)—and reclaimed by force rather than a negotiated
legal charter.
In the middle rested the heart of the movement; including practical Zionists—
socialist-minded settlers who sought to revive the Jewish community in Palestine through
intensive Jewish immigration and rural development; cultural Zionists—those committed
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to the rebirth of Jewish culture, the Hebrew language, intellectual scholarship, and
spiritual being within the parameters of either a Jewish homeland or sovereign state; and
Political Zionist whose sole aim was firmly established and affirmed by the First Zionist
Congress in 1897 as the “creat[ion] for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by
public law” (Basel Program, 1897).
In addition to these long-standing factions, an additional bloc emerged
immediately upon adoption of the Basel Program. Territorialists sought to establish a
Jewish homeland regardless of location. Their cause took on serious dimensions in 1903
when “His Majesty’s Government,” declared that it “will be prepared to entertain
favourably proposals for the establishment of a Jewish Colony…if a suitable site had
been found…in East Africa” (Clement, 1903). Whereas territorialists embraced the offer
with full-vigor, political Zionists were only willing to consider the ‘Uganda Proposal’ as
a temporary refuge. In particular, a safe haven for those Russian Jews in need of shelter.
Upon further study, however, the Uganda proposal was deemed ill-suited to Jewish
settlement and flatly rejected by the Seventh Zionist Congress of 1905. Feeling wholly
betrayed, Territorialists led by Israel Zangwill walked out in protest; eventually
withdrawing from the WZO to form the Jewish Territorialists Organization. The split
nearly brought an abrupt end to the nascent movement.
Elucidating the costly effects of the divide, Weizmann pointed out that problem
involved two sides of the same coin. On the one hand governments would not grant legal
recognition to a non-entity while without an entity to settle, the Jewish people would
remain uninspired. Weizmann therefore recommended to movement’s leaders that they
continue in their diplomatic efforts to secure legal recognition (Weizmann, 1983-I: 65).
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Concomitantly he asserting that foreign governments would only take serious note of the
Zionist’s aspirations when the movement had demonstrated its capability of being in
possession of Palestine—“so far we have made our claims” he declared, “but we haven’t
shown that we can be of use” (1983-I: 67, 69). To this end, he unreservedly threw his
support behind settlement in Palestine viewing such action as the only practical means of
obtaining the political objective. In Congress he explained:
The Jewish people has not yet expressed a will. True, but show me the means
you are to employ to get it to manifest its will. Is it not proof of will when a
great part of the Zionist ranks goes to Palestine and says…‘in spite of the
continuing critical situation, we shall go all the same, because there is no
other way’ (Weizmann, 1983-I: 68).
Although not formally adopted as the singular operational mode of the WZO until
the Tenth Congress of 1911, Weizmann’s ‘synthetic Zionism’ – the pursuit of
international diplomatic efforts in combination with the active creation of a proto-state in
Palestine – can be counted as one of the Zionist movement’s greatest achievements. A
melding of factional aspirations allowing territorialists to return to the mainstream
movement soon thereafter.
With the seed capital of less than ₤8 million—a fraction of what was deemed
necessary to launch the envisioned program (Israeli Foreign Ministry, 2011)—the WZO
founded the Jewish Colonial Trust and the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Jaffa “for the purpose
of promoting Zionist work there and of furthering the economic development of the
country” (JTA, 1934). While this important first step was essential for the provision of
basic needs to new immigrants (olim), it was the blue box campaign which forged a
national consciousness. Binding Jews across the globe in a common and universally
understood cause, the campaign inspired thousands to embark on the arduous journey to
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Palestine in search of redemption. Thus in accordance with the prescriptions set out by
synthetic Zionism, at the international level the WZO, KKL, and the Jewish Agency
looked over matters of fundraising, recruitment, and negotiations on behalf of the Jewish
people, while in Palestine itself the movement began to take on a life of its own.
Described by the League of Nations (1921) as a largely barren area—“desolate to
the last degree of desolation…undeveloped and under-populated [where] the methods of
agriculture are, for the most part, primitive,” members of the second and third aliyahs
transformed the land. As the League Nations reported:
[Jewish colonists] developed the culture of oranges and gave importance to
the Jaffa orange trade. They cultivated the vine, and manufactured and
exported wine. They drained swamps. They planted eucalyptus trees. They
practiced, with modern methods, all the processes of agriculture. There are at
the present time 64 of these settlements, large and small, with a population of
some 15,000 (1921)
Aside from a network of agricultural settlements, by 1920 members of the Yishuv
had begun to develop the institutions of self government, economic independence, and
social enrichment. Vaad Leumi served as the national council and the executive arm of
the legislative body; the Assembly of Representatives. The Assembly itself was
populated by no less 19 democratically elected parties in 1920 and was thereafter
dominated by the mostly left-leaning socialist parties Labor and Mapai—both dedicated
to establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine with an emphasis on immigration and
pioneering settlement (Edelheit, 2000: 549-550). Facilitating integration of newly arrived
pioneers, the Jewish Agency settled olim on land acquired by Karen Hayesod and worked
with the Histadrut labor union that had “established training centers, helped to absorb
new immigrants, and funded and managed large-scale agricultural and industrial
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enterprises” (Reich, 2008: 23). Finally, in response to Arab attacks and British reluctance
to implement effective countermeasures, the Yishuv maintained a network of mostly
defensive armed forces that gradually matured into a unified unit—the Haganah.
By 1939 it could not be denied that a de facto Jewish community had come into
full existence in Palestine. As the MacDonald White Paper, perhaps reluctantly,
summarized:
During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a
community now numbering 80,000, of whom about one fourth are farmers or
workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an
elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils
in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its
elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its
religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular
language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive
intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This
community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious
and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has
in fact ‘national’ characteristics (MacDonald, 1939).

Movement Approach (1940 - 1947)
With the outbreak of war in Europe, Zionist leaders faced a double dilemma. On
the one hand they felt it prudent to demonstrate their loyalty to the British; viewing that
path as the surest route to autonomous rule. On the other hand, they quickly surmised the
fate which awaited European Jewry and accordingly recognized the need for mass
immigration to Palestine—be it through legal channels or in violation of the 1939 White
Paper’s dictates. With these dual challenges in mind, in September 1939 David BenGurion succinctly articulated the movement’s new strategic posture: “we shall fight the
war against Hitler as if there were no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as
if there were no war” (in Mortimer, 2002: 54). As a result, a more assertive posture and
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proactive mode of operations came to dominate the strategic planning of the movement’s
mainstream throughout the war. Some however, believed these reforms to be a retreat; far
too passive in light of world Jewry’s existing challenges.
As early as 1923, a discernable split could be detected between the followers of
synthetic Zionism—those who subscribed to a dual settlement-diplomacy strategy—and
those who assessed matters in rigid realist terms; thinking it folly to proceed in any other
manner than active self-assertion. As Ze’ev Jobotinsky explained:
It is of no importance whether we quote Herzl or Herbert Samuel to justify
our activities. Colonization itself has its own explanation, integral and
inescapable, and understood by every Arab and every Jew with his wits about
him. Colonization can have only one goal. For the Palestinian Arabs this goal
is inadmissible. This is in the nature of things. To change that nature is
impossible.
This colonization can, therefore, continue and develop only under the
protection of a force independent of the local population – an iron wall which
the native population cannot break through. This is, in toto, our policy
towards the Arabs. To formulate it any other way would only be hypocrisy
(1923).
Staunchly adhering to their founder’s guiding principles which asserted that:
“every Jew had the right to enter Palestine; only active retaliation would deter the Arabs;
only Jewish armed force would ensure the Jewish state”( Jobotinsky in Sachar: 265-266),
revisionists leaders organized under the banner, HaZack (strength) strongly urged
mainstream Zionist leaders to abandon their policy of havalga (restraint). Unable to
convince the Zionist Executive to adopt a more aggressive approach, revisionists
withdrew from the WZO in 1935 to form the New Zionist Organization (NZO). The NZO
and its paramilitary arm the Irgun soon thereafter emerged as a serious challenge to the
mainstream Zionist leadership.
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The outbreak of Arab riots in 1936 and the subsequent publication of the Peel
Commission Report in 1937 inspired the NZO and its Irgun leadership to put into practice
the philosophy of HaZack. Augmented by members of the Haganah who could no longer
support the policy of havalga, the result was a three-pronged strategy that, in the end,
forced Zionism’s mainstream to reassess its ultimate objective and consequent tactics.
This strategy included 1) the forging of an “iron wall” through the creation of a proactive
Jewish militia; 2) the pursuit of what Jabotinsky termed “the evacuation of Europe” by
means of illegal immigration; and 3) the implementation of active retaliation as a means
to deter Arab attacks while concomitantly raising the cost of British occupation. The
latter of these approaches became entrenched on November 14, 1937 when Irgun units
carried out 15 attacks on Arab targets; including city busses and cafes (Shindler,
(2013:35). The incident set into motion a decade-long wave of Jewish resistance targeting
both Arab and British assets.
Despite their commitment to the strategy of active retaliation, with the onset of
World War II Irgun leaders declared a pause in operations against the British; turning the
whole of their attention to anti-Nazi operations and defense of the Yishuv (Edelheit: 560).
Viewing this shift in policy as a betrayal of the Irgun’s core principal of HaZach,
Abraham Stern and several dozen like-mined associates split with the Irun to form
Lehi—Fighters for the Freedom of Israel. For Stern and his disciples “Britain was the
enemy because she occupied Palestine and thereby barred the way for Jewish
independence” (Bauer: 1966, 203). It was therefore Lehi’s objective to “prove that Jewish
nuisance value was no less dangerous than the Arab variety [that had led to British]
capitulation to Arab demands contained in the White Paper” (ibid: 188).
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That Great Britain and the Jewish nation no longer shared in a common interest
was made resoundingly clear in 1942 at the Extraordinary Zionist Conference where
American and other Zionist leaders affirmed their “unalterable rejection of the White
Paper of May1939 and denie[d] its moral or legal validity” (EZC, “Biltmore Program,”
1942). Shaming Britain, members urged:
…that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested
with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority
for upbuilding the country…and that Palestine be established as a Jewish
Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world
(Isseroff, 2008).
A radical departure from mainstream Zionist policy of the past, the Biltmore
Program not only asserted the movement’s intention to defy British directives, it also
revealed an intent to establish a sovereign Jewish state rather than merely settling for a
Jewish homeland. In effect the meeting and its influential outcome represented a strategic
shift towards a more assertive approach. More concretely, the meeting set the stage for a
transfer of authority from the old guard—the internationally-centered political Zionists
headed by Chaim Weizmann—to a new guard led by David Ben-Gurion and his Yishuvbased Mapai party. It also singled a rise in prominence of American Zionists; a bloc
whose influence in Washington would later prove to be instrumental to the forging of US
foreign policy vis-à-vis the Zionist struggle and the state of Israel itself.
While dictates of the Biltmore Declaration signaled a pivotal turn against the
British, in reality the Zionist leadership vacillated between cooperation and resistance
over the next seven years. Early on, it was decided that although the movement should
resist British policy vis-à-vis the Yishuv, it needed to support Great Britain in its war
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with Nazi Germany because that was a priority of the highest urgency. Importantly, this
decision yielded the Haganah professional military training; an asset that later proved to
be a decisive factor in the surge for statehood. In the meantime, the Haganah and its
political leadership cooperated with the British when it served their larger interests—
going so far as to assist British forces in the capture and arrest of rival Jewish factions. At
other times—when it did not critically jeopardize their ultimate political objective—
mainstream Zionists worked in concert with those same factions to frustrate and/or
subvert British designs.
As the war wound down, Jewish resistance factions became evermore brazen.
Although sometimes reigned in by Haganah forces who a) feared British reprisals, and b)
sought to unite Jewish forces under a single command, violence persisted throughout the
post-war period peaking with the assassination of British Minister of State Lord Moyne
in 1944 and the 1946 bombing of the Mandate’s administrative headquarters housed in
Jerusalem’s King Davis Hotel. As the Irgun’s post-war leader Menachem Begin
explained, the organization’s ultimate objective was to increase the costs of British
occupation; “to force her to change her policy, and ultimately, cause her to abandon
Palestine altogether” (in Bauer: 1966: 202).
While the resistance was effective at rising the cost of continued British
occupation, for their part the Haganah and Jewish Agency turned attention towards
shaming British authorities. This entailed vocal pronouncements of Great Britain’s
abandonment of the Jewish people in their hour of most need, as well as public acts of
defiance thorough deliberate attempts to defy Great Britain’s immigration policy. The
fruits of this public diplomacy campaign were realized in 1947 when British authorities
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turned back refugees attempting to enter Palestine aboard the steamer ship Exodus.
Followed closely by the international press, the decision to return these ailing refuges to a
displaced persons camp in Germany caused the British profound public embarrassment. It
also pressed members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)
to find a resolution to the Jewish refugee problem as well a solution to the question of
Palestine as a whole.

International System (1940 - 1947)
Throughout the post-White Paper era British interests had been guided by the
need to secure reliable sources of oil in support to the war effort, a desire to maintain
low-levels of violence in Palestine so as to not divert forces from the European front, and
a need to maintain lines of communications linking London and Delhi via Cairo and
Jerusalem. In order to obtain these objectives, the government of Neville Chamberlain
reasonably concluded that it was in Great Britain’s best interests to forge good relations
with Arab leaders. As a consequence, Zionist leaders fumbled to develop a coherent
strategy throughout the war and post-war periods while Great Britain’s stance toward the
Yishuv and Palestine remained unyielding. Elsewhere, however, powerful forces alert to
the images of Nazi death camps and aware of Great Britain’s policy refusing refugees the
ability to find safety in Palestine made their voices clearly heard.
For its part, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees concluded that the
“treatment of the Jews by the Allies was little different than what they knew under the
Nazis except we do not exterminate them.” Members accordingly, recommended “the
quick evacuation of non-repatriable Jews in Germany and Austria, who wish it, to
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Palestine” (1944). Meanwhile, U.S. Representatives responding to a sea of letters
introduced two identical bills into the United States Congress, each demanding:
That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate
measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be open for free entry of
Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for
colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine
as a free and democratic commonwealth (US Congress: H. Res 418, and H.
Res 419 in USCR 1944: 963).
President Truman assessed the push to allow Jewish refugees to enter Palestine as
“good sense and good policy’ (in Reich: 37). Not everyone agreed. Secretary of War
Henry L. Stinson, for example, warned that passage of the resolutions “would provoke
dangerous repercussions in areas where we have many vital military interests” (1944:
563). The State Department concurred, “fear[ing] developments in Palestine would cause
upheaval in the Arab world which the USSR might capitalize upon” (in Ottolenghi, 2004:
968). This fear was heightened on October 7, 1944 when the newly formed League of
Arab States issued the Alexandria Protocol, declaring:
The Committee is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British
Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the
preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for
Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would
constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace
and security… there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving
the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting
injustice on the Arabs of Palestine (LAS, 1944).
In a letter dated April 5, 1945, President Roosevelt assured King Ibn Saud that he
“would take no action, in [his] capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this
Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people” (1945: 623). He also assured
the King that no decision would be made vis-à-vis Jewish refugees and Palestine without
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consultation. Upon Truman’s ascension to the Oval Office, however, the new president
calculated that a significant number of displaced persons could immigrate to Palestine
without driving the Arab world into the hands of the Soviets. This assessment was based
on the understanding that Saudi Arabia was intricately intertwined to the US economy,
and moreover, that King Ibn Saud was desperately seeking stronger US guarantees
against Soviet hostility (Ottolenghi: 971-972). As Truman biographer Michael Ottolenghi
(2004) put it, the administration saw an opportunity to tie the regimes of the Middle East
to the US without inserting US troops while at the same time shoring up its bulwark
against soviet expansionism along the Northern Tier (967). This brought the White
House’s strategic vision of the Middle East into accord with that of the War Department’s
concerns while playing into the State Department’s three-pronged approach to Palestine:
1) working towards a peaceful resolution of the Jewish-Arab conflict, 2) denying
Palestine and the region to the Soviets, and 3) ensuring that US troops would not be
implicated in Palestine (ibid).
It was the last of these objectives which seemed to worry the Attlee government
most. Truman himself had written Attlee requesting the immediate admission of 100,000
Jewish refugees into Palestine (Truman, 1945). However, given America’s freshly
formulated foreign policy objectives, the United Kingdom feared that U.S. pressure for
Jewish immigration would not be backed by US military commitments, thus leaving
Great Britain to deal with the political and military consequences alone (Ottolenghi: 970).
In reaction to the President’s ‘meddling,’ Attlee seized the opportunity to entangle the
United States further; suggesting a joint committee be established with the aim of
“[examining] the political, economic, and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon
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the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the
peoples living therein” (Anglo-American Committee, 1946).
The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry submitted its report to the
governments of the United States and United Kingdom in April of 1946. “Profoundly
impressed” by the Yishuv’s governing capacity, committee members deemed the
immediate issuance of 100,000 immigration certificates to be appropriate (ibid: chp VIII).
They further recommend that future Jewish immigration policy be conducted under the
terms of the Mandate (i.e. unlimited) and that the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940
restricting Jewish land purchases be rescinded (ibid: chp. X). In sum, the report amounted
to nothing less than a repudiation of the 1939 White Paper.
On the heels of the committee’s report and reflecting the extraordinary
importance each administration attached to the situation in Palestine, in June 1946
President Truman established a cabinet-level commission on Palestine consisting of the
Secretaries of State, the Secretary of War, and the Treasury. Similarly, Prime Minister
Attlee appointed a high-level committee seated by representatives of the Foreign Office,
the Colonial Office, Treasury and the Military Services. Then, in keeping with their
earlier commitment to jointly reach a unified policy, Attlee and Truman appointed a six
member commission to examine the recommendations of the Anglo-American
Committee and to arrive at broad principals to guide future policy. The resulting GradyMorrison Plan suggested that the British High Commissioner remain in control of
defense, foreign relations, customs, and immigration while calling for a division of
Palestine into semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish regions. They further recommended a
repeal of the Land Transfer Regulation and called for a one-year allowance of 100,000
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Jewish refugees to enter Palestine; after which, limits on immigration would be set by
British authorities (Grady-Morrison, 1946, 652-68).
The Attlee Government estimated it would cost between £115,000,000 and
£125,000,000 to absorb the additional 100,00 Jews and require between 300,000 and
400,000 additional soldiers to keep the peace. Apprising the President of these concerns,
U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes reported: “the British are convinced that they would not be
in the position to put the report into operation without substantial financial and military
contributions from the US Gov[ernment]” (FRUS, 1946: 602). It was later reported back
to London, that given the Jewish Agency’s rejection of the proposal as a basis for
discussion5 and the intense feelings expressed by the American Jewish community,
neither US political party would be able to support the committee’s proposals at that time
(ibid: 674). For their part, the Arabs too condemned the plan; rejecting any form of
partition and calling for the immediate independence of Palestine. Meanwhile, in
Palestine itself Jewish terrorism persisted unabated as the Jewish Agency adamantly
refused to assist British forces in their efforts to put an end to the bloodshed.
Unable to find a compromise between Jewish and Arab factions and no longer
able to absorb the costs of administrating Palestine alone, the Prime Minister’s cabinet
decided that “the right course of action was to submit the whole problem to the United
Nations…if the settlement suggested by the United Nations were not acceptable to us”
they concluded, “we should be at liberty to surrender the Mandate” (in Geddes, 1991:
245). On April 2, 1947 the United Kingdom Ambassador to the United Nations,

5

The Agency demanded not only the immediate grant of 100,000 certificates, but full political and
economic autonomy and the right to control immigration in that part of Palestine that it demanded to be
designated as a Jewish State (FRUS, 1946: 680).
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Alexander Cadogan, asked the Secretary-General to place the question of Palestine on the
agenda of the General Assembly and suggested a special committee be formed to instruct
the Assembly on a prudent path forward (GAOR: A/286). The United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) submitted its findings to the Assembly on August 31,
1947; ultimately recommending the partitioning of Palestine into a Jewish state and an
Arab state. De facto recognition of the State of Israel was thus achieved on November 29,
1947 with the Assembly’s adoption Resolution 181(II) and that resolution’s subsequent
acceptance by both Great Britain and the United States, as well as the Soviet Union.

Assessment of Applicable Hypotheses
1. To what extent was a preconceived plan conducive the movement’s creation of de
facto conditions?

Strongly. Herzl’s Der Judenstaat provided a detailed blueprint for the movement’s
organizational structure and established a strategic path for the attainment of
Zionism’s objectives. That this plan was essential to advancing the cause and staying
the course when things did not go as planned can be evidence in the innovation of the
blue box campaign and Weizmann’s ability to return a divided movement to its
foundational strategic approach by means of synthetic Zionism.

2. Were allies essential to attainment of de facto conditions and recognition?

Moderately. It is difficult to conceive a scenario in which Zionism would have
attained a firm and legitimatized foothold in Palestine (or anywhere else for that
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matter) without the diplomatic and institutional support of Great Britain.
Nevertheless, as witnessed in each successive White Paper beginning in 1922, British
support quickly diminished and no other allies ever emerged to afford the Zionists
direct aid.

3. Did internal fractionalization facilitate or frustrate the movement’s efforts?

Moderately Facilitated. The Zionist movement was made up of many factions each
promoting a differing ‘texture’ (i.e. cultural, religious, socialist, etc) to the
movement’s secondary aims. These were largely resolved through the movement’s
democratic institutional processes. Strategic divisions on the other hand, were far
more confrontational. The political Zionist –Territorialist divide, for example, nearly
derailed the Zionist project from its outset. Conversely, while the split between the
mainstream and revisionists sometimes reached the level of internal violence, in the
end the Irgun and Lehi’s acts of terrorism hastened Great Britain’s departure.

4. Did external political cleavages and divergent elite strategies condition the
movement’s approach?

Yes. Aside from Chaim Weizmann’s ability to rally the support of a mostly
accommodating British elite in 1917, the historiography reveals little evidence to
indicate that Zionist leaders were able to exploit internal British divisions over
Mandate policy. With the rise to prominence of the United States, however, both the
movement’s leaders and their operatives were afford greater freedom of action. In
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accord with Miller and Kagan’s (1997) prediction, the competitive postures take up
by the great powers resulted in an increase in violence within Palestine and an
expansion of illegal immigration activities abroad. At the same time, these political
cleavages were exploited by Jewish political leaders to rally American support as a
counter-balance to Great Britain’s defiant stance vis-à-vis Zionist ambitions.

5. Was de facto recognition preceded by a shift in the hegemonic order and was that
shift fundamental to success?

Yes. World War II greatly diminished Great Britain’s hegemonic role, leaving the
United States in a position of regional dominance. Hence with US backing, the
decision to partition Palestine seemed to be an obvious choice for a war-ravaged
international community seeking an expeditious solution to an intractable quagmire
itself had created three decades earlier.

6. Was de facto recognition a great power interest?

Yes. The mounting refugee problem in Europe pointing to impending crisis
demanded a comprehensive and lasting response. Opening Palestine to increased
Jewish immigration seemed an obvious solution to all but Arab States and Great
Britain—for its part, the Attlee government understood the increased pressures that
would come to bear on its resources. As for the U.S. recognizing the crisis to be a
U.S. interest, it was up to President Truman to find a solution while advancing
America’s post-war regional role. Endorsing partition, Truman devised a strategy that
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would advert disaster while keeping the Arab states aligned with the West and at the
same time confound Soviet expansionalism into the Middle East.

De Jure Affirmation
On September 16, 1948 United Nations Mediator on Palestine, Folke Bernadotte,
reported to the General Assembly the unalterable fact that “A Jewish State called Israel
exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to
do so” (GAOR: A/648). Despite this appreciable observation, the Jewish state of Israel
had not yet been recognized as a legitimate entity—as a full member of the international
community endowed with the legal rights and protections of states and burdened by the
duties thereof. Nevertheless, unlike the Jewish state’s fight for de facto recognition—
which from the convening of the First Zionist Congress to the Partition of Palestine lasted
precisely 50 years—the struggle for the State of Israel’s de jure recognition was
completed in less than a year. Not without a fight however.

International System
Bitterly opposed by the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine and surrounding
Arab States, the decision to partition Palestine was meet with immediate armed conflict
on the part of the Palestinian Arabs. Following an emergency meeting held on November
30, 1947, the Arab Higher Committee called for a three-day general strike to begin
December 2nd. The Committee ordered a complete boycott of Jews and said that persons
found dealing with Jews would be considered traitors. It announced that it would soon
take the “necessary preliminary measures for implementing a non-cooperation policy in
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preparation for a declared state of emergency” (JTA, 1947). In the spiral of violence that
followed, the United Nations Palestine Commission reported that by April 3, 1948, some
1,977 persons had lost their lives while another 4,210 had been wounded—Arab civilians
suffering the greatest losses in each category (GAOR: A/532).
In light of the ferocity demonstrated in opposition to partition, great powers
including the United States, the Soviet Union, and France began to reassess their earlier
support for partition. Despite wishing to establish herself as a central figure within the
UN system while at the same time asserting herself as dominate power in the Middle
East, France withdrew its support immediately after the historic UN vote hoping to
maintain a low profile and to not agitate her Arab allies (Herschco, 2008). For the
Soviets, although officially condemning Zionism as a form of “bourgeois nationalism”
(Prochorov, 1977), foreign policy pragmatism took precedence over ideology. Believing
that the new country would adopt socialism as its guiding principle—thus accelerating
the decline of British influence in the Middle East—the USSR threw its full support
behind the Zionist cause becoming the first nation to recognize Israel’s de jure status on
May 17, 1948.
As for the Americans, on December 5, 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall
announced the imposition of an arms embargo against all belligerents. The move was part
of a larger strategy calling for the trusteeship of Palestine (Truman, 1948) and thus allow
the administration to pursue a ‘middle way’—supporting the plan for partition while
concomitantly encouraging a negotiated settlement between the Arabs and Jews. (USDS,
1945-1952). Moreover, certain the Soviets planned to arm the Arabs, the move was also
intended to signal the USSR Americas preference to avoid direct confrontation.
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For its part, Great Britain had been opposed to the plan from the start; believing
partition would ultimately create an untenable security situation. With fears confirmed,
members of the House of Commons met on December 11th 1947 to chart the Kingdom’s
extrication from Palestine. Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech Jones,
surmised the mood: “It was not for Britain, after it had given so much, to take up again
the heavy commitments of bringing a new order fashioned by the United Nations into
being in the face of new conflict” (1947: 1211).
In accord with this sentiment, it was decided that Great Britain would terminate
the Mandate on May 15, 1948 (Four and one-half months prior to the deadline). In the
meantime, Britain refused to cooperate in the partitioning of Palestine or to assist
members of the Palestine Commission in its mission to enforce resolution 181(II).
With Great Britain ‘blockading’ implementation of the partition plan (A/532), the
UN Security Council reluctant to provide the Commission with the requisite security
attachment, and facing stringent opposition to partition by Arab factions, Zionist feared
that the objective for which they had fought so hard may be immediately lost. Seizing the
initiative, the Jewish Agency Executive determined that they would proclaim the
establishment of the State of Israel upon formal dissolution of the Mandate. At 9am on
May 14, 1948 the Union Jack was lowered over Jerusalem for the last time as the High
Commissioner for Palestine and his British military commanders boarded a Britain-bound
steamer ship in Haifa. At 4pm that afternoon, Chairman of the Executive, David BenGurion, declared Israel’s independence. The following day, the fledging state submitted
its formal application for membership to the United Nations.
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In response, the Security Council posed several questions to the Jewish Agency in
a letter dated May 18, 1948. The inquiry sought to 1) establish the territorial extent to
which Jewish forces exercised control, as well as the extent to which Arab forces had
entered the proposed Jewish state; 2) determine the Zionist’s intention to allow men of
military age to enter Palestine; 3) ascertain the Jewish Agency’s willingness to cooperate
with the Security Council Truce Commission, and in this regard, its status in working
towards a negotiated peace with Arab authorities; and 4) learn of the Jewish nation’s
intentions vis-à-vis the City of Jerusalem (SCOR: A/766). Despite submitting a detailed
reply, the Jewish Agency was informed that Admissions Committee did have the
requisite information proving that Israel was a viable state. During the course of the year
to follow, both the Security Council and the General Assembly weighed in on the matter;
ultimately defining the conditions that would prove Israel to be a workable state.
Surmised from a broad reading of Security Council debates (S/PV.383-6,
S/PV.413 and S/PV.414), Resolution 59 (S/1045), General Assembly resolutions (e.g.
A/RES/194 (III)) and various reports submitted by the Palestine Commission (A/532), the
Palestinian Mediator (A/648 et al ), and the Conciliation Commission (A/992 et al),
recognition of the State of Israel as a de jure entity hinged on five areas of concern. First
and foremost was the issues of borders; that is, Israel’s ability to establish concrete and
defensible borders that did not infringe on the rights of Palestinian Arabs or neighboring
countries. On a related note, members of the world body voiced their concerns over
Israel’s command and control capabilities; specifically its ability to rein in “irresponsible
elements” (i.e. Irgun and Lehi terrorists) and the suspicion that Jewish forces were
operating outside the immediate zone of conflict. Member States’ third concern entailed
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Israel’s position towards the internationalization of Jerusalem. Their fourth worry
centered on the plight of Palestinian refugees and Israel’s commitment to cooperate with
Conciliation Commission officials in their efforts to implement the directives of the
General Assembly’s resolution 194 (III). Finally, members of the General Assembly
demanded assurances that Israel would comply with all UN resolutions.

Movement Approach
On May 15, 1948, just hours after David Ben-Gurion had declared Israel’s
independence, the armies of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt joined their
Arab compatriots in Palestine in the fight to defeat partition. Lacking allies willing to
lend military support, the Jewish community in Palestine was left to fend for itself. Yet
despite being outnumbered 6 to 1, the battles which ensued favored an Israeli victory.
Although initially suffering great loses, by the end of May Israeli forces had turn
the tide. The shift in momentum can be attributed to variety factors. Unlike the Arab
forces which lacked modern equipment, were poorly trained, and whose leadership was
more concerned about who would declare victory rather how that victory was to be
achieved; having served with British during the war, Haganah soldiers (now the IDF)
were well-trained, well-disciplined, more strongly motivated, and initially better
equipped (Geddes: 293). Moreover, when supplies and equipment began to run low,
Israeli operatives drew upon their experience as human traffickers during Operation
Aliyah Bet (illegal immigration operations) to effectively evade enforcement of
America’s arms embargo by smuggling weapons into the war zone; mostly from
Czechoslovakia.
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Demonstrating a will to abide by UN resolutions, On July 15th the Security
Council determined that the Provisional Government of Israel accepted the Security
Council’s repeated requests for a prolonged truce (SCOR: 773 / SCOR: 801) and that
“States members to the Arab League ha[d] rejected successive appeals” (SCOR: S/902).
Accordingly, battles between Arab and Jewish forces continued well into the winter of
1949. In the meantime, the provisional government faced yet another threat; a direct
challenge to its authority and the outbreak of civil war.
On July 18, 1948 Irgun operatives attempted to land in Israel the Altalena – a
transport ship whose hull was full of weapons and ammunition. By agreement with the
provisional government, the ship was to be ported at Kfar Vitkin were its smuggled cargo
would be off-loaded and handed over to IDF commanders. At the last minute, however,
Irgun members diverted their landing to Tel Aviv in a move that was widely perceived as
a challenge to the provisional government’s authority. A battle between the two units
soon ensued; briefly pointing towards civil war. Recognizing the dangerous implications,
Provisional Chairman David Ben-Gurion ordered the Altalena sunk and more than to 200
Irgun fighters arrested. Subsequently, intensive talks between Ben-Gurion and Irgun
leader Menachem Begin resulted in an August 27 accord whereby Begin agreed that
Irgun soldiers would be fully integrated into the IDF.
Attempts to integrate renegade Jewish units into the IDF had began earlier when
on April 9, 1948 Irgun and Lehi operatives entered the Arab village of Dier Yassin killing
107 civilians and badly blemishing Israel’s reputation around the world. Like their Irgun
counterparts, the majority of Lehi operatives were integrated into regular IDF forces by
the end of April 1948. Nevertheless, dispersed cells of Lehi operatives continued to
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perpetrate acts of terrorism throughout country, especially in Jerusalem where the gang
operated more freely. On September 17th 1948 one of these Jerusalem-based cells
Gunned-down UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte – just one day after presenting his
report the UN General Assembly. Lehi fighters had overplayed their hand and the
reaction of the provisional government was as swift as it was harsh. Just three days after
the assassination, the Israeli government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of
1948 (GOI, 1948: 33) and declared Lehi to be a terrorist organization. Its remaining
members were summarily arrested.
Believing that a negotiated agreement could best be attained only when Israel was
recognized as a de jure state (thus removing from the agenda that question) and
encouraged by the progress Israel had made on the ground over the course of six months,
the United States concurred with Israel’s decision to reapply for membership on
November 29, 1948. The issue was formally taken up by Security Council members on
December 11 and discussion proceeded through December 17 (SCOR: S/PV.383-6).
Although many of the delegates’ statements included a nod to the Jews historical
attachment to Palestine and their recent tragic experience, concerns over statehood
remained substantive. While Member States voiced concern over the capture of Count
Bernadotte’s assassins, Israel’s intentions vis-à-vis Jerusalem and its respect for
international law and the dictates of the United Nations; the bulk of their concerns
centered on Israel’s ability to establish viable and defendable borders. Unable to delineate
clear boundaries that did not infringe on the rights of others and that would provide for
regional peace and security, members to the Security Council voted down Israel’s second
application for membership (SCOR:S/PV.383).
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Disappointed by the Security Council’s rejection of Israel’s membership bid and
believing that the “UN may not arrive at any satisfactory solution” (FRUS, 1948: 1680),
Israeli military forces strengthened their positions vis-à-vis the Arab states. Achieving the
first of its military objectives on February 24, 1949 the Provisional Government of Israel
negotiated an armistice agreement with the Arab Republic Egypt; sending a signal that
Israeli forces were establishing control. This momentum was carried forward throughout
the spring as can be witnessed by the signing of ceasefire agreements between Israel and
the governments of Lebanon (March 23), Jordan (April 3), and Syria (July 20).
Significantly, the new borders provided the Israel with additional territory on to which
settle new immigrants. More importantly, the new borders afforded the beleaguered state
an additional degree of strategic depth to protect her vulnerable center.
Believing questions of borders and security to
be sufficiently addressed, the provisional government
instituted a full diplomatic press. With an Egyptian
armistice in hand, that same day Israel once again
submitted its application for membership to the world
body (SCOR: S/1267). The matter was taken up by
the Security Council in earnest on March 2nd. Having
heard the opinions of the Secretary General and in
review of the historical measures taken by the United
Nations in connection with the Palestine Question, on
March 4th Council members passed resolution
S/RES/69 which in part reads:
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Figure 4.5 – Post War Border

The Security Council…1. Decides in its judgment that Israel is a peaceloving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in
the Charter, and accordingly, 2. Recommends to the General Assembly that it
admit Israel to membership in the United Nations (GAOR: A/818).
Text of this decision was forwarded to the General Assembly on March 7th for
their consideration.
On May 5, 1949 members of the General Assembly convened to deliberate
Israel’s status. Aside from debating their legal authority to grant statehood (to a state they
themselves had created) among their top concerns was the prospect that Israel would not
follow through on its obligation to uphold UN resolutions. The representative of Lebanon
succinctly listed the cause of anxiety, pointing out that:
The State of Israel, in its present form, directly contravened the previous
recommendations of the United Nations in at least three important respects:
in its attitude on the problem of Arab refugees, on the delimitation of its
territorial boundaries, and on the question of Jerusalem (GAOR:
A/AC.24.SR45).
In a speech lasting over two and half hours, Abba Eban address each of these
concerns; forcefully and convincingly making the legal, moral, and political case for
Israel’s de jure affirmation. With “fluency and accuracy, as his most potent weapons”
(Clader, 2002), the methodical, soft-spoken yet stern Eban gave exhaustive answers to
the Assembly’s questions; recapping in great detail the historical record, legal
precedence, the international community’s moral obligation, and the hypocrisy of tactics
implemented by those countries attempting to derail Israel’s application (Eban, 1949).
The force of Eban’s response could not be ignored. He presented to the Assembly
a peace-loving state founded upon entrenched democratic institutions that, unlike its Arab
neighbors, had demonstrated the ability and will uphold UN resolutions—going so far as
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to arrests its own citizens where necessary to the enforcement of those values. A state
embedded in a hostile neighborhood that had nonetheless succeed in securing its borders
and welcomed the signing armistice agreements with its neighbors in accordance this the
Security Council’s dictates. A state that was willing to work for a fair and equitable
solution the question of refugees. A state who would protect and persevere the unique
spiritual and religious character of Jerusalem in accordance with the Assembly’s
resolution of November 1947 (GAOR: A/RES/181(II)). And finally, a state that did not
hold any views or purse any policies that were inconsistence with the UN Charter or any
of the resolutions passed therein (Eban, 1949).
Convening on May 11, 1949 the General assembly determined that:
Israel had presented itself as an eligible applicant for membership in the
United Nations…the representative of Israel had given the Committee
binding assurances of his Government's earnest desire to be a useful Member
of the United Nations and to uphold the Charter and its principles (GAOR:
A/PV.207).
It was further noted that in light of recent events, Israel could be expected to
uphold current and future resolutions(ibid). With these thoughts in mind, the matter was
put to a vote. With the passage of Resolution 273 (III) by a margin of 37 members voting
in favor, 12 against, and 9 abstentions, the Zionist enterprise had achieved its long sought
after goal of attaining de jure affirmation by a large majority of Member States.

Assessment of Applicable Hypotheses
1. Did Zionism’s narratives of nationalism and tragic suffering contribute to the
movement’s de jure affirmation?
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Slightly. Noted in the remarks of Security Council delegates, the Jews’ historical
experience was taken into account but was not a substantive issue. As the record
shows, greater concern lie with the nascent state’s ability to secure and hold its
borders, its intention to be peace-loving, and its willingness to uphold various
resolutions of the international community.

2. Were allies essential to attainment of de jure affirmation?

No. While the United States guided Israel through United Nations bureaucratic
procedure, its arms embargo greatly frustrated the movement’s efforts to secure it
borders. Likewise, France and Russia offered moral but no material support while
Great Britain actively sought to confound establishment of the new state.

3. Was the movement’s tactical choice to employ both violence in combination with
diplomatic measures a product of political cleavages and great power interests
brought about by a shift the prevailing hegemonic order?

No. As noted in the previous section, Great Britain’s egress from the region shifted
hegemonic influence to the United States. Political cleavages thus arose between not
only the US and Great Britain, but to some extent, between Arabs states and the
great powers as well. Nonetheless, it was system-level dictates that all but
determined the Zionists’ activities. Diplomacy was the only system-defined means
through which membership and thus de jure affirmation could be acquired. At the
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same time, membership was made dependent upon the movement’s ability to secure
its borders.

4. Did fractionalization facilitate or frustrate the movements effort to attain de jure
affirmation?

Slightly Frustrating. Had the mainstream leadership been unable to rein in and
absorb “irresponsible elements” as the United Nations had demanded, it is logical to
concluded that failure to demonstrate this level of authority may have postponed the
movement’s bid for de jure affirmation.

Summary
As established with the publication of Der Judenstaat and formalized by the First
Zionist Congress, from its very inception the articulated path to Jewish national liberation
was relatively straightforward, pragmatic, more than a bit optimistic, yet obtainable. The
movement’s strategic guidance and ideological foundation were strongly reflective of a
late nineteenth century international temperament which prescribed legal-diplomatic
solutions to the pursuit of self-determination, yet provided space for grand social
experiments attempting the creation of socialist utopias. Towards this end, Zionist leaders
forged a sturdy democratically orientated organizational structure with both local and
global reached. This afford the movement an ability to absorb differing ideological
conceptions of the Jewish state-to-be while drawing upon the resources of Jewish
communities the world over.
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Exerting their intentions on the international community, Zionist leaders appealed
to the pluralist preferences of the hegemonic order; presenting themselves as a means of
ensuring the continued stability of a state system based on individual national
independence while providing the world’s reigning hegemon an avenue for the
achievement of its objectives. Taking advantage of this structural opening, Zionist leaders
ardently pursued a comprehensive state building project forever changing conditions on
the ground to create a de facto state, and by default, a situation that could not be undone.
Then, when it was viewed that the movement no longer served the hegemon’s interests,
Zionist leaders became evermore defiant; exploiting divergent great power elite strategies
to pursue a policy of illegal immigration while employing violence in an effort to raise
the costs of British occupation. Finally, movement leaders were able to capitalize upon
political cleavages within the international structure to rally the support of one of the
system’s newly rising hegemons, and in turn, gain favor for both their de facto
recognition and de jure affirmation.
Along the way fractionalization did present troubling challenges to the
movement’s authority, and at times, continued existence. Nevertheless, because divisions
centered on the strategic means to attain the same objective and not on political rivalries
making one faction’s survival dependent upon another’s ruin, these division never rose to
the level of movement destruction. Likewise, the role of allies was not as expected. As
the historical record lays bear, other than Great Britain’s initial support for the Zionist
project, at no time did the material assistance of allies play a seminal role in Zionism’s
success.
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Chapter V:
The Palestinian Movement for National Liberation
Introduction
The Palestinian movement for national liberation is a direct response to Zionism
and the challenges that ideology has pressed upon the Arab residents of Palestine over the
course of some 125 years. The movement’s emergence and the character of its struggle
are a product of an international structure that stressed the universality of selfdetermination, recommended a strategy of decolonization towards that end, and should
that strategy fail, recognized the validity of Marxist-revolutionary tactics. Moreover, the
movement’s advance has been significantly shaped by regional politics, tectonic shifts in
the global hegemonic order, as well as disruptive internal strife. Following the pattern
established in the previous chapter, this case study examines the past 100 years of
Palestinian struggle for self-determination to assess the role of both structural forces and
movement characteristics in the advancement of that cause. It further seeks to discover
variance with the Zionist movement, determine if and where that variance was
fundamental to the advance of the Palestinian independence, and to explain the differing
paths to statehood as either a product of movement strategic and tactical choice,
movement leadership capabilities, or as hypothesized, a function of international system
dictates.
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Movement Emergence and Recognition
In much the same way Theodore Herzl had assembled representatives of world
Jewry in Basel Switzerland to define the aim of Zionism and the strategic course to be
pursued towards its realization, on May 28, 1964 Ahmed Shukairy, with the consent of
the Government of Egypt, gathered 388 Palestinian representatives in Jerusalem with the
stated aim of establishing a movement for Palestinian liberation (PNC, 1964: §23). The
established Palestinian National Covenant was then extensively amended in 1968 and
renamed the Palestinian National Charter. Succinctly, the Charter defines the movement’s
purposes and objectives as:
1. Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an
indivisible territorial unit;
2. The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland;
3. The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic;
4. That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual,
and historical connection with Palestine are indisputable facts;
5. The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now
living, is that of national (watani) struggle for the liberation of Palestine;
6. Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine;
7. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary
objectives;
8. The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed
Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total
liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of
the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization (Palestine National
Council, 1968).
Lending legitimacy to the nascent movement, members of the Arab League
meeting in Rabat Morocco on October 28, 1974, declared the “Palestine Liberation
Organization [to be] the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” (LAS,
1974). Members further pledged “to support the Palestine Liberation Organization in the
exercise of its responsibility at the national and international levels” (ibid).
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Making good on this latter commitment, the Government of Syria—acting in
accord with the General Assembly resolutions 3102 (XXVIII) of 1973, which “Urges that
the national liberation movements recognized by the various regional intergovernmental
organizations concerned be invited to participate in the Diplomatic Conference as
observers in accordance with the practice of the United Nations” and resolution 3210
(XXIX) of October 14, 1974 inviting “the representative of the Palestinian people to
participate in deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine”—
introduced to the Assembly draft resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) for their
consideration. Having heard the statement of the Palestinian representative Yasser Arafat
on November 13, 1974 (GAOR: A/PV.2282), the Assembly affirmed by a vote of 95 in
favor, 17 against, and 19 abstentions, the Palestinian’s right to self-determination,
national independence, and sovereignty. They further agreed to recognized the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a legitimate liberation movement; inviting
its representatives to participate in meetings of the General Assembly and all
international conferences convened by United Nations organs in the capacity of observer
(GAOR: A/RES/3236[7] (XXIX)).
Despite obtaining observer status, the Palestinian cause lacked the sort of
hegemonic legitimacy initially enjoyed by their Zionist counterparts. Specifically,
western powers did not support either of these initiatives believing that the stated aims of
the PLO—liberation through armed struggle with the ultimate objective of supplanting an
existing Member State—to be inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the
Charter (GAOR: A/PV.2294). As a consequence, the Palestinian struggle for
independence was relegated to the realm of exogenous conflicts: those emanating from
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system-wide materialistic ambitions

Figure 5.1 – Structure of Palestinian Struggle
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Declaration of Principles on September

13, 1993 and the subsequent Gaza –Jericho Agreement of May 4, 1994 that the
Palestinian Liberation Organization was officially recognized as the legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people (GAOR: A/RES/180; S/1994/727). Then, in
much the same way that the Mandate sought to facilitate the founding of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine through the auspices of the Jewish Agency, a newly formed
Palestinian Authority was endowed by the DOP and subsequent Oslo II Agreement with
legislative, executive, social, and economic responsibilities to be exercised towards the
objective of attaining Palestinian autonomy (ibid).
Given the extend timeframe in which the struggle for movement emergence and
recognition took place—from the first sustained wave of Jewish immigration beginning
in 1914 to universal recognition in 1994—as well as the differing levels of recognition
attained along the way, it will be interesting to note factors that facilitated and frustrated
Palestinian efforts. Was, for instance, the institutional structure of the international
system confounding; closing off any attempt to assert Palestinian nationalism? If so was
this the product of unyielding hegemonic preferences? Alternatively, could it be that the
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Palestinian’s were unable to exploit great power political cleavages and thus incapable of
asserting their case as a great power interest? Or as was the case with Zionism, was it
fractionalization that stalled the movement’s advance?
Bearing in mind the hypotheses developed in chapter three, this section examines
each of these possibilities as well as the forces which resulted in the movement’s ultimate
success. This will entail examination of the movement’s nationalist narrative and its
internalization by the international community. Comparably, inquiry into the conditions
of tragedy that befell the Palestinian people during this period and which grew evermore
grave as time passed will be assessed as a contributing factor. On the other hand, we can
expect that movement formation and acceptance was the product of skillful leadership;
the ability to exploit political cleavages in the face of Israel’s confounding tactics, placing
pressure on the prevailing hegemonic powers to recognize the movement’s legitimate
aspirations. Along the way, the role of fractionalization and allies will also be assessed.
In consideration of the extensive time span that frames the Palestinian pursuit for
movement recognition this section is divided into two parts correlating to the movement’s
emergence and then its recognition. These achievements are roughly delineated around
the fundamental hegemonic shift that decisively realigned the movement’s strategic
orientation—the pre and post-Six Day War eras.

International System (1914 – 1969)
Using the turn of the twentieth century as a launching point, a review of the
Palestinian historical narrative reveals little which would indicate a sense of nationalism
among the residents of Palestine living under Ottoman rule. In fact, quite the contrary.
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The narrative illustrates a people who thought of themselves primarily as Arab, Muslim,
Christian, or Jew; as a Jaffen, Jerusalemite or Nubulsi and lastly as a Palestinian (Khalidi,
1997: 146). This lack of national consciousness can be largely attributed to Ottoman
political and economic policies which prevented the establishment of a unified
educational system and deliberately sought to suppress notions of independence among
the politically self-conscious Palestinian elite through a system of biased taxation which
distributed tax monies collected from peasants and non-Muslims to this privileged class
(Welty, 1995). As a result of these policies, the people of Palestine were more apt to view
their identity in terms of locality or social status rather than as a nation. At the same time,
they did not see themselves as mutually exclusive from other groups living in the
region—being connected as they were through common history, religion, and Arab
ethnicity.
It was only under British occupation and the emergence of Zionism that a true
sense of Palestinian (or even Arab) nationalism began to coalesce. As noted cultural
theorist Stuart Hall put it, “only when there is an Other can you know who you are”
(1989: 16). Indeed, it was the emergence of a new narrative, one which defined the land
of Palestine in wholly different terms and historical context that greatly contributed to the
formation of a unified Palestinian identity. While widespread opposition to Zionism
among the educated urban elite and politically active was present from the earliest stages
of the Zionist movement, it was not until a 1914 editorial entitled “An Open Letter To
Subscribers” published in the newspaper Filastin, which made repeated reference to the
“Palestinian nation,” that the mass of Arab residents in Palestine began to associate
themselves as a collective (Khalidi, 1997: 176). This association of identity defined in
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terms of Other and attachment to the land of Palestine was further strengthened at the
conclusion of WWI when the people of Palestine once again found their land occupied by
an external power.
The inhabitants of Palestine had long perceived that control of the country was a
highly sought after goal of the western powers. To considerable extent, this attitude did
much to cement a sense of community and to spur notions of patriotic pride with regard
to Arab possession of the Holy Land. It was therefore British occupation and its
subsequent promotion of Jewish national aspirations in Eretz Israel which alerted Arab
residents of Palestine to the emergence of a incompatible and dangerous reality. As one
resident put it:
A nation which has long been in the depths of sleep only awakes if it is
rudely shaken by events, and only arises little by little…This was the
situation in Palestine, which for many centuries had been in the deepest sleep,
until it was shaken by the great war, shocked by the Zionist movement, and
violated by the illegal [British] policy, and awoke, little by little (AlSakakini, 1925: 9).
Like the Jews of Europe, Palestinian identity and its nationalist aspirations
materialized under the weight of tragedy. Although the international community had
made clear its demand that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Balfour, 1917; San
Remo, 1920; League of Nations, 1922: §6), as has been established in the previous
chapter, the Zionist movement, once initiated, became an unstoppable force. While a
sharp increase in Jewish immigration, Jewish land purchases, the division of traditional
geographical linkages, and the emergence of rival governmental and security apparatus
served to unite Christian, Muslim, urbanite and peasant (Welty, 1995: 17-20), it was Arab
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rejection of the 1947 Partition Plan and the ensuing war which produced a most
devastating consequence for the Arab populace of Palestine.
Al-Nakba—the catastrophe of 1948—resulted in the exile of some 711,000
Palestinian residents and annexation of the proposed Arab state of Palestine by the
governments of Israel, Transjordan, and Egypt (GAOR: A/1367/Rev.1). Taking up
residence in neighboring Arab states, the fate of Palestinian refugees and their pursuit of
self-determination was placed squarely in the hands of external actors. Unfortunately,
Arab governments; self-conscious of their defeat, consumed by their own ambitions, and
under pressure from their citizens to reject the State of Israel; adopted the attitude that no
progress could be made until Israel fully restored the rights of Palestinian refugees. As
the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine reported in October of 1950:
With the exception of Transjordan (Jordan), the Arab Governments
maintained that the acceptance by Israel of the right of the refugees, as
expressed in paragraph 11 of the resolution 194 (III), to return to their homes,
must be regarded as the condition sine qua non for the discussion of other
questions (GAOR: A/1367/Rev.1).
Israel’s commitment to accept 100,000 refugees immediately after the war and an
additional 250,000 over time, was not enough to satisfy Arab demands (ibid). At the
same time, King Abdullah of Jordan, with the blessings of Great Britain, made good on
his plans to annex Arab portions of Palestine and fully integrate those territories into his
kingdom. To this end, on December 1, 1948, the King convened the Jericho Convention
with the aim of unifying the two banks (the east and west banks of the Jordan river).
Attended by several thousand Palestinians representative including notable
community leaders such as the mayors of Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, the Arab
Legion Military Governor General, military governors of all the districts, and other
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notables (FRUS, 1948), delegates to this conference adopted the following resolutions;
setting into motion events which would place Palestinians at the center of an unfolding
inter-Arab rivalry. The document reads:
1. Palestine Arabs desire unity between Transjordan and Arab Palestine and
therefore make known their wish that Arab Palestine be annexed
immediately to Transjordan. They also recognize Abdullah as their King
and request him proclaim himself King of new territory.
2. Palestine Arabs express gratitude to Arab states for their efforts in behalf
of liberation of Palestine. (The delegates indicated that the object of this
was to hint to the Arab states that their job was done).
3. Expression of thanks to Arab states for their generous assistance and
support to Palestine Arab refugees.
4. Resolve that purport of first resolution be conveyed to King at once (ibid).
Two months later, the Jordanian Nationality Law was amended to grant every
Palestinian Jordanian citizenship. In the meantime, remaining members of the Arab
League felt the need to placate Arab public opinion which grew critical of the Arab
governments for failing to secure a Palestinian state. They therefore sought a means to
safeguard Arab claims over all of Palestine. Meanwhile they looked for a way to divest
themselves from responsibility for losing the war (Shlaim, 1990: 40).
In an effort to meet these goals while at the same time frustrate Abdullah’s
designs, Members of the Arab league founded the All-Palestine Government in the Gaza
Strip on September 20, 1948. Initially headed by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj
Amin al-Husayni (former president of the Arab Higher Committee under the Mandate),
the All-Palestine Government declared independence over the whole of Palestine with
Jerusalem as its capital on October 1, 1949 (Kassim, 1988: 294). Husayni then
summoned his Holy War Army with the aim of liberating all of Palestine. Viewing such a
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move as a direct challenge to his authority, King Abdullah ordered these forces
disbanded. The King was summarily assassinated in July of 1951.
Political leaders of the short–lived and now defunct liberation movement then
retreated to Cairo where they proved to be ineffectual. Accordingly, when in 1958 the
Governments of Egypt and Syria decided to form a United Arab Republic, Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser officially annulled the All-Palestine Government by
decree; reasoning that the movement had failed to advance the Palestinian cause; even
more, that it had failed to capture the imagination of the Palestinian people (in Geddes,
1991: 321).
While Palestinians of the West Bank had effectively relinquished their fate to
King Abdullah of Jordan, the Egyptian plan to unite all Arabs under the banner of PanArabism failed to launch an indigenous mass movement for national liberation among the
Palestinian populace. Accordingly, members of the League of Arab States meeting in
Alexandria Egypt on September 11, 1964 charged former Assistant-Secretary General to
the All-Palestine Government, Ahmed Shukairy, with formulating an organization aimed
at liberation and repatriation of the Palestinian people to their historical and natural
homeland in accordance with the imperatives of Arab unity (LAS in SCOR: S/6003).
Like its predecessors, the reformulated All-Palestine Government based in Cairo
– now the Palestinian Liberation Organization—initially failed in its duty to inspire a call
to arms. This was due in part to the movement’s scant organizational capabilities; but
perhaps more directly, as a result of Cairo’s discretion. Although the PLO and its newly
established Liberation Army (PLA) were permitted to operate out of Gaza, their soldiers
were closely monitored by President Nasser who feared that their activities may create
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problems with Israel at inopportune moments. In the end, however, it was Nasser himself
who invited catastrophe. Singing the praises of Pan-Arabism and singling out Israel as the
solitary roadblock to that objective, in speeches broadcast throughout the Middle East
Nasser managed to awake a sleeping giant. The Arab street, keen on restoring its honor,
beseeched Arab leaders to seize the initiative. Swept up in a wave of nationalist
enthusiasm, on May 23, 1967 President Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships.
He concomitantly advanced his forces toward the Israeli border in the Sinai. Less than
three weeks later the regional balance of power was fundamentally altered with a
unexpected yet definitive Israeli victory; leading some elements of the Palestinian
movement to seek another way.

Movement Approach (1914 - 1969)
As demonstrated above, Palestinian national identity did not come into full view
until the fall of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent occupation of Palestine by British
administrators. Furthermore, it did not fully congeal until the entire scope the Zionist
project had made itself known. To some extent this explains why the Arab populace of
Palestine was initially incapable of establishing a movement for liberation—not realizing
that one was actually needed. Another explanation lies in the traditional bonds and class
structures which had come to govern political and economic relations throughout the
region for centuries. It is from this latter circumstance that the character of the Palestinian
movement for national liberation took its form.
Attempts to solidify a unified movement for independence were frustrated by
internal divisions among the Palestinian political elite even before British occupation. In
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their efforts to dissuade political upheaval, Ottoman authorities established a highly
inegalitarian class system whereby the upper strata of society was clearly set off from the
vast majority of Palestinians peasants; favoring wealth, landownership, reputation,
ascriptively acquired social status, and marriage into influential families (Tibawi, 1956:
14-16). Accordingly, as Nashif (1977) notes: “political power was largely concentrated at
the upper tip of the socioeconomic pyramid composed of a small group of heads of old
influential clans, other members of the landowning aristocracy, wealthy merchants and
traders, and some professionals” (114). Thus it was the placing of personal ambitions
over national interests that initially foiled any chance of forging a national liberation
movement with the flexibility, operational coherence, and single-mindedness that the
Zionists had achieved (Ibid: 120).
Manifestation of this consequence can be best observed in the rivalry pitting
members of the al-Husayni family against those of the Nashashibi clan. Whereas the
Nashashibi cohort was inclined to take a more conciliatory approach towards British
authorities—believing that “Arab struggle against the Zionists and against the Mandate
would be more effective if conducted within the framework of the Mandate itself”
(Peretz, 1963: 261), Haj Amin al-Husayni believed a more aggressive stance was called
for. First recognized for his role in inciting the Nebi Musa riots of 1920, Haj Amin soon
rose to prominence as an effective leader and mobilizer of the Arab populace of
Palestine. Sentenced in absentia for his role in instigating the riots, Husayni had fled to
Damascus where his reputation earned him a senior position among his fellow Palestinian
Arabs (Elpeleg, 1993: 7). So great was his popularity, that in 1921 British High
Commissioner Samuel Herbert, on the advice of the British administration, set aside
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Husayni’s prison sentence. He was subsequently appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and
president of the Supreme Muslim Council with the belief that these appointments would
help to maintain peace in Jerusalem (ibid: 9).
Haj Amin’s ascent to these prominent positions made the Husayni family the most
influential of all the Arab clans—it also served to deepen the divide with the Nashashibi’s
and their allies. Although the two faction were able to jointly convene the First Palestine
Arab Congress in 1919 resolving “to reject political Zionism and to accept British
assistance on the condition that such assistance would not impinge upon sovereignty in
Palestine” (Hassassian, 1990: 33), by the time of its sixth plenary it was evident that the
Congress could not find a middle ground between those who sought independence
through confrontation and those who promoted a more passive approach (PAC: 1923). In
much the same fashion, neither the Supreme Muslim Council nor the subsequently
formed Arab Higher Committee were able to forge a unified strategy. As Taysir Nashif
lamented:
The prolonged inability of the two major factions …to present a workable
political front rendered the Palestinian Arabs as a nation unable to achieve
the tactical flexibility needed to deal effectively with the Zionist challenge
either in Palestine itself or in relation to the Great Powers (211).
Despite these setbacks, or perhaps because of them, a new and more militantminded breed of Palestinian nationalist emerged out the shadows of this internecine
conflict. With Arab-British negotiations coming to an abrupt end in the wake of the 1929
Arab Uprising, young Muslim activists formed the pan-Arab independence party and
organized themselves into clandestine revolutionary cells. As a whole, these quasipolitical organizations were able to mobilize that sector of Palestinian society which was
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not previously involved in the national liberation struggle and was irritated by the landowning elites as epitomized by the Husayni-Nashashibi rivalry. The most significant of
these cells was headed by Shykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam.
In contrast to their ‘old guard’ contemporaries now reconstituted as the Arab
Higher Committee, al-Qassam and likeminded Palestinians proposed the forging of ties
with Arab states as a means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Palestinian national
liberation movement and in support of militant activities. By early 1931, Izz al-Din
fighters had organized militant units; engaging both British and Zionist elements directly.
However, it was not until the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the ominous realization that the
region’s balance of power was shifting in Israel’s favor that the strategy of direct struggle
against the Zionists came to take on a new urgency. Spearheading this call to arms was
Fatah; a movement inspired by the dictates of Shykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and
“apotheosized the peasant-as-heroic-guerilla [that would rise] up to avenge and reclaim
the land” (Lybarger, 2007: 22).
Founded by Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir, Fatah’s strategic
and ideological posture was a product of its time: the prevailing belief among colonized
and recently decolonized states that revolutionary armed struggle was a legitimate tactic
in the quest for self-determination—a sentiment expressly endorsed by the United
Nations General Assembly in its resolution of November 30, 1973 (GAOR: A/3070
(XXVIII): §2). Lacking resources, Fatah’s activities were initially limited to the
declarative level. Nevertheless, lyrical credos underscored Fatah’s uniqueness,
“popularizing the goal of direct Palestinian struggle against Israel” (Kurz, 2005:17). In
turn, its amorphous concept of ‘Palestine first’ attracted hundreds of Palestinian recruits
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from across the Arab world and soon transformed the nascent group into a mass
movement driven by the image of a new generation of young Palestinians taking up arms
in pursuit of self-determination.
That this image found strong resonance within the prevailing international
temperament of the 1950s, 60s and 70s; an atmosphere which endorsed revolutionary
fervor as a counter to all forms of colonialism and injustice, is not surprising. It is also
therefore no surprise that between the years 1959 and 1963 Arafat and his cohorts
competed with as many as 40 secret organizations, some boasting as many as 400
members expressing frustration with the passivity of the previous Palestinian leaders
(Kimmerling and Migdel, 1993: 208). Thus by the late 1960s, a discernable divide could
be detected between those who sought confrontation through conventional measures, and
those who endorsed guerrilla warfare as the primary means of destroying the Jewish state
(Kass and O’Neill, 1997: 215-222).
Of these early ideological strains, four are most evident. Reflecting the pluralist
approach, the PLO drew upon traditional organization structures to promote a rationalist
approach to confrontation with Israel; occupying themselves with tactical questions such
as when and where the launching of an armed struggle would yield the most benefit
(Sayigh: 1997: 221). For their part, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP) and likeminded leftists believed that Palestinian national goals could be achieved
only through a revolution of the masses. Adhering to Marxist-Leninist ideology, they
renounced acts of violence outside of Israel and instead promoted an uprising; not only
within the Palestinian populace, but among Arabs and international allies as well (ibid:
677). At the other end of the spectrum were both Islamist and Marxist groups which
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viewed violence as the surest means of attaining the Palestinian’s ultimate goal—
complete abolishment of the State of Israel. The former of these groups was represented
by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The latter by the Popular front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), its splinter ‘General Command’ faction (PFLP-GC), and perhaps most
notoriously, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).
With Egypt seeking to funnel these rapidly emerging forces towards the aims of
Arab and especially Egyptian government policy, the PLO and its military wing the
Palestinian Army were seen by these fedayeen fighters as a threat. As Fatah founder
Khalil al-Wazir explained, “the PLO had been created with the express purpose of
preempting the revolutionary process among Palestinians” (in Sayigh, 1997: 101). It was
meant to give the Palestinians the ‘illusion’ of determining their own destiny while
simultaneously ensuring Arab state control over it. As Cheryl Rubenberg (2003) surmised
the situation, “[the PLO] was created by Egypt, controlled by Egypt, and functioned
primarily as an instrument of Egyptian diplomacy in Arab politics” (16).
Accordingly, the creation of the PLO represented a challenge to Fatah in its bid
for primacy over the national struggle and a threat to its base of operations in the Gaza
strip. Rising to the challenge, Fatah resorted to active, though sporadic engagement in
violent struggle (Kurz, 2005: 18). By the eve of the 1967 War Fatah had completed 300
raids; at least twice as many as those emanating from fedayeen bases in Jordan, Syria,
and Lebanon (Brynen, 1990: 22). This fact, and as a consequence of the Arab armies’
shocking defeat in the Six Days War that resulted in Israeli occupation of all of Palestine
the, divide between those who sought confrontation through conventional measures and
those who endorsed guerrilla warfare as the primary means of reclaiming Palestine
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became evermore apparent. It was within this post-war environment that Arafat and his
colleagues were able to seize control of the now disgraced PLO.
Arab defeat in the Six Days War inspired a new generation of Palestinian
revolutionaries to take matters into their own hands; confronting Israeli forces directly.
After a barrage of persistent fedayeen raids into Israel culminating with an attack on an
Israeli school bus on March 21, 1968, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a counter
offensive on Fatah headquarters located in the Jordanian village of Karamah. What was
expected to be a relatively routine ‘clearing out’ mission turned out to be hard fought
battle as Fatah-led forces were able to hold their ground. Although a tactical victory for
Israel, the Battle of Karamah greatly enhanced Fatah’s, and especially Yasser Arafat’s
credibility, and in turn, spurred massive Palestinian enrollment into Fatah’s ranks (Kurz,
2005: 18). By years end, Arafat and the Palestinian cause had become known worldwide.
It was within this atmosphere of burgeoning popularity that Fatah gained control of the
PLO in February of 1969 and Yasser Arafat was thereafter sworn in as the organization’s
chairman and commander-in-chief of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces.

Assessment of Applicable Hypotheses

1. Was movement emergence the product of repressive institutional structures incapable
of meeting the demands of this disenfranchised people?

No. Conditions of repression and tragedy persisted for over 600 years under Ottoman
rule, yet no movement emerged. Moreover, the British approach—though initially
focused on Zionist settlement and thus confounding—provided institutional openings
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for self-government as incorporated into the 1922 Mandate and evident by the
administration’s attempts to forge Palestinian governing bodies.

2. Is it true that it was only through shifts in the prevailing international structure that
institutional openings were made available so that a mass movement for Palestinian
liberation was able to emerge?

Yes. As noted above, the conclusion of World War I brought to Palestine a
hegemonic order that provided institutional pathways to self-government.
Nevertheless, these openings (at least initially) were not of the sort that would be
supportive of total Palestinian independence. Accordingly, it was only when the
regional balance of power was fundamentally reordered in the wake of the Six Day
War that an indigenous and truly independent unified movement for Palestinian
liberation emerged.

3. Was the Fatah-led PLO’s adopted ideology and its associated strategic approach a
reflection of the established international temperament?

Yes. Fatah’s adoption of a Marxist-socialist ideology promoting self-determination
through revolutionary armed struggle was not only appropriate given the need to
overthrow an occupying colonial power, but as expressed in United Nations
resolution A/3070 such an orientation was the prevailing attitude among a large
segment of international society as well.
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4. Did allies play a central role in the successful emergence of a Palestinian movement
for national liberation?

Yes, but not as a positive mentor. Although Arabs states devoted considerable
resources in their two attempts to liberate Palestine and provided the foundations for
the All-Palestine Government as well as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as
witnessed by Jordan’s Jericho Convention and subsequent annexation of the West
Bank, as well as Egypt’s strict constraining measures over its Palestinian proxy
organization, it is clear that these measures were taken in self-interest and did much
to frustrate the emergence of an indigenous movement.

5. Did fractionalization play a facilitative or frustrating role in the movement’s
emergence?

Strongly frustrating. Second only to Arab ‘meddling,’ internal maneuvering for
political clout and differing opinions over the best means of achieving independence
significantly stalled the movement’s formation. Nonetheless, these same division over
strategic orientation brought differing approaches to the fore and coalesced at a ripe
moment resulting in the adoption of a most appropriate strategy for that time.

Movement Approach (1970 - 1974)
Now under control of the resistance factions, the PLO established integrative
institutions to interconnect the far-flung Palestinian communities into a well-defined
political entity. Its cross-community social and cultural structures focused around
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education, health, social assistance to martyrs' families, and artisan centers. Its
professional associations, and its organizational network of constituent political groups
provided vital linkages not only between the various Palestinian communities of the
Diaspora, but between the Diaspora on the one hand and the Palestinians inside the
occupied territories on the other (Hiklial, 1993: 46). At the national level as well, the
organization underwent a considerable makeover.
Because Fatah was not the only faction urging for liberation through
revolutionary armed struggle, upon their ascension to power Fatah leaders reoriented the
fundamental composition and institutional structure of the PLO as a means of
maintaining their position of dominance. Traditional faces disappeared as seats in the
supreme legislative representative body—the Palestine National Council (PNC)—were
more than halved. Moreover, whereas the PNC served as the representative of all
Palestinian people both inside Palestine and in the Diaspora, as the highest
decisionmaking body it set PLO policies and long-term plans (PLO, 1964). In practice,
the PNC elected members of the Palestine Executive Committee which was headed by
Chairman Arafat until his death in 2004. Charged with executing the policies and
decisions set out by the PNC and the Central Council, the Executive served as the
provisional state of Palestine and its members held portfolios in areas of highest
importance; including foreign policy, military operations, and social welfare (SOP:
2015). To carry out these tasks, the Executive was provided with a Palestine Liberation
Army that was supported by a Palestine National Fund (ibid).
As its first order of business, the Arafat-led PLO focused on direct military
confrontation with Israel and began to conduct evermore brazen attacks against the
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Jewish state using Jordanian territory as a launching platform. Initially the King, eager to
portray himself as the rightful leader of the Palestinian people, allowed and even actively
fostered these incursions (Richards and Ash, 2000). By January 1970, however, it was
becoming fast apparent that the situation was spinning out of control when Palestinian
militants erected pseudo-governments in several Jordanian cities (Shemesh, 1988: 132133). Setting-up security check points, customs controls, and even going so far as to
implement a system of visa controls, King Hussein faced not only the mounting threat of
an Israeli invasion in retaliation for PLO attacks, but even more troubling, the usurpation
of his kingdom (Richards and Ash, 2000).
In response, the King issued a 12 point Communiqué that in its effect was
intended to deny the PLO the capacity to erect governmental institutions—including the
capacity to establish a government-in-exile and then claim for itself authority over all or
part of the West Bank (Shemesh, 1988: 138). PLO leaders pledged not to comply with
the dictates of the Communiqué, even if that meant resistance by force. As a
consequence, immediately thereafter direct confrontation between Jordanian and
Palestinian forces broke out. The level of violence intensified in July of 1970 when King
Hussein sought to expel PLO leaders from his territory. Violence came to a head on
September 1 when radical elements of the PLO attempted to assassinate the him. The
result was the outbreak of civil war and the events of Black September that would
ultimately determine if Jordan would be ruled by the Palestine Liberation Organization or
the Hashemite Monarchy (Shlaim, 2007: 301-302).
After 10 days of intense fighting, King Hussein, under great pressure from
Egyptian president Abdul Nasser, was pressured into signing the Cairo Agreement of
137

1970 in which the King agreed to end martial law and all ‘abnormal conditions’, such as
military rule (BBC, 1970). In effect, the agreement gave equal standing to the Palestinian
leadership and afforded Palestinian organizations the right to operate in Jordan
unconstrained. Nasser died of a sudden heart attack a day after signing the Cairo
Agreement, however, and as a result the PLO lost its primary source of protection.
Consequently, the King, who had no intention of upholding the agreement in any case,
proceed with his plan to expel the PLO leadership and their fedayeen fighters. By
September of 1971, the PLO was forced to reestablish its base of operations in the
refugee camps of South Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Fatah’s counterparts were busy ushering an age of international
terrorism by engaging in brazed attacks across the globe. In doing so, they successfully
brought to the world’s attention the plight of the Palestinian people. For their part, Fatah
militants now operating out of Lebanon focused their attention on the more
straightforward strategy of direct confrontation with Israeli forces. Long constrained by
the interests and interventions of others, Lebanon offered the Palestinian movement its
first period of sustained political and military freedom (Brynen, 1989: 2) It was within
this environment that the PLO was able to set up a virtual para-state; fortifying its
political, social, and military apparatus while relentlessly launching guerilla sorties into
Israel in accordance with its Ten-Point Program. Serving as the movement’s grand
strategy, the program flatly rejected UN Resolution 242 for its relegation of the
Palestinian struggle to that of a crisis of refugees and instead called for a phased effort to:
Liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant
national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is
liberated…Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive
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to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing
the liberation of all Palestinian territory (PLO, 1974).
International System (1973 – 1993)
Firmly entrenched in South Lebanon, the PLO took advantage of its new found
operational freedom to accrue a series of successful attacks on Israeli forces. Meanwhile,
neighboring Arab states had launched a plan to regain not only lost Arab lands, but Arab
honor as well. Pitting the best of America’s armaments against those of the Soviet Union,
the October War of 1973 nearly brought the entire region to the brink of catastrophe as
both American and Soviet leaders feared they may be drawn into direct conflict in
defense of their respective client states. Seeking to avoid this danger, US Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger engaged each party through a process of shuttle diplomacy in the
hopes of obtaining a ceasefire agreement. After nearly three weeks of intense effort,
Kissinger had successfully mediated the terms of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 338 which not only brought hostilities to an end, but sought to address the
root cause of the war as well by “Call[ing] upon the parties concerned to start
immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242
(1967) in all of its parts” (SCOR: A/338).
In accordance with the latter of these objectives and in recognition of the fact that
the international community had proven itself incapable of enforcing the numerous
armistice agreements signed by Israel and her neighbors since 1949, the United States
and the Soviet Union convened a conference in Geneva aimed at resolving all
outstanding issues in the Middle East. Although a noble first attempt to bring the warring
parties together, the Geneva discussions failed to bring about the sort of stability that the
139

superpowers had hoped for. Several factors contributed to this outcome: 1) Syria did not
send a delegation, 2) despite the PLO’s recent recognition in Rabat, failure to recognize
Israel’s right to exist was a sine qua non for participation, and 3) both Israel and the
United States had become suspicious of Soviet motives.
In the end, the Geneva process was abandon for a more direct approach.
Encouraged by the United States’ success in effecting the Sinai I and Sinai II Agreements
of 1974 and 1975 respectively and reasoning that only the United States had any
influence over Israel, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat recognized that the surest means of
achieving secure borders with the Jewish state was through direct negotiations monitored
and guaranteed by the West. The consequent Framework for Peace in the Middle East of
September 17, 1978 not only achieved its long-term objective of peace between Israel
and the Republic of Egypt, it also set into motion a tenuous and often tumultuous process
of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians by calling for:
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people [to]
participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all
its aspects: To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank
and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
(a) ...there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza
for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing
governing authority has been freely elected...
(b) …the parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers
and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the
West Bank and Gaza…
(c)…When the self-governing body authority (administrative council) in the
West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of
five years will begin. As soon as possible, but no later than the third year
after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to
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determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza…(Governments of
Israel and Egypt, 1978).
To Yasser Arafat and his compatriots, the agreement was a betrayal. Not only had
Sadat “excommunicated [Egypt] from its national role to liberate the occupied Arab land,
especially Jerusalem, as well as the restoration of full national rights of the Arab people
of Palestine” (Geddes, 1991: 378), but in doing so, accepted the principle of ‘land for
peace’—a policy which the PLO viewed as a direct threat to its own objectives.
Accordingly, PLO operatives, encouraged by the advantageous position they had
acquired as a consequence of the Lebanese Civil War, used their near total control of
southern Lebanon as a platform to intensify attacks on Israeli targets. However, in the
wake of a particularly brutal attack on an Israel bus in March of 1978 (timed to derail
peace talks), Israel launched operation Litani. The aim of this military intervention was to
halt Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets by forcing PLO militants from their strongholds
in the south of Lebanon to positions north of the Litani River. Unprepared for face-toface confrontation with the IDF, PLO forces were quickly overwhelmed and by March
21st the Israelis had achieved their objective.
In response to this incursion, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolutions 425 and 426 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment
of a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL forces, however, made
little attempt to halt the PLO’s rearmament and in the end “the PLO was granted a free
hand in the building up of arms caches and supplies within the twenty-kilometer cordon
sanitaire that the United Nations Security Council guaranteed Israel” (Gabriel, 1984: 57).
Apprehending the dilemma faced by Israel, Menachem Begin began to seek an
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internationally recognized provocation that would afford Israel a legitimate excuse for
ridding itself of its northern threat. Accordingly, when on June 3, 1982 members of the
Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to the United
Kingdom on the streets of London, Begin’s government used the occasion to justify a
repeated effort to rout PLO operatives from their strongholds in southern Lebanon.
Israel’s full-scale invasion of Lebanon was met with several peace initiatives
including the Fahad Plan put forth by Saudi Arabia and the Reagan plan of 1982.
Ultimately it was Reagan’s envoy Philip C. Habib who was able to secure an agreement
among the governments of Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, as well as the PLO leadership.
That agreement demanded the evacuation from Lebanon of PLO leaders, offices, and
combatants to be completed no later than September 3, 1982 (US Dept of State, 1982).
With their military cadres dispersed throughout the Middle East, Yasser Arafat
and key members of the PLO leadership established new headquarters in Tunis and began
to reassess the organization’s overarching goal of destroying Israel; emphasizing instead
the more pragmatic aim of establishing a secular Palestinian authority in the West Bank
and Gaza. This decision was met with condemnation by the PLO’s scattered militants
who believed such a move would sap the movement of it revolutionary fervor and ensnarl
its cadres in the day-today business of governing. The now floundering PLO was dealt
yet another devastating blow when Palestinians of the inside (Gaza and the West Bank)
demonstrated that they were no longer content to be subjugated to whims and interests of
an externally based leadership.
By the late 1980s two things had become clear 1) the exiled PLO leadership was
seemingly unaware of developments rapidly transpiring on the streets of Palestine, and 2)
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as a consequence of this disarray and the PLO’s inability to fill the political void that had
been created upon their departure from Lebanon, a new voice of representation had
emerged. In the wake of the 1987 intifada, Hamas had firmly established its rejectionist
position, and in so doing, solidified its support base as a direct challenge to the PLO’s
authority. Yasser Arafat was therefore left with little choice. If he and the PLO leadership
were to remain relevant, a bold initiative was required.
Engineering the Algiers Declaration of November 1988, Arafat called for a twostate solution to end the conflict with Israel. The Palestinian National Council promptly
thereafter issued a Declaration of Independence which was immediately recognized by
sixty, primarily Third World, countries (GAOR: A/43/877; SCOR: S/20278). One month
later, Arafat stood before members of the United Nations General Assembly gathered in
Geneva to declare:
The PLO will work for the achievement of a comprehensive settlement
among the parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State
of Palestine, Israel and the other neighbouring States, within the framework
of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East and on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1974) so as to guarantee
equality and the balance of interests, especially our people's rights, in
freedom, national independence, and respect the right to exist in peace and
security... It [the Palestinian National Council] has also reaffirmed its
rejection of terrorism in all its forms, including state terrorism, emphasizing
its commitment to its past resolutions in this regard (Arafat, 1988)
Although just one year earlier the United States Congress had taken action to
close all PLO offices operating in the United State and had adopted the Antiterrorism Act
of 1987 which determined “the PLO and its affiliates [to be] terrorist organizations and a
threat to the interests of the United States, it allies, and to international law” (US
Congress, 1987), Arafat’s UN speech was accepted as meeting US conditions for
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recognition. By denouncing terrorism and accepting in principal the UN Partition plan of
historic Palestine, the PLO had outmaneuvered Hamas to gain U.S. recognition, Jordan’s
relinquishment of the West Bank, and Israeli flexibility in recognition of Fatah’s role in
quelling the violence (Kurz, 2001: 3).
Although excluded from the Madrid Peace Talks (instead being represented by
the State of Jordan), Israel’s recently elected Labor Party saw a purpose in direct
negotiations with the PLO—the only representative of Palestinian interests with the
internationally recognized authority and legitimacy to conclude such an agreement
(Flamhaft, 1996: 96). As a result, beginning in July 1992 representatives from the
Government of Israel and the PLO began 14 months of clandestine negotiations in Oslo.
Then in August of 1993, Israel and PLO negotiators emerged from talks shocking the
world with a joint communiqué revealing that their representatives had been meeting
secretly and that they were preparing to sign an agreement involving mutual recognition
and gradual transition towards Palestinian autonomy. With the September 13, 1993
signing the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) on the Whitehouse lawn, Yasser Arafat and
his government-in-exile had finally achieved their long sought after goal of universal
recognition and legitimacy.

Assessment of Applicable Hypotheses
1. Did external political cleavages and divergent elite strategies condition the
movement’s approach to movement recognition?

Yes. Cold War tensions reached new heights in the immediate aftermath of the Six
Day War thus affording the Palestinian leadership a great deal of leeway in the
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pursuit of their objectives. While the ostensively more pragmatic course of direct
engagement with enemy forces yield few gains accept to mobilize internal support, it
was international skyjackings and other worldwide operations which garnered the
movement international attention and sympathy for the Palestinian cause. In turn the
mainstream leadership was able to mobilize these attitudes towards attainment of
legitimacy in international forums in spite of hegemonic objections.

2. Was movement recognition a product of great power interest.

Yes. With the fall of the Soviet Empire, the United States was left to manage global
affairs on its own. To this end, President Bill Clinton stressed the effect on US
national security of allowing regional conflicts fester; declaring that “where we can
make a difference, we must be prepared to do so” (Clinton, 1999: 273). It was within
this framework that the US administration saw in the recognition of the PLO a
means of securing America’s regional interests—a reduction of Arab tensions on the
street and animosity towards both Israel and the United States, while providing the
Palestinians a pathway to a fair and just resolution of their cause.

3. Were allies essential to attainment of the PLO’s recognition?

Yes. Not only did Arab States play a central role in the attainment of the
movement’s legitimacy within international institutions including the PLO’s status
as an observer within the United Nations and it organs, but Egypt’s insistence that
that solution to the Palestinian question be included in its 1978 peace treaty with
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Israel laid the groundwork for all the progress the Palestinian movement has since
made.

4. To what extent was a preconceived plan conducive the movement’s recognition?

Slightly. The PLO’s Ten-Point Program did not advance the movement’s cause, In
fact as recognized in Arafat’s speech before the General Assembly in 1988, the
movement’s recognition demanded that some of the Program’s dictates be forcefully
renounced.

De Facto Recognition
Less than one year after signing the Declaration of Principles, Yasser Arafat and
the PLO leadership stepped off a plane in the Gaza strip, thus completing a roundtrip
journey which had now retuned them to the place where their struggle began 27 years
earlier. Over the course of nearly three decades the PLO had been forced to move its
headquarters three times: from Gaza to Jordan, Jordan to Lebanon, and lastly setting up
base in Tunisia. Now back on Palestinian soil and armed with an internationally backed
agreement which envisaged the establishment of Palestinian autonomy leading to
statehood, the PLO set out to fulfill the vision of Oslo.
Taking cues from the Zionist case, to complete this task the Palestinian leadership
would need to proceed with resolve—building the institutions, infrastructure, and image
of a state without being distracted by forces seeking to derail that objective. Pursuit of
these tasks would require a skilled leadership with the ability to forge united political
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support for the movement’s established course to statehood within Palestinian society and
the agility to capitalize on external political cleavages in order to overcome Israel’s
defiant elite strategies. Finally, as has been observed with all stages of success examined
thus far, the Palestinian’s attainment of de facto recognition is likely to be preceded by a
realignment of the hegemonic order and either facilitated or frustrated by the preferences
of allies.

Movement Approach (Arafat)
From its founding in 1964, the PLO had established a variety of governmental,
social, and military institutions. The Central Committee and Unified Command for
example, were charged with unifying all militant groups in “popular revolutionary war
[as] the main path to the liberation of Palestine” (Nassar, 1991: 56), while the PLO’s
military department was charged with the supervision and coordination of all military
activities. On the political front, the PLO National Council functioned as the Palestinian
parliament; the Executive Committee served as its cabinet of ministers. In addition there
was a political department which performed the duties of a ministry of foreign affairs, an
information bureau which coordinated the movement’s propaganda and information
dissemination activates, as well as a national fund which facilitated the movements
financial activates including fund raising and budgeting. Lastly, the movement had
established a number of social institutions, including the Social Affairs Department and
Samed Institute which together provided services such as healthcare, welfare, education,
and occupational training (ibid).
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With the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and subsequent Oslo II
Accord in September 1995, the PLO’s institutional apparatus, territorial jurisdiction, and
governmental responsibilities were greatly expanded. As an initial step, the DOP
transferred governing authority and responsibilities to the newly formed Palestinian
Authority (PA), including the right to legislate and to enforce law and order. It further
established interparty forums and mechanisms for dispute resolution, regional
cooperation, and economic development in preparation of a final status agreement (DOP,
1993). Oslo II— known formally as the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza
Strip—established detailed plans for extending Palestinian self-rule to the occupied
territories including all of the West Bank without prejudice to a future final status
agreement. Toward this end, it set out a schedule for the withdraw of Israeli military
forces from Palestinian controlled territories in the lead up to democratic elections to
select a Palestinian Council (what became the Palestinian Authority) that would serve as
the governing body for the Palestinian people and to which legal authority would be
transferred by the Israeli military government and its civil administration.
In sum, the DOP and Oslo II were to provide the space, infrastructure, and
capabilities for a robust and comprehensive state-building project to be implemented in
the lead-up to negotiations on the final status of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Unfortunately, forces seeking to derail this endeavor, whether by design or consequence,
quickly gained the upper hand.
From the moment PLO leaders decided to reestablish their base in the territories,
Fatah’s civic affairs operations came into direct confrontation with Hamas-backed
programs that had provided food and social subsidies to many Palestinians in an effort to
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unite support for an uprising against Israel. Moreover, the PLO’s assertion that any future
Palestinian state would be secular-democratic in form—be it leftist, communist, or
Baathist—did not rest well with Brotherhood adherents who envisaged an Islamic
nationalist state founded upon Quranic teachings (CRS: 1993). In turn this clash of
objectives resulted in a geopolitical rift in that Hamas—on the grounds of shared beliefs
and common vision—turned towards Islamic extremists based in Lebanon, Iran,
Indonesia, Sudan and elsewhere for its sources of support. In contrast, the PLO—seeking
to win favor from the West—allied itself with moderate Arab states.
Joining forces with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, the Democratic and
Islamic Nationalist Fronts, and several smaller factions, Hamas-led rejectionists
demonstrated their resolve to derail the peace process on April 6, 1994 when they
instituted a campaign of suicide bombings which was intended to discredit the PLO in
both the eyes of the international community as well as the Palestinian populace. In
response to these attacks, Israel demanded of the newly autonomous Fatah-led Palestinian
Authority (PA)—which was now endowed with a “strong police force” in accordance
with Article VIII of the Declaration of Principles—an all-out assault on its Palestinian
rival. The PLO leadership, however, feared the outbreak of civil war; more than that, they
feared an ensuing loss of popular support (Kurz, 2001: 4). In spite of these concerns,
however, Arafat did act—engaging in a strategy of what Louis Kriesberg (1998) refers to
as persuasive inducement (105). Seeking to gain concessions within the ongoing Oslo
framework, Arafat demonstrated to the Israelis the alternative to his leadership while at
the same time strengthening his position vis-à-vis that of Hamas by weakening, but not
destroying his opponent’s support base. What resulted was not only a split between the
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two factions on ideological and strategic grounds—a secular PLO accepting the State of
Israel, Islamist Hamas calling for its irradiation—but their physical separation as well;
Fatah ruling the West Bank, Hamas dominating Gaza.
This internecine Palestinian feud provided Israel with a basis to delay withdraw of
its forces from areas to be handed over to the Palestinian authority. The conflict was
further exploited by the recently elected Netanyahu government that implemented
closures, proceeded with the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and
denied the release Palestinian prisoners on the basis of security concerns. IntraPalestinian conflict had moreover frustrated efforts to build a viable economy in the
Palestinian autonomous regions because international donors either could not find a
suitable infrastructure through which to channel funds or simply did not fulfill their
pledges (UNSCO, 1999). As a result, there developed a two-way path of blame and
justification for non-action with each party accusing the other of recidivating (fig. 5.2).

International System
Despite these alleged transgressions, or perhaps because of them, a concerted
effort was made to push the peace process forward. At President Bill Clinton’s insistence,
Chairman Arafat and Prime Minster Netanyahu negotiated and signed the Wye River
Memorandum in October of 1998. In essence the Memorandum was an agreement to
resume implementation of Oslo II and the gradual handover of Palestinian autonomy.
Although approved by the Knesset by a margin of 75-19, implementation of the
Memorandum’s dictates was hampered by Netanyahu’s stubborn posture towards the
peace process and shunning of US wishes that had ultimately driven the United States
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Figure 5.2—Summary of Declared Violations
Palestinian Grievances:
 Israel had not fulfilled its obligation to provide
Palestinians safe passage between Gaza and the West
Bank.
 Israel annexed land to build by-pass roads to Jewish
settlements.
 Israel prevented the establishment of air- and seaports in Gaza as agreed to.
 Israel refused the release of 2,500 prisoners in Israeli
jails as called for by the previous Israeli cabinet,
justice minister and president.
 Israel expropriated Palestinian land.
 Israel refused agreement on Hebron withdraw
because it was demanding to renegotiate the
agreement, seeking to control one-third of the Hebron
in order to expand its settlements.
 Israel demanded the right to carry out ‘hot pursuit’ of
prisoners.
 Israel had not lived up to its agreements for further
redeployment: a litmus test created by the interim
agreements.—By creation of Oslo II, the West Bank
was divided into areas A, B and C. In a four phased
process Israeli forces were to gradually redeploy until
all areas were in Palestinian control—(Musallam,
1999).

Israeli Grievances:
 The PA failed in its obligation to renounce violence and to take all measures
necessary to prevent acts of violence and terrorism against Israel.
 The PA refused to resolve all outstanding issues through bilateral negotiations, to
resolve all disputes through peaceful means, and to cooperate in the creation of joint
mechanism for negotiation and dispute settlement.
 The PA actively engaged in acts of incitement in contravention of the spirit of
peace.
 The PA refused to apprehend, prosecute and detain known terrorists.
 The PA failed in its obligation to ensure that holy sites in the areas under the
administration of the Palestinian Authority were to be duly respected and protected.
 The obligation to ensure that no armed forces other than the Palestinian police and
Israeli military forces were to be established or operate in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip was not adhered to.
 The obligation to confiscate illegal weapons was not fully carried out.
 The PA failed to maintain joint security and other cooperation mechanisms with
Israel in order to ensure public order and security (Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2000).
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Memorandum’s dictates was hampered by Netanyahu’s stubborn posture towards the
peace process and shunning of US wishes that had ultimately driven the United States
and the Palestinians closer together while producing nothing of value for Israel in return
(Ross, 2004: 490). Accordingly, if progress toward peace were to continue, it would have
to wait for a change of leadership in Israel. That change came with the election of Ehud
Barak in July 1999.
Unlike his predecessor who preferred a gradual approach, Barak sought to cut
the Israeli-Arab Gordian knot with one bold stroke. Removing the phased approach from
the agenda once and for all, the Barak Plan called upon Arab leaders to discuss the gamut
of issues facing the parties and set a time table of 15 months (until October 2000) to
reach a breakthrough on all tracks: a final status agreement between Israel and Palestine,
peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon, and regional agreements for refugees and
water rights (Rabinovich, 2004: 124; Barak, 1999). Yet as Arafat made clear in a June
1999 meeting with President Clinton, he believed it was much too early to discuss final
status issues. His reasoning was clear; Israel had not honored its commitments as called
for in the Wye agreements: it had not completed the redeployment its forces, it had not
freed Palestinian prisoners, and it had not transferred Jerusalem suburbs to the Palestinian
Autonomous Authority as agreed to (Enderlin, 2003: 16).
Arafat was trapped; if he refused to participate in the peace talks he would be
blamed for derailing the peace process. If he agreed and the summit failed, once again the
culpability would fall on his shoulders. In the end, at the urging of Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, Arafat reluctantly agreed to take part in the talks at Camp David (ibid:
170).
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The Camp David Peace Summit commenced on July 11, 2000 and for the first
time in seven years the fate of the Palestinian populace was once again in the hands of its
PLO leadership. Despite Arafat’s apprehensions, the Palestinian delegation to Camp
David and the subsequent Taba negotiations took up their task with full vigor. On the
agenda were three of the most contentious issues faced by any negotiation team. These
items included the fate of Palestinian refugees, final agreement on borders and
outstanding security issues, and the most daunting task of all, determining the future
physical, spiritual, and demographic configuration of Jerusalem. In the end, the Camp
David summit and Taba peace talks failed to reach a firm agreement on any of these
issues. Instead, violence and internecine conflict once again ensued.
Many have placed the blamed for the failure of Camp David and the subsequent
outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada squarely on Arafat’s shoulders. Dennis Ross declared,
“when all is said and done…negotiations failed mainly because they ran into a brick wall
called Yasser Arafat” (in Haberman, 2001: 36). Prince Bandar Bin Sultan of Saudi
Arabia lamented that “Arafat's failure to accept the deal in January of 2001 was a tragic
mistake—a crime, really” (Walsh, 2003: 48). Meanwhile the US initiated Mitchell Report
found that “Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at
provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic
initiative” (US Dept. of State, 2001). Viewed from the inside, “many people in the
occupied territories were fed up with what they saw as the virtual dictatorship of Arafat
and Fatah” (Pratt, 2006: 112). In this sense, the intifada provided Arafat and the PLO
with a means of regaining legitimacy in eyes of the Palestinian pubic who were prone to
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look upon the rising new generation of militants with admiration while remaining
skeptical of Arafat’s old-guard pragmatism.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the cards were stacked firmly against the
Palestinian delegation at Camp David and accordingly Arafat was justified in declining
Barak’s ‘generous offer.’ Not only had the proposed agreement forced Arafat to cross red
lines—for instance, with regards to Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem—but in
essence, it amounted to the forfeiting of rights Palestinians were already entitled to by
international law including the right of return and all territory east of the 1967 border. In
any case, Yasser Arafat died on November 11, 2004 and with him died any sincere hope
that the Oslo process would bring about Palestinian statehood. After seven years of
arduous compromise and sacrifice, the Oslo process “had won [Palestinians] only shards
of an independent state and had not, as they had hoped, improved their standard of
living” (Bregman, 2003: 274). Even more foreboding, with the rise to power of Ariel
Sharon, Palestinians found themselves walled in, impotent, and lacking a credible voice.
Sharon’s approach to the Palestinian problem was in stark contrast to that of his
predecessors. Neither gradual nor negotiated, Sharron’s method was bold, deliberate, and
one-sided. After a decade of agonizing negotiations and four years of unrestrained
violence the Israeli public had little appetite for continued dialogue, nor did they
sympathize with the plight of the Palestinian populace (Yaar and Hermann, 2004). It was
within this environment that Sharron carried out his plans for disengagement.
Upon his election, construction began on a 700km security barrier designed to
keep terrorist from entering Israeli territory. The barrier and its elaborate set of
checkpoints, however, also cut links between individual Palestinian villages, and in some
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cases, separated villages from their source of economic livelihood. The second element of
Sharon’s plan was equally disruptive. Dismantling all Jewish settlements and
subsequently withdrawing all Israel assets—civil and military—from the Gaza Strip, it
was hoped that the Hamas-led territory would turn its attention to peaceful
socioeconomic pursuits rather than violence. It did not. As a result, Sharon and his
successors have dismissed the idea of building a West Bank–Gaza corridor citing security
concerns. The effect has been to frustrate efforts to forge a unified Palestinian
government and to establish an effective Palestinian economic infrastructure.
Not only had the Al-Asqa intifada elicited Israel’s ire, the international
community was also forced to reassess its stance. Instead of fostering external support for
the Palestinian cause, the uprising forced the international community to reconsider its
prescribed path to Palestinian statehood. Accordingly, Moodley (2005) observed that
“after Arafat’s death, Palestinian statehood was made dependent…on ending attacks
against occupation forces, on instituting democracy and internal reform, [and] ending
incitement in the media and history textbooks” (183). Moreover, in view of the realities
created by the intifada, international donors began to recalculate their financial
contributions to the Palestinians as well. Not only did these externally imposed
restrictions result in striking income inequality within Palestinian society—the West
Bank’s economy tied to Israel, the Gaza Strip cut off from the world (Hilal, 2010: 31)—
but even more detrimental were the restrictions disallowing Palestinian control over its
own economic future.
While able to participate in the drafting of budgets, decisions on fund allocations,
the drawing up financial and long-term economic plans, and the determination of goals
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and priorities, the PA had been reduced to the role of technical assistant in its own
financial affairs. Thus from the outset of Oslo it has been international experts and
private donors who have determined the trajectory of Palestinian economic policy (ibid:
33-34). In the wake of the second intifada, marginalization of Palestinian input on fiscal
matters worsened. Moreover, as a consequence of the physical destruction of Palestine’s
economic infrastructure and subsequent economic decline that resulted from Israel’s
response to the intifada, donor aid shifted from development projects to covering
recurrent expenditures including the salaries of PA officials. Accordingly, outside
pressure primarily from Quartet members (the United Nations, European Union, Russia,
and the United States) had focused insistently on governmental reforms rather than
policies that would lead to the development of a practical economy worthy of
independent statehood (ibid).

Movement Approach (Abu Mazan)
Public opinion polls conducted in the immediate post-Arafat era revealed a gain in
public optimism toward the peace process, a willingness to compromise, and that public
support for violence against Israelis, while still high, was fast declining (Shikaki, 2006:
2). Nevertheless, Palestinians of the West Bank soon realized that there sea with a few
islands of Israeli settlements had been transformed into a collection of Palestinian
enclaves surround by wide corridors controlled by the IDF (Ha’aretz, 2003). Conflict
with Israel, however, soon became the least of the Palestinian’s problem as Yasser
Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was sworn in as Chairman of the PLO
on November 11, 2004.
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Just how entrenched and far-reaching conflict between the Palestinian’s two
predominate political parties—Fatah’s PLO-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas’
Islamic Resistance Movement—had become was made apparent in the run-up to
Palestinian legislative elections scheduled to take place in January 2006. Hamas’
grassroots organizing strategy, its promotion of the ‘resistance project,’ and its ability to
gain the backing of regional actors enhanced its election prospects. Its role in providing
basic social services, disillusionment with the peace process, and “revulsion at a decade
of Fatah misrule,” seemed to have cemented its victory (Usher, 2006: 3). In the end, it
was the fact that “Palestinians by and large were not voting for political Islam or the
destruction of Israel,” said Hamas political leader Ghazi Hamad, rather “Hamas presented
an alternative to rampant corruption, Oslo and the road map…[and] a proper balance
between political and military struggle.” (ibid: 11).
With the swearing in of Hamas’ Ismail Haniya as the Palestinian Prime Minister
on March 29, 2006, it quickly became apparent to all that the gun, not the olive branch,
would guide the new government’s approach to statehood. Hamas’ refusal to recognize
Israel, renounce violence, and to accept past agreements led Israel, Canada, the United
State, and the European Union to cut ties with the newly formed government—providing
only the very minimal amount of aid to Palestinian-based aid agencies as necessary to
prevent a humanitarian crises (Labott, 2006). The cumulative result was a 75% cut in the
PA’s monthly budget (CPJME, 2007: 1).
Attempting to overcome externally imposed financial and diplomatic isolation, as
early as July 2006 PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniya
sought out a means of forging a unity government that would meet western demands.
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With the assistance of the Saudi government a power sharing formula based on a
platform that in a roundabout way was aimed at meeting the three western stipulations—
acceptance of Israel, acceptance of Oslo, and renouncement of violence—was reached in
February of 2007 and a unity government established the following month (ibid). The
new agreement did little to allay western concerns, however. In fact, the only western
country to reestablish cordial relations with the unity government was the Government of
Norway (2007). Moreover, because Hamas did not voluntarily negotiate the terms of the
newly established unity government—being forced to do so by external pressures and at
the insistence of Abbas and other Arab governments—its submission resulted in a high
level of ambiguity with regards to the national leadership (CPJME, 2007: 2). This in turn
garnered a great deal of frustration within Palestinian society.
Manifestations of this frustration became apparent even before unity talks began
as Fatah supporters and Hamas-backed militants began to embark on differing paths
toward statehood. For its part, Hamas launched raids into Israel culminating with the
abduction of Corporal Gilad Shalit on June 5, 2006. This action invited Israeli retaliation
and thus pitted Abbas’ cooperative orientation towards Israel against Hamas’ defiant
stance (Moran, 2006). The result was a sharp escalation in internecine conflict edging
towards civil war. Then, on May 27, 2007 Hamas boldly rejected Abbas’ request to halt
rocket fire on Israeli targets and instead intensified its attacks (Reuters, 2007). Seeking to
reign in Hamas-backed militants, Fatah forces confronted Hamas militants in the Gaza
Strip; ultimately leading to a series of bloody battles culminating with the expulsion of
the PA and Fatah forces from the Gaza Strip on June 14, 2007 (ibid).
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Hamas’ take over of Gaza prompted President Abbas to declare a state of
emergency, dismiss the government, and to form a new government with Salam Fayyad
appointed to take up the post of Prime Minister. While several attempts at a Fatah-Hamas
reconciliation have been made since 2007, the new Abbas-Fayyad government shifted its
attention to unilateral measures designed to bring about sovereign Palestinian statehood
within a two-year time frame. Drawing upon Prime Minister Fayyad’s experience as a
World Bank advisor, the Palestinian Authority developed a program of action entitled,
Ending Occupation, Establishing the State. The August 2009 program (aka the Fayyad
plan) for the first time since the implementation of Oslo placed the entire gamut of issues
facing the Palestinians squarely in their own hands. As noted in the document’s forward,
the goals set out were both comprehensive and ambitious.

The program, which sets out our national goals and government policies,
centers around the objective of building strong state institutions capable of
providing, equitably and effectively, for the needs of our citizens, despite the
occupation…
It is time for our people to obtain their unconditional freedom and national
rights as required by international law. This calls for positive and proactive
steps, both nationally and internationally, in order to end the occupation and
reach a just and lasting political settlement in our region. For our part, we
have to dedicate ourselves to the task of state-building…
The establishment of an independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian state
is fundamental for peace, security and stability in our region. Whereas Israeli
settlement policies and activities continue to undermine the viability of the
two- state solution, our government is determined to preserve and advance
this solution…This is the path to freedom. This is the path to the creation of
the independent state of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied in
1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital (Palestinian National Authority,
2009).
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The Fayyad Plan was forward looking; it focused unyieldingly on state-building
efforts and refused to succumb to the all too common tendency to redress past wrongs
rather than move forward when things got tough (Green, 2010: 3). The Plan broke with
the past in that it sought to create an accountable governmental administration which
encouraged the private sector to undertake economic initiatives (Simanovsky, 2011). By
placing public investment under the oversight of the Ministry of Finance, linking
budgeting to economic planning to ensure greater transparency, instituting modern audit
and control measures, adopting international accounting standards, and enforcing
payments of public utilities, the PA’s new approach greatly strengthen public confidence
in the full range of newly established government departments (ibid).
Indeed, less than one year after implementing these reforms noticeable progress
could be detected. Within the security sector, US-Israeli-Palestinian coordinated
offensives dismantled illegal militias and created an overall safe environment for
Palestinian businesses and citizens. As US Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton
put it, “crime is down, Palestinian shops are open after dark and teenage girls in Jenin can
visit their friends after dark without fear of being attacked” (in Simanovsky, 2011). In
addition to restoring basic law and order, scaling back corruption, and reestablishing a
measure of public confidence; roads were paved, institutions strengthened, services
improved, and the investment climate greatly enhanced (Luck, 2011). In turn the new
environment yielded almost immediate pay-offs. By 2011, not only had tax collection
increased by 50% and thus the PA’s public debt nearly halved, but the PA could also
boast an annual growth rate of 9% (Barthe, 2011). These improvements did not go
unnoticed by the international community. By the end of 2010, the PA had received
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pledges of nearly one billion dollars in foreign investment (Simanovsky, 2011), and the
World Bank had declared the PA to be “well positioned to establish a state at any time in
the near future” (in Elgindy, 2013).
Success of the accelerated state-building project under the Fayyad plan and
subsequent endorsements received by many in the international community convinced
President Abbas that the time had come for the Palestinians to take their case to the
United Nations. In a May 2011 editorial published in The New York Times, President
Abbas itemized the political, economic, and social developments that had taken place
within the Palestinian community since Al-Nakba—particularly those which had been
achieved the past two years. He noted that in sum the Palestinians had met all the
prerequisites to statehood as detailed in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States—the Palestinian right to self-determination had been confirmed time and
again by the United Nations and various international institutions, Palestinians had legal
claim to territory which was populated with a permanent Palestinian populace, and the
PA had proven its capacity to enter into foreign relations with other states (Abbas, 2011).
In fact, as Abbas went on to note, “only the occupation of our land hinders us from
reaching our full potential; it does not impede United Nations recognition” (ibid).
With the backing of the vast majority of nations, Abbas took his case for full UN
membership as the de jure sovereign State of Palestine to the United Nations Security
Council in September 2011. Because the United States held fast to its conviction that a
true and lasting peace could only be achieved through direct negotiations, the
Palestinians, recognizing that they would only be able to muster eight of the nine
requisite votes for statehood, decided to put off their bid for full statehood membership
161

and instead pursued de facto recognition (Hume and Fantz, 2012). Taking their case to
the General Assembly where the vote would be free from the threat of a US veto, on
November 29, 2012— precisely 65 years to the day that that same body passed resolution
181 which once and for all ended the British rule and partitioned Palestine—the
Palestinian Authority easily won support for their upgraded status from ‘observer’ to
‘non-member observer state’ by a vote of 138 to 9 with 41 abstentions. As noted in the
General Assembly’s Resolution 67/19, the decision to confer the upgraded status was
due, at least in part, to the efforts of Prime Minster Fayyad, his two-year plan, and the PA
leadership’s ability to stick to that plan:
Commending the Palestinian National Authority’s 2009 plan for constructing
the institutions of an independent Palestinian State within a two-year period,
and welcoming the positive assessments in this regard about readiness for
statehood by the World Bank, the United Nations and the International
Monetary Fund and as reflected in the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Chair
conclusions of April 2011 and subsequent Chair conclusions, which
determined that the Palestinian Authority is above the threshold for a
functioning State in key sectors studied…
Decides to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the
United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role
of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as the
representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant
resolutions and practice… (GAOR: A/RES/67/19).

Assessment of Applicable Hypotheses
1. Were allies essential to attainment of de facto conditions and recognition?

Yes. The divide between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority brought differing
resources to the Palestinian cause. For its part, Hamas appealed to Islamist-minded
states to gain financial and military aid. The PA acquired both technical assistance
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and monetary support, primarily from Quartet members. It also received moral
support from a vast majority of states sympatric to the Palestinian plight. While all
these sources of assistance were a significant factor in promoting each faction’s
objectives, it was only support to the PA that can be considered essential in bringing
about de facto recognition of the Palestinian state.

2. Did internal fractionalization facilitate or frustrate the movement’s efforts?

Moderately Frustrating. Oslo’s elevation of the Fatah-led PA to a privileged status
presented a direct challenge to the widespread popular support Hamas had enjoyed
prior to its implementation. The result was a steady escalation in violence as each
party sought to demonstrate its dedication to the cause through armed struggle
culminating in civil war. Realizing the destructive consequence, Abu Mazan stirred
the mainstream away from violence to instead advance the cause by implementing a
strategy of persuasive inducement and thereby regained western support.

3. To what extent was a preconceived plan conducive the movement’s creation of de
facto conditions?

Strongly Conducive. The historiography clearly demonstrates that the Fayyad Plan
was the single most significant factor allowing for Palestine’s de facto recognition.
Not only did the plan define a path towards a prudent and comprehensive statebuilding project, but in its implementation the Mazan government was able to
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demonstrate its ability to stay the course –particularly in light of Israel’s ever
intrusive occupation policies—and in doing so win not only renewed financial
backing, but support for their statehood bid as well.

4. Did external political cleavages and divergent elite strategies condition the
movement’s approach?

Yes. As just noted, Israeli policy and Hamas’ defiant posture pushed the Manan
government to act unilaterally. While the PA was forced to abandon its ambition for
de jure recognition, its unilateral move afforded it the ability to rally near universal
support for de facto in spite of Israeli and American protests.

5. Was de facto recognition preceded by a shift in the hegemonic order and was that
shift fundamental to success?

No. Although no definitive shift in the global hegemonic order can be detected within
the established timeframe, the region itself was experiencing a significant
reorientation of its traditional power structures. Precipitated by a US military
withdraw, the Arab Spring promised a new future for the Middle East. Nevertheless,
by the time of the UN vote on statehood, the prospects of an Arab Winter were
beginning to emerge. Aside from America’s long-standing policy promoting a
negotiated peace, this prospect likely contributed to the administration’s decision to
steadfastly support its regional proxy, Israel.
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De Jure Affirmation
Despite the Palestinian Authority’s upgraded status, the fact remains that the
Palestinian national liberation movement’s full aspirations remain unfulfilled. And while
their position as a non-member state affords them an array of useful tools for combating
the ill effects of occupation, many barriers still stand in their way. The most evident of
these barriers is the movement’s inability to forge a unified front with its Hamas rival.
The PA remains a weak government that derives its authority from the role it has played
in the internationally supported peace process, not so much by the consent of the
Palestinian people themselves. Moreover, no matter the niceties of titles and status
upgrades, the fact remains that Palestine is far from free to pursue an independent path.
Not only does Israeli occupation bear on the day to day lives of Palestinian citizens, but
international donors and regional governments have much say on the policies and
strategies employed by Abbas and his associates. That said, if a truly sovereign
Palestinian state is to take root, accommodation with Israel must be reached—either by
force of facts, international pressure, or through a comprehensive and final negotiated
peace settlement.

International System
As was witnessed with the passing of UN resolution 67/19, all but nine countries
are supportive of Palestinian statehood. Moreover, of the nine voting against,6 only
three—The United States, Canada, and Israel—can be said to exert real influence on the
6

Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau,
Panama, United States.
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matter. Moreover, since that historic vote, on October 30, 2014 the Government of
Sweden became the first to recognize Palestine’s de jure status (Sweden, 2014). Then on
May 13, 2015 the Holy See issued a joint communiqué with the Government of Palestine
signaling its recognition of Palestine’s upgraded status as well (Holy See and State of
Palestine, 2015).
As the case for full recognition of Palestine’s de jure status becomes ever
stronger, it should be recognized that those states voting against de facto recognition,
save possibly Israel, do not reject the notion of a fully sovereign Palestinian state; rather
it is their firm conviction that any said status change must be achieved through a process
of dialogue and conciliation. As recognized early on by Truman’s State Department,
lasting resolution to the claims of both Jews and Arabs can only be achieved through
comprehensive negotiations (USDS, 1945-1952). Similar to United Nations Resolution
242, this notion is predicated on the experience that unilateral action taken by one side
will only result in escalation by the other. Thus, recalling the ramifications of the
international community’s fateful decision of 1947, those withholding their support for
imposing Palestinian statehood recognize that lasting peace can only result through the
agreement of both parties based on the tried and tested policy of land for peace.
Despite this optimistic outlook, however, both Palestinians and Israelis have
grown evermore leery of each others intentions. For their part, Israelis feel that, not only
have they endured successive rounds of increasingly lethal rocket fire into their cities,
they do not view the Mazen government as a credible partner for peace; citing the PA’s
failure to reach agreements with Israel in 2000, 2008, and 2014. As a result, a sense of
dread has befallen the once vocal proponents of a two-state solution; a sense that has
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permeated the Israeli left and center-left populations who are now more prone to focus
their political clout on other, domestic, social ills. The result has the emergence of
spoilers on both sides further complicated by the rise to dominance of hardliners headed
by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party who recognize that some sort of accommodation
must be made with the Palestinians, but true to their revisionist heritage, are determined
to forge unalterable geographic and demographic conditions that would enhance Israel’s
spiritual and strategic depth while reducing any future Palestinian state to a mere shard of
what is due.

National Liberation Movement
In its effect, resolution 67/19 recognized a state where in actual material terms
only the contours of one exists. It is true however, that since 1994 the Palestinians have
constructed the requisite infrastructure, institutions, and economic foundations of a viable
state and thus their de facto recognition is more than justified. Nevertheless, their
physical hold on the territory set aside by international law to be the foundation of the
future de jure state is tenuous at best—the occupation administration of the Israeli
government controlling nearly every aspect of activity therein.
Hence like the Israelis, Palestinians are also suspicious of Israel’s sincerity. Failed
peace talks, expanded settlement building, restricted access to Jerusalem and other parts
of Palestinian territory combined with the bellicose statements of more than a few Israeli
leaders have only served to reinforce such sentiments. It is therefore not surprising that
Abu Mazen’s approach to de jure recognition has been defiant in nature—falling back on
the sort of unilateralism that had served the movement well in the past.
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Held in check by Israel’s steadfast refusal to institute the directives of UN
resolutions 242, 194 and others and overwhelmed by Israel’s unquestioned military
supremacy, the Mazan government has chosen to harness its newly acquired tools as
afforded it by resolution 67/19 to bring strong international pressure to bear on the
occupying power and its activities. In an attempt to overcome Palestine’s weakness vis-àvis Israel, Mazan has now taken his case to the International Criminal Court in the hope
of receiving an internationally binding ruling on Israel’s illegal occupation policies.
While such a ruling would succeed in shaming Israel and is likely to force change in its
occupation strategies, it is unlikely to bring Palestine any close to (near) universal de jure
recognition.

Assessment and Prospects
Taking into account the lessons gleaned from both case historiographies and the
theoretical orientation which has guided this study, it is possible to identity several
patterns that may be useful in bringing about a successful conclusion to the Palestinian
struggle for national liberation.
Both case demonstrate the value of forward looking plans of action that are
positive in their orientation (i.e. focused on means to advance the cause rather than an
overemphasis on destroying the enemy). Theodor Herzl’s Der Jundenstaat undoubtedly
set the Zionists on an unstoppable course to de facto recognition. Likewise, the Fayyad
Plan put the Palestinian Authority on a unilateral path to recognition impervious to
forces seeking to derail that effort. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that
formation of a like-fashioned plan for achieving (near) universal recognition of the de
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jure state of Palestine would be among the greatest assets toward achieving this
objective. Drawing on the insights revealed by the two cases, such a plan should address
each of the following issues / opportunities.
1. Recognizing the international community’s demand that mainstream Zionist leaders
rein in renegade factions and that this condition was established as a prerequisite to
de jure recognition, a central component of any comprehensive plan for attaining
Palestine’s de jure recognition must find a way of dealing with Hamas, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, and to a lesser extent, other like-minded factions. Preferably this
would entail a mechanism for absorbing these elements into the mainstream and
political processes for resolving outstanding disagreements. A minimum condition
of any such agreement would have to incorporate an instrument for guaranteeing the
cessation of rocket fire into Israel throughout the plan’s implementation. For unlike
Great Britain, the Israelis will not simply leave and thus sustained levels of violence
would only serve to justify Israeli designs to derail the plan’s implementation.
Should it be found impossible to find a mutually acceptable agreement with rival
factions, a contingency plan should be devised allowing the PA to part ways (at least
temporarily) in order to advance the established plan unilaterally.

2. Although already established in the many framework agreements completed to date,
the plan should included a precise statement of its objectives. This would be a step
beyond what the Zionists were able to achieve, and in its publication would serve to
alleviate many of the fears that exist on both sides of the table. What will a
sovereign state of Palestine look like? What will be it borders? Where will its capital
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be placed? How will its economy function? What instruments of defense will it
employ? What of its future? In each case, the objectives of the state-to-be should be
stated in the affirmative while explicitly detailing acceptable areas open to
negotiation after de jure recognition is granted.

3. The established plan must incorporate a mechanism for exploiting existing political
cleavages within Israeli society as well as differing strategies to the question of
Palestine as promoted by individual elite groupings. The objective being to place
strong pressure on Israeli rejectionists from within Israel itself as well as externally,
strategies to rally the support of allies—while taking recognition of allies’ selfinterest—must be incorporated into the plan as well. Moreover, given the
Palestinian’s militarily disadvantaged position and the disastrous consequences of
past military offensives pursued by their allies, emphasis should be placed on
diplomacy over violence. Nevertheless, as the Zionist case demonstrated, violence
may be warranted in order to hold borders. Thus violence perpetuated against Israeli
military targets within the bounds of the 1967 border is not only justified, it may be
necessary. It should be recognized, however, that to operate outside these strictly
established parameters (e.g. in Israel proper or against civilians) could result in
severe blowback—particularly in the present era wherein all great powers are
strongly aligned against acts of terrorism.
4. Finally, in the same way that Zionist leader’s were able to pressure Great Britain in
to capitulating politically—abstaining rather than vetoing Israel’s admission to the
United Nations—by rallying the diplomatic assets of the United States; the
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Palestinian leadership must devise a plan for the attainment America’s passive
acceptance. This needs to entail a strategy through which European leaders will see
it as their strong interest to place sustained pressure on the United States for its
abstention (or preferably endorsement). Again, taking note of Israel’s experience,
these efforts will be greatly enhanced by a strategy for demonstrating that the
government of Palestine exercises complete and singular control over its territory
(which depending on inter-faction negotiations may only include the West Bank)
and has developed mechanisms for addressing potentially violent outburst, is
capable of minimally defending itself, does not harbor belligerent intentions, is
willing and able to uphold the values and dictates of the international community.

Summary
Like the Zionist movement, the Palestinian struggle for self-determination
emerged under conditions of tragedy. Nevertheless and also in accord with the Zionist
experience, it was not tragedy that launched a truly unified and indigenous movement,
rather movement emergence was made possible by a fundamental reordering the regional
balance of power and the consequent adjustments to hegemonic alignments. Moreover,
the movement that emerged found a high degree of acceptance and accommodation
within the prevailing international temperament despite adopting an ideology and
associated strategy that was in opposition to western great power preferences. This later
observation highlights the various political cleavages—East vs. West, North vs. South,
and secular Arab vs. Islamist—that movement leaders have been able to exploit or rally
throughout their struggle.
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On the other hand, unlike the Zionist movement which rapidly developed during
its formative, the Palestinian formative years were marked by great leaps forward
punctuated by debilitating setbacks. Although fractionalization has at times severely
constrained the movement’s progress, for the most part these setback were externally
induced—be it Israeli occupation policy, refusal on the leaderships part to submit to great
power demands, or the activities of allies ostensively supporting the movement, but in
acting in their own self-interest, frustrating the movement’s advancement. Elsewhere, the
Palestinian leadership has been highly effective at rally solidarist support—even in their
pursuit of a pluralist objective. In the end however, just as was the case with Zionism,
marked advances in the movement’s cause always came on the heels of hegemonic
decline and the emergence of a newly configured international system.
Today the Palestinian people are well positioned to execute the final stage of their
struggle. In addition to the widespread support they have enjoyed from members of the
Global South for decades, western European countries are also moving towards full
recognition as evidenced in the European Union’s December 17, 2014 resolution. And
while the United States and Israel remain resolute in their opposition to an imposed state
in the absence of a mediated agreement, it just may be the case that with Islamist militant
inching closer to the borders of more moderate states in the region, the West Bank secular
PLO could establish itself a linchpin of stability, thus elevating its negotiating position
vis-à-vis Israel and the United States.
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Chapter VI:
Conclusion
The Puzzle
Summary
This study has examined the story of two peoples—Jews and Palestinians—who
through the fate of history, found their respective quests for self-determination to be
intricately intertwined and conditioned by many of the same forces. At the same time, the
two peoples pursued their respective quests for statehood in distinctly different manners
by making use of separate pathways to statehood and by capitalizing upon differing
elements of the structures in which they were embedded to advance their respective
causes. Because each movement faced unique constraining and facilitating forces, it was
also found that ultimately the interests and preferences of existing states, especially great
powers, explained these unexpected outcomes.

Approach
This study asked: 1) are movement-international system interactions a good
indicator of national liberation movement emergence, advancement, and outcome? And
2) what attributes of the international system must be overcome or otherwise harnessed
by movement leaders that will ultimately propel them towards their final status? These
questions properly lend themselves to analysis within a structure vs. agency framework.
Evaluating the respective influence of agency and structure on the course and outcome of
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struggles for national liberation, the approach drew upon the historical experiences of two
exceptional cases. Zionism, it was proposed, constituted what Harry Eckstein (1975)
refers to as a crucial case in that it succeeded in achieving statehood under conditions that
would seemingly lead to failure—most noticeably: non-possession of territory, strong
internal divisions including a majority sector of Jewish society which was staunchly
opposed to statehood, and the rapid evaporation of hegemonic (British) support between
the years 1936 and 1948. Similarly, it was suggested that the Palestinian movement for
national liberation is representative of a crucial case being that the movement has thus far
been unable to attain statehood despite enjoying strong and widespread external support,
being wholly united internally in the cause of statehood, and being in possession of a
national territory—albeit severely restricted by Israel’s occupation policies.
The task was thus to discover through inductive investigation potential
explanations for these divergent and seemingly counterintuitive outcomes. By situating
the historiography of each movement within the context of the hegemonic order in which
it was embedded it was possible to ask of each case what was the impact of externally
imposed structures. For example, how were institutionally defined pathways to statehood
determinative of movement activities? What role did outside elite strategies play in
formulating systemic political cleavages and how did these cleavages influence alliance
structures and the capacity to rally outside powers to one’s cause? Alternatively, situating
a movement’s progress within the opportunity structure that defines its path to statehood
allowed us to inquire whether or not narratives of nationalism and conditions of tragedy
significantly contributed to the positive reception of each movement’s claims to selfdetermination. It furthermore allowed us to assess the value of both violent and non174

violent strategies as well as a leadership’s capacity to effectively deploy each of these
instruments in a manner that holistically advances the movement’s immediate and longterm objectives.

Findings
As illustrated in both case studies, the most influential factor guiding these
struggles for national liberation are those forces which emanate from the prevailing
structure of the international system. Not only was it demonstrated that the established
material and ideational preferences of existing states have strong bearing on a
movement’s ideological orientation and by consequence its chosen course of struggle, but
hegemonic order configurations also define political cleavages and in so doing present
movement leaders with both tactical and strategic opportunities by harnessing or
exploiting those cleavages. In a similar fashion it was shown that elite strategies can
serve as both a source of opportunity or conflict. In this sense they are the battlefields
upon which struggles for national liberation take place. Accordingly, elite strategies are
telling of one’s tactical approach in that they are the hurdle to be overcome, or in the case
of alliance structures, the resource to be mobilized. With regard to the latter, the case
studies reveal alliances to be somewhat helpful but always outside movement leaders’
sphere of control. Not only will allies be inclined to prioritize their own interests over that
of the movement’s, but their assistance may also suppress the development of indigenous
capabilities and a movement’s freedom of action.
From the agency perspective, the cases showed that the leadership of each
movement was highly influential in the determination of a movement’s success or failure.
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Narratives of nationalism were deemed relatively unproblematic, and beyond group
emergence, insignificant. Similarly, conditions of tragedy were shown to be effective at
rallying external support but in the end could not override the prevailing hegemonic will.
In sharp contrast, it is leadership that strongly influences the course of struggle and its
eventual outcome. In this regard, planning and long-term vision were essential in that
they informed and guided each movements’ activities. Accordingly, in both cases it was
found that the choice to deploy violence or more benign measures to advance the cause of
statehood was the product of international temperament and the immediate challenge
faced. It is thus leadership decisionmaking, not the instrument itself, that matters most.
Facilitating the decisionmaking process is the movement’s organizational
structure. There is good evidence to show that hierarchal organizational structures make
good use of all available resources while charismatic leadership is essential to mobilizing
both internal and external supporters. Finally, together the case studies demonstrate that
while fractionalization can enhance a movement’s efforts, when based upon political oneupmenship it can also be a highly destructive force hindering the achievement of
statehood in that great powers are averse to recognizing new states where internal strife
persists and may in fact worsen.
Overall the case studies revealed that it is the hegemonic order in which each
national liberation movement was embedded that had the greatest impact on its advance
towards statehood and its present status. As defined in the theoretical framework that
informs this study, it is the hegemonic order; comprised of both material interests and the
ideational preferences of existing states; that defines the institutional structure of the
international system, informs the temperament of that system, and in doing so, drives the
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course of struggle. This was reasoned upon two insights as confirmed within each of the
cases studies. First, by establishing the rules that guide system behavior and forging
parallel institutions to enforce and support those rules, it is hegemonic order that
determines the pathways to statehood available to movement leaders. Second, although
hegemonic powers have the greatest influence on the composition of that order, the
international system is far from unified and thus affords the leaders of national liberation
movements the ability to exploit or otherwise capitalize upon political cleavages and/or
divergent elite strategies.
This latter insight highlights the strong influence leadership has on the course and
outcome of both nationalist struggles. Forming the rational core of the liberation
movement it is leadership which unifies group members, fans the flames of discontent,
and creates within the minds of its followers the image of an independent state wherein
group interests will be safeguarded. More directly, it is movement leadership that
interprets and responds to the international temperament to devise strategic and tactical
plans, erect appropriate organizational structures, and in the end, drives the movement
along its course to statehood by appealing to the various material and ideational interests
of existing states. With these observations in mind, Table 7.1 on the following page rates
the causal force of each of the independent variables examined in this study.
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Table 6.1 – Summary of Variable Impact
Indicator

Origin

Effect
Determinate of movement progression,
Institutional System External
ideology and strategy.
The rational core whose planning, vision, and
Movement
Internal decisions drive a movement’s advance and its
Leadership
chances for success.
Played a strong role in advancing both causes.
For Zionist, bombing of King David Hotel
Violence
Internal contributed to British withdraw. Palestinian
skyjackings attracted attention to the
movement.
Key instrument for advancing cause. Either
by making oneself useful to material interests
Political Cleavages
External
of others or by exploiting ideational
cleavages.
Telling of tactical approach. The arena
Elite Strategies
External defining the hurdles (elites) to be overcome or
the resources (elites) to be mobilize.
Significant for advancing cause at each stage,
Diplomacy
Internal but influenced by the prevailing, hegemonic
order.
May contribute to movement
advance/success, but only when in the interest
Alliance Structure
External
of allies. Otherwise allies are prone to exert
strong constraining effects.
Useful for mobilizing solidarist support, but at
Conditions of
Internal their very best are incapable of advancing
Tragedy
movement beyond de facto recognition.
Has a confounding effect when based on
incompatible political or strategic objectives.
Fractionalization
Internal Can moderately facilitate movement
advancement by rallying added resources to
the cause.
Fundamental to in-group cohesion and
Nationalist
Internal external recognition, but beyond movement
Narratives
emergence they are mostly inconsequential.
Key: 1 = Very Strong, 2 = Strong, 3 = Moderate, 4 = Low
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Impact
1
2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

4

Assessment of Hypotheses
1) Movement emergence and mobilization is the product of repressive, confrontational,
and polarizing political structures with inadequate institutional apparatuses for
meeting the demands of a disenfranchised populace (Kriesi et al, 1995).

False: While these factors may inspire movement emergence, both movements had
extended experiences with confounding structures prior to movement
formation. Accordingly, this study found David Armitage’s (2007)
observation that movement emergence is the product of hegemonic decline to
be a far better indicator (see next).

2) International system openings brought about by shifts in the hegemonic order are the
only means though which movements can emerge and advance.

True: Both cases support the proposition that institutional openings must first take
place before a movement can advance. For Zionists it was the Napoleonic
Code, Great Britain’s rise to power as the region’s hegemon, WWII, and
Americas’ inheritance of Britain’s regional role. For the Palestinians it has
been British occupation, the rise of America as the regional hegemon, Egypt’s
defeat in 1967 and its turn to the West, and the egress of Russia’s influence
coupled with America’s alignment with Israel.
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3) Movement members are afforded greater policy options including the pursuit of
violent strategies when great powers adopt competitive postures. Likewise, their
actions are highly constrained when great power interests are in accord (Miller and
Kagan,1997).

True: US – UK divisions over Jewish immigration and partition afforded Zionists
leaders ample space to pursue both violent and illegal activities. Palestinian
leaders were able to engage in both guerilla warfare and terrorism throughout
much of the Cold War. In contrast their activities were strongly constrained
during the periods of both Great Britain and the United States unilateral
hegemonic rule (1914-1945 and the post-Cold era respectively).

4) A movement’s strategic and tactical approach is the product of hegemonic
preferences and cleavages in the international temperament—i.e. pluralist vs.
solidarist values (Jackson and Sorenson, 2013).

True: Initially, Zionists appealed to pluralist values to take advantage of hegemonic
material interest to launch and advance their movement and rallied solidarist
support when those material interests shifted and in the wake of WWII. Never
being presented with a genuine opportunity to serve hegemonic interests,
Palestinian leaders have instead appealed to solidarists for support as a means
to counter confrontational hegemons.
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5) A movement’s founding ideology is the product of prevailing international
temperament and that ideology in turn is determinate of its approach to statehood.

True: Both cases demonstrate evidence of this assertion. Zionists adopted a utopianMarxist ideology reflective of late eighteenth century idealism and
accordingly focused their attention on building a socialist utopia. The PLO of
1968 adopted a Marxist-revolutionary ideology reflective of mid-twentieth
century anti-imperialist sentiment and pursued their struggle through armed
conflict.

6) To obtain legal recognition as an equal (full statehood), the narratives movement
members project about the origin and nature of their being (their nationalist claim to
self-determination) must find resonance within the minds of the majority of existing
members of the international community (Coppieters and Sakwa, 2003; Philoptt,
1995).

True: The Zionist’s primordial narrative was well understood by European powers of
the eighteenth century and played a vital role in the granting of a charter to
establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. At the same time, Palestinian
nationalist identity and associated right to self-determination was incorporated
into legal instruments such as the San Remo Agreement, the Mandate for
Palestine and numerous United Nations resolutions.
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7) The formation of a workable strategic plan for attaining statehood and the capacity to
refrain from deviating from it is essential to the positive advancement and ultimate
success of the movement’s objectives (Wood, 1981).

True: The Zionist case demonstrated that planning can greatly facilitate a
movement’s advancement; particularly throughout its formative years.
Likewise the Palestinian case showed the right plan for the right time can be
highly effective. For instance, their Ten-Point Program, while not achieving
all of its objectives, did garner the movement widespred support. Moreover, in
the absence of the Fayyad Plan the movement’s de facto recognition would
likely have not been attained.

8) Allies are essential to a movement’s recognition, advancement and ultimate
attainment of statehood (Kriesi et al, 1995).

False: Although Zionists initially received both moral and material support from
Great Britain, during the formative years of struggle (1936 – 1949) they
received no outside support except for the availability of weapons via
Czechoslovakia. In contrast, Palestinian’s have received support from various
powerful allies throughout their struggle. In spite of this they have yet to attain
statehood. Moreover, the case study demonstrated that often the Palestinian’s
allies worked against their interests.
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9) Movement recognition and successful attainment of statehood can only be obtained
when that objective is in the interests of at least one great power (O’Leary and
Triman, 2007).

True: Especially with regard to the sort of universal de jure recognition national
liberation movements require since it is only the Security Council that can
grant membership and thus advance universal recognition of a state’s legal
legitimacy (UN XIV: Rule 136). Accordingly, if any one great power were to
use its veto to frustrate recognition (as the United States has threatened to do
with regards to Palestinian statehood in the absence of a negotiated
agreement) said status could not be attained.

10) In-group fractionalization is the greatest barrier to movement advancement and
success (Misra, 2001; Gates, 2002).

False: When based upon contradictory strategic visions such as those witnessed
between mainstream Zionism and the Irgun on the one hand, and the PLO and
Hamas on the other, fractionalization can have strong confounding effects.
Nevertheless, as the 1948 Ben-Gurion—Began standoff illustrates, these
barriers are not insurmountable so long as each party is able to envision the
higher objective (i.e. advancement of the movement’s primary goals).
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The Contribution
This study has set out to explore the nature and force of system-level constructs
on nationalist struggles. Acknowledging that the ultimate objective of any given national
liberation movement is the attainment of international legitimacy, it was reasoned that
beyond examining a movement’s interactions with its target state, focused attention must
also be given to ways in which existing states can both facilitate and frustrate a
movement’s efforts. While the literature on nationalist struggles provide rich context and
insight into the dynamics of target state/movement exchanges, too little attention has
been given to the role of international system/movement relations in bringing about the
success or failure of people’s quest for statehood. One contribution of this study is its
heuristic approach and consequent ability to discover interesting ways in which
movement activities and the international system interact and the resulting insights into
how struggles for national liberation are pursued within the any given hegemonic order.
Explicitly, it demonstrated that because divisions exists over the proper ordering
of international society and the values which should take precedence in the pursuit global
justice, national liberation movements are able to latch onto or otherwise exploit these
political cleavages in their efforts to overcome confrontational elite strategies. While it is
undoubtedly true that a movement’s day-to-day tactical and strategic activities are indeed
aimed at influencing a target state, viewed through this paradigm these activities are less
about directly changing the position of the target state itself than they are about
influencing the policy preferences of the international system in which both the
movement and target states find themselves. This observation provides both fertile
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ground for scholars and practitioners alike. For those who seek to further our
understanding of independence movements and the acquisition of statehood and those
who can draw upon these insights to resituate like conflicts and in doing so, seek out
innovative pathways to their resolution.

Limits to Research
This study of Palestinian and Jewish independence struggles was a comparative
exploration of two exceptional cases each amounting to a crucial case in that their course
of struggle and current status defy what one would reasonably expect to find. In the case
of Zionism this amounted to focused assessment of local determinates as well
internationally derived forces since it was the global hegemon itself which had the
strongest impact on the movement’s activities. Conversely, while shifting regional power
structures and the preferences of neighboring states were assessed in regard to the
Palestinian struggle, some may argue that too little attention was paid to role of Israeli
policy in constraining Palestinian efforts to advance their cause.
This omission was deemed justified on the basis of a) the study’s focus on
system-level interactions and b) that the constraining effects of Israeli policy and interests
can be taken as a given defining characteristic of a national liberation movement’s
challenge with respect to a target state. In retrospect, and as a wealth of studies
examining this specific topic demonstrate, such analysis could have provided better
context to Palestinian strategic and tactical pursuits. Nevertheless, it was determined that
inclusion of this dynamic would distract attention from this study’s focus and orientation
which prioritizes international structure over secondary-level accounts.
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Similarly, this same omission could be said to ignore Israel’s ‘special
relationship’ with the United States and the frustrating conditions this imposes on
Palestinian ambitions. The study acknowledged and explored the strong constraining
effects US preferences have had on the Palestinian’s bid for statehood and discussed at
length the means through which the Palestinian leadership has sought to overcome these
barriers. It does not, however, give sustained attention to arguments such as those
postulated by Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) which give significant explanatory power to
Israeli and diasporic Jewish meddling in US policy formation with regard to the final
status of Palestine.
While there is little doubt that Israeli officials, the American Israel Political
Affairs Committee, and Jewish-American voters are very active in promoting the
interests of Israel, to attribute US policy to Israeli interests is to ignore the well
established fact highlighted by realists that any nation will always act in its own best
interest. For hegemons, stability is first and foremost their greatest concern (Gilpin,
1988). Accordingly, while the granting of Palestinian statehood would bolster the
Westphalia system and thus offer one path to stability; in the most unstable region of the
world it should come as no surprising that the United States would enlist a proxy (Israel)
to enforce its will. Not only does this explain America’s tough stance vis-à-vis
Palestinian statehood (Bush, 2002), it also explains the Bush administration’s decision to
pursue a two-state solution in the wake of 9-11 in order to ease tensions and antiAmerican sentiment in the region by demonstrating progress on the Palestine front (Bush,
2008). While US and Israeli interests may enter into alignment, from a realist
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perspective—the perspective adopted throughout this study—one should not conflate
alignment with influence.
A more appropriate criticism of this study could be leveled at its methodological
approach and use of secondary resources. With regard to the latter, as is evident in each
of the case historiographies a concerted effort was made to rely on and prioritize the use
of primary resources. In this regard the study draws extensively on League of Nations
and Untied Nations documentation including rules of procedure, debate minutes, treaties,
and resolutions. Similarly, first hand accounts, memos and internal reports were pulled
from the national archives of relevant actors; most specifically those of Great Britain, the
United States, Israel, and where available, both the Palestinian Liberation Organization
and the Palestinian Authority. Adding context to these predominantly legal and political
instruments, the study draws on the essays, memoirs, and speeches of seminal political
leaders, as well as The Statesman Yearbook and other sources of complied demographic
data. Where said sources were unavailable, secondary resources bridge the missing
elements of the respective narratives to paint a full picture. This was especially the case
with regard to the Palestinian historiography wherein pre-1968 documentation was
particularly scarce as were English versions of the organization’s meeting minutes and
leadership’s strategic thinking.
With reference to the former criticism—that the methodological approach
employed herein fails to definitively establish causal relationships between structural
forces and movement activities and outcomes that can be generalized to the full body of
national liberation struggles—there is some necessary incompleteness in the study. This
is due partly to the exceptional character of the cases themselves. Unlike the far more
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common nationalist movements defined by a people attempting to succeed from an
established state, the two movement’s singular reliance on system-level forces to
formally establish them as states promised to offer a clear lens into the raw impacts of the
system effects on the processes and outcomes of these national liberation movement.
Moreover, and as a consequence of the difficulty in separating system level impacts, the
vast majority of studies on nationalist struggles focus on movement-target state
interactions and at best only tangentially address the facilitating factors and systemic
restraints that limit the attainment of statehood. As a result, being informed primarily by
that literature this study employed an inductive approach with the aim of theory
generation rather the theory confirmation. As Eckstein (1975) makes clear, this differs
considerably from disciplined-configurative studies which simply assume that general
laws already exist and are available for testing through deductive analysis.
In sum then, this work amounts to a heuristic case study. It has relied upon an
inductive methodology to deliberately stimulate the imagination in order to discern
important general problems and to generate possible theoretical solutions to those
problems (Eckstein: 104). In this respect, the central problem was defined as ‘finding out’
the frustrating and facilitating effects of system-level influences on struggles for national
liberation and the ways in which these same influences are determinate of a movement’s
activities. A secondary problem was to establish how a movement’s capabilities influence
its response to structurally imposed constraints or opportunities. Then, guided by the
indicators of social movement success at the national level of analysis, these same yet
slightly modified variables were drawn upon to generate theoretical explanations of their
observed effects as witnessed in each of the cases examined. It is hoped that the insights
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drawn herein will stimulate similar works examining the causal effects of system-level
influences on the course of other struggles for national liberation.
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